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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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3 NOVEMBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

REAGAN STANCE ON SDI SAID LOSING SIGHT OF REAL GOAL

Hong Kong SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST in English 24 Sep 86 p 24

[Editorial]

PRESIDENT Reagan's speech before the United Nations on Monday represented the latest gambit in his pre-summit manoeuvrings with the Soviet leader, Mr Gorbachev. These moves seem to be coming thick and fast and it is increasingly difficult to assess what they actually mean — if anything.

There are grounds for arguing that few of Mr Gorbachev or Mr Reagan's offers or counter-offers have any substance at all. The main point of contention between the two leaders is Mr Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, the technology for which is totally unproved. The most likely effect of the present jockeying for position is to make life increasingly difficult for the Russian and American arms control negotiators who are in Geneva trying to translate political hot air into concrete reality which would make the world a safer place.

While the two leaders are vying for headlines, the Geneva delegates are grappling with mankind's most vexing dilemma: the two most powerful nations the world has seen have weapons which, if unleashed, would destroy civilisation and most of the human race. Yet their enmity is so implacable that neither has the will to make any but the most trivial of concessions.

The internal forces which shape Mr Reagan's approach to disarmament have been well illustrated in recent weeks. The propaganda coups which Mr Gorbachev has scored — although his extension of Russia's unilateral nuclear testing moratorium is the only concrete step he has taken — have widened the distance between the disarmers and the anti-communist hardliners in the American Government.

On the one hand, the disarmers are delighted with Mr Gorbachev; they may not trust him but he could at least force Mr Reagan into a marginal retreat from the belligerent posture that it is his most consistent political position. On the other, the hardliners have persuaded Mr Reagan into saying he no longer feels bound to observe the weapons ceilings laid down in the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. They have also introduced the Anti-Ballistic Missiles treaty signed with the Soviet Union in 1972 into the bargaining process, a dangerous step which threatens what little progress has been made in arms control over the last 20 years.

These hardliners claim the Russians are not interested in arms control. If they are not, then the Reagan approach is playing into their hands. By dangling Star Wars

before them — at US\$32 billion the costliest red herring in history — and making it the focus of debate, the real goals of arms control are lost. What are those goals? Mr Reagan said on Monday that the real purpose of arms control was “not just to codify the levels of today’s arsenals, not just to channel their further expansion, but to reduce them in ways that will reduce the danger of war.” Star Wars, either as a bargaining chip or as a practical proposition, achieves none of these aims.

The negotiators who drew up the ABM treaty in the 1960s included in it a clause prohibiting the development and testing of space-based weapons systems. They realised that any attempt to do so would bring an immediate response from the other side, thus adding fresh momentum to the arms race. There is no reason to fault their reasoning. A corollary to Mr Reagan’s offer of a seven-year commitment to the ABM is that after that period the United States would be free to ignore it. He has thus offered to sweep aside one of the few enduring agreements the two superpowers have managed to achieve.

The secret to Mr Reagan’s negotiating stance was contained in the one theme that ran consistently through his UN speech. He returned repeatedly to the sophism that nations do not mistrust each

other because they are armed, but are armed because they mistrust each other. In doing so he implicitly linked arms control to conflicts in Afghanistan, southern Africa and South America and indeed to global terrorism. His comments may be interpreted as a further threat that unless progress is made in these conflicts, arms control is a lost cause but, of equal importance, his comments underscore the philosophy of confrontation. The abhorrence of the Russian system upon which his foreign policy is based blinds him to the superpowers’ mutual need for a workable arms control agreement.

Monday did, however, bring news of an accord in Stockholm which does offer some solace. Although the agreement signed there concerns only the conventional military threat to European security, it does enshrine — for the first time — the principal of “on-site verification.” By accepting Western observers during Warsaw Pact manoeuvres, the Soviet Union has set a precedent which may one day be extended into the mutual inspection of nuclear arms stores. It is a small step on the road to peace, but is of more practical use than anything Mr Reagan had to offer to the United Nations. The world still waits for action, not words.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: U.S. SCIENTISTS SPEAK ON DANGERS OF SDI

LD130855 Moscow TASS in English 0807 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] San Francisco October 13 TASS--TASS correspondent Yuriy Algunov reports:

The Strategic Defence Initiative of the U.S. Administration leads to the aggravation of the international situation and poses a grave threat to mankind. This conclusion was drawn by participants in a theoretical conference on SDI at the Berkeley campus of the University of California. During the three days of debates many well-known American scientists, politicians and public figures stressed that the task of averting the nuclear arms race in space had new acquired special importance. Most of the speeches at the conference were keyed by the idea that it was necessary to look for ways to accelerate progress on arms control. The more real and prompt way of doing away with the nuclear threat is not SDI, as the President tries to prove, but a total ban on nuclear testing which is being called for by the Soviet Union, Congressman George Brown said.

It is only the Soviet "star peace" programme and the joint exploration of space for civilian purposes that offers the sole sensible alternative to the nuclear space ventures planned by the White House, one of the organisers of the conference, physics Professor John Halloran of University of California, said. Growing rivalry in outer space, Professor Jerry Sanders added, is fraught with the depletion of the world's natural resources and the aggravation of global ecological problems. Some SDI proponents, among them employees of military laboratories and centres, also addressed the conference, convened by the Federation of American Scientists and the Physicians for Social Responsibility. Yet the forum clearly demonstrated that most American scientists have made their choice in favour of peace.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW RADIO: TREATY ON SPACE EXPLORATION, SDI

LD132259 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 13 Oct 86

[Text] In October, an important international treaty on space exploration came into effect in 1967. In "Vantage Point," Boris Belitskiy recalls how the treaty came into being and looks at its role today:

Almost at once after Sputnik ushered in the space age in October 1957, the Soviet Union began working in the United Nations for an international code of laws which would govern the activities of states in this new and challenging medium. But 17 years passed before these efforts produced the first such code, known as the space treaty. The treaty is to this day the cornerstone of international space law as this new area of international law has come to be called. At the insistence of the Soviet Union and over the objections of the United States, a provision was included in the treaty specifically binding the parties not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. This provision has to this day prevented an extension of the nuclear arms race to outer space.

Since the treaty came into effect in October 1967, the Soviet Union has continued its efforts to proceed further in the direction of banning any weaponry, not just nuclear, in space, and achieving the total demilitarization of space. The USSR was the initiator of such documents at the 1977 convention on preventing the use of space modification techniques for military or other aims hostile to nations. More recently, in 1981, the USSR submitted to the United Nations a draft treaty that would prohibit the deployment of any kind of weapons in space and quite recently it proposed a treaty to outlaw the use of force in or from outer space.

Unfortunately, work on these Soviet proposals never got off the ground because of opposition from the United States Administration, obsessed with its vision of star wars. These two opposite trends in the area of international space law, became particularly apparent at the meeting just held by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik. The Soviet leader came to the meeting with a whole package of major proposals whose adoption would have signified notable progress in all the main areas of nuclear disarmament such as the 50 percent reduction in strategic missiles and the total abolition of the Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. In other words, the USSR accepted the zero option which President Reagan himself had earlier proposed.

As Mikhail Gorbachev told a news conference in Reykjavik last night, agreements were on the point of being concluded, but then the American side balked at the Soviet

insistence that during the next 10 years which would see these reductions in nuclear potentials, neither side would do anything to strain the machinery serving to contain the arms race. Specifically, neither side would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, all its provisions would be strictly observed, and there would be no development or testing of space weapons other than on a laboratory scale. In other words, two approaches to the major issues of our times and specifically two attitudes to international space law flashed in Reykjavik.

While the Soviet Union wanted to see existing treaties, such as the ABM treaty, strengthened, the United States Administration wanted to reserve for itself the right to torpedo those treaties in a futile bid to achieve military supremacy through what it calls its Strategic Defense Initiative, with its militarization of space, including the use of nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers, which would be a specific violation, of the space treaty.

Although Britain's Conservative government often tends to side with the United States on arms control issues, several sober-minded Western strategic analysts have lately pointed out that the American star wars program in reality conflicts with Britain's genuine defense interests. This point is made for example in a recent study by three American arms control experts, John (Prediss), (Joe Wit), and Michael (Zedoric). The authors of this study, published in the SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN in August conclude, and I quote: "Clearly Britain would be better off if the status quo were preserved" and they explain that if the status quo were upset and anti-ballistic missile systems were deployed in violation of existing treaties, this would first of all render impotent what the authors call a deterrent effect of the British nuclear force. Under such circumstance, they conclude, it would be (?propitious) for Britain to take part in the arms control process.

Well, the Soviet Union has repeatedly made offers to Britain to begin direct bilateral talks on arms control. It is in the interests of all nations, and Britain particularly in the view of many experts, that international space law, born in October 1967, be built upon, not torpedoed.

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CSO: 5200/1030

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET GENERAL DESCRIBES ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE

LD160106 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As is well known, one of the main problems at the Reykjavik talks was the issue of the ABM Treaty. What does this treaty comprise and what is the essence of the problem? We have asked Major General Yuriy Ivanovich Lyubimov, a military expert, to answer this question.

[Begin Lyubimov recording] Hello, comrades. What does an antimissile defense system comprise? An ABM system includes antimissile missiles, radar stations, and control facilities to counter and strike at attacking ballistic missiles. During the seventies the Safeguard ABM system was created in the United States to defend the missile positions at the Grand Forks base. Similar work was being conducted in our country, too. By their nature, ABM systems destabilize the military balance, since each side, in striving for defense, builds up strategic offensive armaments. In 1972, after lengthy and complex negotiations with the U.S. Administration, two important agreements were achieved. A treaty on limiting ABM facilities was concluded, as was a provisional agreement on limiting strategic offensive armaments. In 1974, a supplementary protocol was signed on further limiting the deployment of ABM facilities.

A nuclear balance and the ABM accord are not to the liking of the new American Administration. In January 1984, the United States embarked on the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative program, which provides for work to create facilities and deploy a multilevel ABM system containing space-based elements. Space strike facilities are to strike at ground targets, missiles in the active phase of their flight, combat units in the intermediate phase, and satellites in space. Ground ABM facilities, which are in a final stage of construction in the United States, ensure the elimination of the combat units that have broken through. Even from this list of tasks it is evident that the aims of the SDI program go far beyond a defense against ballistic missiles -- that is, the ABM framework.

For this reason, we are opposed to work on the SDI program, to the multilevel ABM system, and to a fresh arms race. The SDI program conceals efforts by the United States' aggressive circles to obtain unilateral military advantages over us and to upset the strategic parity in nuclear and many types of conventional armaments. Observance of the treaty is an obstacle to implementation of the SDI program, and the United States, as the Reykjavik talks have shown, does not want to adhere to it. In this respect there is a striving to play down the importance of the treaty and an expression of deliberate surprise at our position on ABM defense. The treaty is being ironically referred to as some sort of holy writ.

To all intents and purposes, the United States is striving to reduce the ABM question to something that is immaterial in negotiations between the USSR and the United States. [end recording]

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG PAPER CALLS DOUBTS ABOUT SDI JUSTIFIED BY CONTRACT CAP

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 9 Aug 86 p 3

[Editorial by Hans-Herbert Gaebel: "Forbidden Doubts"]

[Text] The joy of reading must have declined considerably. At any rate, some politicians in Bonn responsible for our destiny in the field of foreign affairs do not even read the treaties they themselves have negotiated. Otherwise Economics Minister Bangemann, the West German signer of the Mutual Agreements on Basic Principles of Participation in Star Wars Research (SDI) between the FRG and the United States of March of this year, could not bemoan the "bad policy" of the American partners and the politically embarrassing situation into which America's ally--that is, the Bonn government--is falling. No one in Bonn should be surprised--should not even act surprised--because this skeleton agreement, viewed from a legal perspective, is cotton candy.

According to it, the U.S. government "is permitted" to conclude contracts directly with German enterprises, research establishments and other entities, and principal contractors "are permitted" to conclude subcontracts with German enterprises. This agreement "shall" facilitate the participation of German enterprises, research establishments and other entities, subject to the observance of American laws and other legal requirements of national policy and international obligations. The U.S. government will, "to the degree that it is deemed proper and necessary," assist German enterprises in fair competition with American firms.

And now the American Senate would allow foreign enterprises to participate in SDI research only in exceptional cases. The agreement obviously does not stand in the way of such a restriction. The American congressmen are only removing the pretty guise.

The SDI program is first and foremost a gold mine for American firms--private firms, be it noted--which are not interested in acting as benefactors of their European competition. In addition, there is Washington's Defense Department with its stringent security regulations. Thus, it was clear from the beginning that European and West German participation was to consist merely of pinch-hitting where "made in America" cannot be offered at all.

But what all have not coalition politicians conjured into this supposedly joint undertaking, the nation's know-it-all in Munich [Franz Josef Strauss] in the lead? It blazed forth like a new Star of Bethlehem, this Star Wars, which supposedly was to bestow equally upon us Star-Neanderthals enormous technical progress and even direct influence on the Western superpower's policy.

Whoever dared to doubt the beauty of vision had to submit to being reviled by its heralds as not only narrow-minded, but--by Franz Josef Strauss and his cohorts in the fore--as "anti-American" as well. That has long been the special weapon by means of which the conservative segment of the Bonn government--that is, the majority--has attempted to stifle all doubt and all criticism of the wisdom of Washington administrations. What the club-wielders did not take into consideration in the process, has not come to pass: namely this trick with "Anti-Americanism" can become a trap for themselves.

The United States is a democracy, and indeed a very lively and efficient one. The congressmen have their eyes and ears constantly directed towards the constituency at home whose interests they represent first and foremost. It may be the armaments industry--witness the contracts for SDI; but it may also be citizens whose doubts about the Strategic Defense Initiative are growing. That Congress is taking away from the President a thick bundle of dollars for SDI in the new budget proposal is undoubtedly connected with this disenchantment. The notion of the great shield over the United States (or over the Soviet Union) is, as is becoming more evident from day to day, only a science fiction film and thus too expensive for many U.S. citizens and politicians.

Now we really need not get excited, because we don't have to become more deeply involved in new armament experiments. But scepticism as to whether the learning ability of our politico-strategists in Bonn is great enough for them to be more careful next time, is appropriate; for if an uncritical acceptance, not of "America's" policy, but that of a certain administration elected for a limited period of time, is made the barometer of decent conviction and, what is more, of the only correct and feasible policy, then one is truly trapped.

It has become evident how correct it was to approach the SDI project with scepticism, says the deputy chairman of the CDU/DSU faction, Volker Ruehe. But who was sufficiently sceptical? No, scepticism was even officially undesirable. Just one example of how it went: When, at the end of last year Foreign Minister Genscher indeed quite bluntly--for this careful man--expressed his doubts, he received a rap on the knuckles by a spokesman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction--there were many good reasons for cooperation between German industry and America. Just the enormous sum of \$60 billion alone would provide the guarantee of crucial incentives in important areas of high technology. And then Genscher's remark: Since it could only be a question of minimal participation by German firms, it would be harmful to the Western Alliance and therefore also to German interests. A splendid example of those alleged constraints of circumstance to which healthy common sense can fall victim.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV 12 OCTOBER NEWS CONFERENCE ON SUMMIT OUTCOME

Television Version

LD122343 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1955 GMT 12 Oct 86

[News conference addressed by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 12 October -- live]

[Text] [Gorbachev] Good evening ladies, gentlemen, and comrades. I welcome all of those taking part in the news conference. I think that about an hour has gone by since our conference, our meeting with U.S. President Reagan ended. It lasted somewhat longer than we planned. Our business required that to be the case and in this connection I would like to apologize to you for not arriving in time for the news conference fixed for 1800.

You know that this meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union took place on the initiative of the leadership of the USSR, but naturally it could not have taken place without agreement to such a meeting on the part of Mr. Reagan. Therefore I would say that it was our joint decision to hold this meeting.

It has now ended. It is sometimes said that things cannot be seen when one gets too close. I have just come from the meeting which, especially in the last stage saw heated discussions and I am still under the influence of these discussions and of the impressions left by these discussions. Nonetheless I shall try at this first meeting of ours to sort out what happened and not just share my impressions.

And yet I think these will be first impressions, first appraisals, a first analysis. This whole meeting will still have to be appraised. A major meeting has taken place, and you will sense this when I tell you about the content of the problems which were the subject of a very broad, very intensive, very interested discussion.

The atmosphere at the meeting was friendly. We had an opportunity to set out our views on different problems freely and, I would say, without constraint and this made it possible for us to deepen our understanding of many major problems of world politics, of bilateral relations, and primarily on the burning problems which are at the center of attention of the whole of the world public -- questions of war and peace, of ending the nuclear arms race, the whole set of questions which are embraced by this subject.

Before I go over to a direct description of the meeting itself, the content of the discussions, the proposals of the sides and the results of this meeting, I want to say, to explain to you, since I have not yet had the opportunity, why we in fact came out with the initiative on holding this meeting.

I read the world press regularly, and I felt recently when the decision to hold the meeting was made, what a broad reaction this announcement provoked, the announcement of the meeting. Much has been said about both the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President. But haven't they been a bit hasty? Is it necessary? And who yielded to whom, and who outplayed whom? And so on.

You know, the grounds which served as the initial factor for our proposing to the U.S. President an urgent meeting and for the decision of the President, Mr. Reagan, to respond to this meeting positively, are very significant, very significant.

I want to return now to Geneva. When we met there it was major dialogue, a major meeting, and now, after more than a little time has passed, we evaluate it as such. Then, if you remember, we acknowledged the special responsibility of the USSR and the United States to preserve peace, and stated jointly that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there can be no winners in it. This is an acknowledgement of immense importance. We also stated that neither side would strive to achieve military superiority, and this is also a very important statement of mutual understanding of this problem.

Almost a year has passed since Geneva. We consider that the Soviet leadership has remained loyal to the pledges it made in Geneva. Having returned from Geneva, we extended our moratorium. It was valid until 1 January of this year. On 15 January we made a major statement substantiating the plan for the liquidation of nuclear arms by the end of this century. I would like to say, returning to the moratorium, that for 14 months our test grounds have been quiet; this is evidence of our adherence to the accords of Geneva and of our responsibility for the fate of the world, because all these are not easy decisions if one takes into consideration the fact that during this period blasts have been continuing in Nevada, and are taking place today as well.

Last June Warsaw Treaty states put forward a major comprehensive plan for a large-scale reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. This is also a major step, given the concern voiced both by the Europeans and the United States, who are their allies -- I mean the European states of the West, of Western Europe.

Having learned the lessons from the Chernobyl tragedy, we have put forward major proposals on the necessity of an extraordinary session of the IAEA in Vienna. It took place, and you know the results. They are very promising. We now have an international mechanism that makes it possible to resolve many questions in the important sphere of nuclear power safety.

In other words, we are now, as we understand it -- and I do not believe I am exaggerating in my assessment of our policies, for I am not speaking simply of intentions, but of facts -- we have been doing all we can to aid the formation of a new way of thinking in the nuclear age. I want to express our satisfaction that the shoots of this new way of thinking seem to be coming up in the European cornfield, too; this has been shown, in particular, in the success of Stockholm.

Perhaps I will end here the list of specific actions we have carried out, taking as our starting point the spirit and the letter of the accord with President Reagan in Geneva.

Since I am speaking of facts, I believe that the facts now permit us -- you and us -- to appraise them, and you will agree, of course, that this is evidence of a serious approach to the Geneva accords.

Nonetheless, I am now coming to the reason why we put forward the initiative for the meeting in Reykjavik. The hopes for major changes in the world atmosphere, which we all had after Geneva after our meeting with Mr Reagan -- I would put it this way in a more cautious manner, perhaps -- began to dissipate, and not without reason, I think. Above all, this is because of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva -- during which generally speaking, very much has been said, as I told the President yesterday -- 50 to 100 variants on a way to curb the arms race and start reducing nuclear weapons have been doing the rounds. This alone creates doubt that fruitful discussions are taking place there. I think that you and I are people who are, as they say, in the know. If there had been one, two, or even three variants, that would have been something. That would mean that the focus of the talks had been narrowed and the search would have been concentrated on some important areas that had been pinpointed. This search would have ended with some specific agreements and proposals to the governments.

Nothing of the sort is happening in Geneva, at the principal forum of world politics. Furthermore, I tell you bluntly, of late these talks have been marking time and have virtually entered an impasse. The arms race has not stopped. And, moreover, we see clearly that we are all approaching a new boundary, after which a new spiral in the arms race with unpredictable consequences, political and military, is unavoidable.

Our initiatives, of which I was speaking in particular at the start of my speech, have, in general met with a broad response among the world public. But they did not meet with due understanding of the U.S. Administration.

The situation has worsened. Once again alarm has started to grow in the world. Yet I think that I shall not, I do not exaggerate -- and you are the living witnesses, representing all continents of our earth -- that in general the world is seething. The world is seething and demanding of the leaders of all countries, and above all of the major powers, and in the first instance of the USSR and the United States, the demonstration of political will, resolve, in order to stop the trends which lead to danger, to unpredictable consequences. It is necessary to do something in order to break the chain of events, to erect a barrier.

We have reached the conclusion that a new impulse is necessary, a powerful impulse for new processes, new approaches, above all at the Geneva talks. In our view such impulses are only able to result at the level of a meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the United States. This is why, in answering the letter from President Reagan, his letter of 25 July, I decided to invite him to meet without delay. I said that the situation was such that it was necessary for us to postpone all engagements for a day or two and to meet, without delay and according [appears to change thought] and said that I awaited a speedy reply.

This letter was passed on by Comrade Shevardnadze to the President. And so the extraordinarily important meeting -- or however we would describe it -- was held. We assumed that much depended on this meeting, bearing in mind our estimation of it, that had prompted us to take this step. And of course when we came to the meeting it was not with empty hands.

So what did we bring to Reykjavik? We brought here a whole package of major proposals which, if adopted, could, indeed, in a short time, and regarding all aspects of the struggle for disarmament, for limiting nuclear weapons, really remove the threat of nuclear war and make it possible to start moving toward a nonnuclear world. I proposed to the President that right here in Reykjavik we should give binding instructions to our ministers or other appropriate departments to prepare three draft agreements that we could then sign subsequently, during my visit to the United States.

First: on strategic weapons. We submitted a proposal to make a reduction of 50 percent, no less -- incidentally on the assumption of totally eliminating this most lethal form of weapon by the end of the century.

We proceeded from the fact that the world is awaiting really major steps, deep reductions, and not any cosmetic steps, so to speak, only to assuage public opinion for a certain period. We have simply come to a time when bold, responsible actions, in the interests of the whole world, including the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, are needed. Of course the Soviet-U.S. delegation, the delegations which would have been set the task of preparing this document, were to achieve well- and honestly-balanced reductions in the structures of strategic armed forces that have come about historically. This concerns the very same triad which was recognized right back at the time of the drawing-up of and preparations for SALT II. There is already an agreed concept, an idea on this subject. When we began to discuss this question with the President, what came over in response were unfitting, far from appropriate proposals which the President and his entourage had brought with them. Here again everything that had figured at the Geneva talks was brought out: all the levels, sublevels, a lot of arithmetic, in order to confuse the essence of the question.

We listened to all of this, and then we put this clarification into our proposals: You and we both have what is recognized as a triad of strategic offensive weapons: land-based strategic missiles, strategic missiles on submarines, and strategic missiles -- rather strategic bombers, strategic aircraft with nuclear weapons. So today we have equal numbers of them in the Soviet Union and in America. Let us cut all of this by 50 percent: 50 percent of the land-based missiles, including heavy missiles, which the United States is so worried about; 50 percent of the strategic missiles on submarines; and 50 percent of the strategic aircraft.

The American delegation agreed to this. So we came to an agreement. And in making this proposal -- we are well informed people, I am just reminding you, so that you will have it fresh in your minds -- we have made serious concessions. You remember that when we put this proposal forward in Geneva we made it a question of a 50 percent cut in weapons that can reach each other's territory, and all of this was considered strategic. But now we removed the question of medium-range missiles, we removed the question of forward-based weapons -- that is, we embarked on an important concession on the most vital question.

That is the first point. The second point is that we proposed that an agreement on medium-range missiles be prepared. I proposed to the President renouncing all the options discussed hitherto -- interim, temporary, and so on -- and returning to the U.S. proposal to eliminate completely U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and Soviet missiles in Europe.

Trying to bring the U.S. side to see the need to adopt an agreement such as our proposal, we had already previously proposed in Geneva that we should leave aside, as it were, the existing balance, the strategic potential of France and Britain, and we asked only that it should not be further improved or increased. That did not suit the U.S. side. We decided today, at this meeting today, to cut out completely the issue of French and British missiles in general -- to put it aside. Let them remain as an independent force; let them increase and be further improved, although you understand this is a very major potential and will indeed be increased and is an organic part of NATO's nuclear potential. This potential is taken into consideration when all plans are being made for all operations. We know that for a fact. I think that 99 percent of all those present can also say that that is the case. But if 1 percent is not convinced of this today then it must urgently get rid of that shortcoming. We cut this issue out.

There was anxiety about Asia. Fine, then let us agree, let us get down to talking about Asia immediately. Let us explain our anxiety and find a solution.

Anxiety came out in connection with the fact that on the side of the Warsaw Pact organization there are missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers, which can fly less than 1,000 km. We proposed, recognizing this anxiety, too, that we freeze these missiles immediately and enter talks on their fate. That is how far we went. I do not think even the Americans themselves expected that of us. A discussion began.

But it turns out this is bad again; it does not suit the American side again; they have begun once again to invite us to agree to intermediate options, to keep the American missiles in Europe, and the Soviet one in Europe, or some part of them. There could be a compensatory amount of Asia. In general, much was said.

We said to the President of the United States: Mr. President, we cannot understand how you can renounce your brainchild, the zero option, which you yourself proposed and which we are putting forward now in order to meet you halfway, recognizing the concerns and taking these concerns into account in our proposals.

In the end the discussion lasted until today, a sharp [ostraya] discussion, and we took the final step. We stated that we were prepared for the following version: We shall eliminate American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. On Missiles with a range of under 1,000 km we shall freeze them and start talks. And in Asia we shall have 100 warheads of medium missiles and, correspondingly, the United States will have 100 warheads on its territory. We also reached agreement to sign such an agreement on this. This would suit everyone, I think -- the Soviet Union too, even though it is altogether again a major concession and is not so easy for us to accept. But we must start moving. I have mentioned this more than once: What is needed are bold, original decisions. If we take the advice of past experience all the time, experience that belongs to a completely different time, without taking into account where we are today and where we will be tomorrow and the possibility that tomorrow we may be completely unable to start a dialogue -- particularly a dialogue on these burning questions that worry the whole world -- then we just have to start somewhere.

We have started out on this, understanding that these were no easy decisions for us. It was -- we reached agreement on this question.

Regarding the fact that we are ready to make deep cuts in strategic offensive arms and to get rid of the nuclear potential of medium-range missiles, we put the issue like this: If we are entering a concrete stage, the actual elimination of nuclear weapons, then there must be at least complete clarity for both sides on two questions: first, monitoring. Now that we are embarking on this stage, we support triple monitoring, monitoring that can provide complete confidence on each side that nothing can happen that would let us down, so that it could turn out to be trapped, ensnared. We are for any form of monitoring and are ready to reach agreement on this. This question was removed from the table in view of this position of ours. And we shall indeed now strive for such monitoring, if we embark on this path.

And the second issue: If we are starting to undertake the practical liquidation of nuclear arms, strategic potential, and medium-range missiles, then an issue arises that each side must have a guarantee that in that period neither side must do anything to achieve a military advantage and obtain the right to dictate. I think this is a very just and logical formulation both from the political and military point of view. From the political viewpoint, if we begin to reduce armaments, then we must take care that all the obstacles that exist today and stand in the way of the creation of new types of weapons, have to be not only preserved but also strengthened. Is this a correct formulation? It is indeed both correct and logical. From the military viewpoint it is indeed necessary to ensure that it does not happen that both sides reduce their nuclear potential, but while the reduction is in progress one side secretly seizes the initiative and achieves military superiority. This is inadmissible. I say this with regard to the Soviet Union, but we also have the right to demand this from the American side.

In this connection we put the issue this way: In this situation when we come to the stage of a real, profound reduction and then in 10 years -- and this was how the whole situation appeared to us at the meeting today on the specific points -- we concluded that in 10 years we should be able to liquidate the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union and the United States of America; and during this period it is necessary not only to weaken the mechanisms, primarily those such as the ABM treaty, that hold the arms race back, but to strengthen these mechanisms. Our proposal boiled down to the following: that we strengthen the open-ended ABM treaty by having the sides make identical pledges that in the next 10 years they will not use their right to abandon this treaty. These are the very 10 years when the reduction of the nuclear potential will be taking place. Is this a correct, logical formulation? It's logical. Is it a serious formulation? It is. Does it match the interests of both sides? It does.

At the same time we stressed in our proposal that in this period of 10 years all the requirements of the ABM treaty should be strictly observed, that the development [razrabotka] and tests of space weapons should be banned, and that only laboratory research and tests are allowed. What did we mean by this.

We know the attachment of the U.S. Administration and President to SDI. The possibility of our consent to the continuation of and to the possibility of laboratory tests gives the President the opportunity to consummate research and elucidate what SDI is and what kind of an animal it is, although for many people, us included, it is already clear what it is.

And this is where, comrades, a real row started, concerning the two approaches of world politics, including on such questions as the stopping of the arms race and the banning of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. Administration, the President, insisted to the end that America should have the right to test, research and test, everything that relates to SDI not only in laboratories but also beyond, including in space. Well, who would agree to that? A madman!

But madmen are usually where they should be, for treatment. At any rate, I don't see them in leading positions, especially at the helm of states. And to think we were on the verge of taking major historic decisions, for hitherto it was only a question of limitation: We had taken the ABM, SALT I, SALT II, and so forth, decisions.

And the U.S. Administration, as we now realize, having come to believe in its technological advantage, is trying to cut its way through SDI, to military superiority; it has even gone so far as to bury the accords, when we had already agreed that all that remained was to sign them, that we only had to make, and give, instructions for the treaties to be drafted, practical instructions as to how they should be implemented, and everything could have been signed in Washington. It disrupted all that.

I told the President we were missing a historic opportunity. Never before have our positions been so close. The President, saying goodbye to me, said he was disappointed and that from the very beginning I came, had intended, no doubt, had come with an unwillingness to sign these treaties, to find agreement, accord. Why do you on account of one word display such hardness in your approach, so to speak, to anything to do with SDI and the problem of tests, with the understanding of these problems?

I don't think it's a matter of a word. Not a word, but substance. This is precisely the key to an understanding of what is in the mind of the U.S. Administration.

In my opinion, what it has in mind is -- as I can now see -- what the U.S. military-industrial complex has in mind; -- it is this that is in power, and the President is not free to take such a decision.

We took breaks; discussions were held; and, I see, the President did not receive support. And this is why our meeting was broken off. It failed when we were close to reaching historic results.

Such is the dramatic situation which came about at this meeting. [Here follows 1-minute break in signal from relay, during which Moscow television displays a Reykjavik city scene. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0600 GMT on 13 October carries a repeat of the statement portion of the Gorbachev news conference. Comparison with the Moscow television version reveals the two to be identical, with the indistinct passage rendered as follows: If you enumerate everything and make a simple list, you will see that we have gone for the most major and unprecedented concessions and compromises that we have ever made. But nonetheless were unable to reach agreement. When the President and I were exchanging opinions,...] ...and even though our dialogue was a difficult one, it nevertheless continued after Geneva, so I told him my point of view in regard to what ought to be the nature of our meeting in the United States during my visit. You are familiar with this point of view.

It is not a condition, but it is rather an understanding, I think, simply of our responsibility -- both mine and that of the President -- which dictates how the future meeting in Washington should be approached.

We need a successful meeting; it should really lead to perceptible results and fundamental changes, and steps, and especially in such a burning issue as nuclear arms control, the prevention of the arms race and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

I told him in letters, and said to him at our meeting: You and I, Mr President, must not allow our meeting in Washington to fail. This is why I advocated an urgent meeting between us -- we do indeed have something constructive to put forward in order to come to an agreement and go into the Washington meeting with serious proposals and serious solutions.

If we were to meet in Washington, I could not for a moment allow myself to let that meeting fail. If it did, what would people think, in general, in the USSR, in the United States and throughout the world? And what does this say about the politicians who head two such huge states, and who to a great extent determine the fate of the whole world? Here they are meeting, they write to each other, they are having their third meeting, and they cannot agree with each other about anything. That, I consider, would be a simply scandalous outcome, with unforeseeable consequences. We simply cannot allow it. This would arouse disappointment throughout the world, and not only in our countries.

So, in fact, it is the plan for having a meeting in Washington, the question of how we are to hold it, and with what results, that pushed us toward the initiative of holding a working meeting here in Iceland, in Reykjavik, in order to get things clear in a businesslike way, to listen to each other attentively, to try to find mutual points of contact, and in general to find common approaches which would be in the interests of our two countries, in the interests of our allies and the peoples of all countries.

All the same, the Americans have come to this meeting bare- and empty-handed, with a moth-balled collection, as they say, that the Geneva talks are already stifling. We, as you can see, in order to break through this situation, to open up the way, to take this process through to a new stage, and to really resolve the issues, have put forward these proposals.

So I have told you what happened.

What is to be done? The United States remains as a reality. The Soviet Union remains as a reality. Some hero of one of our Russian writers wanted to close America, but he couldn't manage it. We are free of this complex. America is a reality -- and what a reality! The Soviet Union, I consider, is also an impressive reality.

I think now that we and the Americans must think over, and world public opinion must think over the current situation in the world on the main issue which is a matter of concern to the peoples of all countries -- the question of war and peace, the question of the threat of nuclear war.

I think that I am not exaggerating when I say that everything that we proposed to the President meets the interests of both the U.S. people and the peoples of all countries. If it is not in someone's interest then we are entitled altogether today: Let them listen to what the U.S. people, the Soviet people, and peoples of all countries are demanding. I arrived for this meeting here and said that the time for action has come. It turned out that these words were prophetic; it really is a time for action, and none of us must waste time.

We shall act, we shall not deviate from our policy for peace, the struggle against the arms race, for the banning of nuclear weapons, for the scrapping of nuclear weapons, for averting the nuclear threat from the whole of our planet. And I think we shall not be alone in this fight.

Well, I have said to you everything that I can say to you right now, immediately after our meeting. Obviously I could say more, if I had the opportunity to think over more everything that has happened. But it seems to me that I have expressed myself completely lucidly and specifically on all matters. At the moment I am not talking about the fact that we touched upon many other matters.

We talked about humanitarian matters, and came onto specific problems here as well. There was an exchange of opinions. Two groups were set up, two working groups, which you probably knew about. The first one on military matters, let us say, was headed on our side by Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff. And on the U.S. side who headed the group? Nitze. Paul Nitze. They worked for 10 hours and 20 minutes, all night. A group on humanitarian issues was working, headed on our side by Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, and on the U.S. side, by Assistant Secretary of State Mrs Ridgway.

They also had an interesting exchange. And this -- certain accords which were achieved there -- could become an integral part of the final document. But since the main thing collapsed, the entire process has halted.

As you see, the meeting was, generally an interesting, important meeting, promising much. But for the time being it finished the way I have described. We will not despair. I think that this meeting has brought us to a very important stage, an important stage in understanding where we are. And it showed that accords are possible, possible. I am convinced of this.

Thank you for your attention.

After such a detailed speech, such an address, are there still going to be questions? There will be? Well, let's go, let's sit until dawn! Yes, please, you.

[Czechoslovak correspondent] Czechoslovak television, Peter Kucera. Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich, I have the following question: You have said that a great chance was missed here in Reykjavik. When, in your opinion, can a new chance arise?

[Gorbachev] You know that I would give an optimistic answer to that because much has already been done, both on the eve of the meeting and at the meeting itself. If we, from realistic positions both in the United States, in the White House, and in our country, in the Soviet leadership, think through everything once again and show realism and responsibility, then the opportunity to resolve these issues is not yet lost. [Gorbachev turns to another correspondent] Japan, if I am not mistaken.

[Japanese television correspondent] Japanese television, NHK. Does this mean that the dialogue with the United States, with the Reagan administration, is still continuing, or do you think that very little opportunity remains for a good dialogue with Reagan?

[Gorbachev] I think that at the moment the need for dialogue has grown even more, no matter how difficult it may be. [Gorbachev turns to another correspondent] Yes, please. Well, I do not know you. What is your surname? Ah, Kolesnichenko! I've read you a great deal, but you have lived mainly in America, so that is why I do not know you!

[Kolesnichenko] Mikhail Sergeyevich, what do you think: Why has the U.S. Administration decided to wreck the talks, making an irresponsible decision that ignores world public opinion?

[Gorbachev] I think America has yet to make itself clear. I think it has not yet made itself clear, and we felt this was seen in the President's position. [Gorbachev turns to another correspondent] Yes, please.

[Australian radio correspondent -- in English followed by Russian translation] General Secretary, (Mark Coleman) from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. You described Mr Reagan as being in the grip of the military-industrial complex. Does this mean that this is (?the cause) of what happened today, and that in the future the United States will still not be able to achieve great successes in his field?

[Gorbachev] For all that the military industrial complex represents today, and for all the weight that it has in America as it is today, we shall not overestimate its capabilities. I have always been a supporter of the approach and evaluation that says that the people have the decisive word in any country, and this includes the American people. [Gorbachev turns to another correspondent] Yes, I promised you.

[Unidentified correspondent, first words not picked up by microphone; question in English; with Russian translation following] As far as the negative result of the meeting is concerned, does this mean that the Soviet Union will go on fighting the development of fresh space programs?

[Gorbachev] I think you have understood the meaning of the Soviet position, that if we have now reached a stage of beginning a deep cut in nuclear arms, of both strategic and medium-range missiles, and we and the Americans were already coming to an agreement that we would do this over a period of 10 years, then we had the right to demand that we should be guaranteed during this period that nothing unexpected and unforeseen should happen. This includes the sphere of space, too, and the deployment in space of a space ABM system. But -- and perhaps I shall open the curtain a little over our exchange of opinions -- I told the President that the SDI does not worry us from a military point of view. I believe that no one in America believes such a system can be built [sozdat]. Furthermore, we shall have our asymmetric answer if, in the final resort, America decides to go ahead with it. Though I did say to him: Mr President, you know, they've made me your comrade-in-arms over the SDI. He was surprised at this, and I said: It seems that because I criticize the SDI so sharply, this gives you the most convincing argument that the SDI is necessary. You simply say: If Gorbachev is against it, that means it is a good thing, and you get the applause and the financing. But indeed, there are cynics and skeptics who say: Isn't that a cunning ploy by Gorbachev, not to get himself drawn into the SDI, but to reduce America to poverty by it?

Well, you can work it out for yourself. In any case, the SDI does not frighten us. I can tell you this with certainty, because to bluff over such questions is irresponsible. There will be a response. It will not be a symmetrical one. We will not have to sacrifice a lot. But where does its danger lie?

First, a political danger. A situation immediately arises that introduces uncertainty and arouses mistrust of one another and suspicions, and then, you know, there can be no talk of cutting nuclear arms. In brief, we need a completely different situation to be able to engage thoroughly in cutting nuclear arms. That is the first thing.

Second, there is after all a military side. Through the SDI it is possible to arrive at new types of weapons. This, too, we are competent to speak about.

It is possible to come out onto a completely new stage; an arms race which is unpredictable, with serious consequences. So the question is asked: On the one hand we have been negotiating to start reducing nuclear weapons which are the most dangerous and terrible thing today and, on the other hand we are supposed to bless the research, and carry it out in space, on location, in order to discover even more modern weapons. All this surely does not tie up, in terms of normal logic.

We have looked into SDI. Let's give, you, yes, no, yes, yes, please go ahead. One moment please, the next one, after you, the next one, you next, you next.

[WASHINGTON POST correspondent] Mr. General Secretary, I represent WASHINGTON POST in Moscow, I will pose a question in English. [Continues in English followed by translator in Russian] You have just had your second meeting with President Reagan. After days of meetings, what kind of impression have you formed of the President as a political figure? Do you feel that he shares your sense of responsibility for the fate of the world?

[Gorbachev] I have the impression that Mr Reagan and I can continue both the dialogue and engage in a search, after all, for solutions to major, urgent problems, including those of which I have spoken.

Please go ahead.

[Rasmussen, in English followed by translator in Russian] Steve Rasmussen, LAND OG FOLK, Copenhagen. Do the unsatisfactory results of your meeting today mean that progress will not be achieved on the issue of prohibiting nuclear tests and on other issues which were discussed yesterday and today? Is this issue of prohibiting nuclear tests tied up with the other issues which have been considered at these sessions?

[Gorbachev] I think that I have actually already replied to this question. We consider that at this stage, our contacts with the Americans and the President, and especially international relations are not broken off. The search continues and will continue. And I think that what has taken place here in Iceland, in Reykjavik, should all the more become a powerful impulse for us all to sense now that it is necessary to join the common struggle for a normalization of the international situation, for a search for ways to get out of situations of impasse, including those such as have been discussed here in Reykjavik; and, in fact, one such impasse did arise here. I am an optimist. Please go ahead.

[Unidentified speaker] I shall speak louder, without a microphone. [passage indistinct]

[Gorbachev] I think that you have carefully thought out your question, and this is to your credit.

What I always like about our German friends is their accuracy in expression, and of thought. I think that what has taken place in Reykjavik, despite the fact that we have ended our meeting without having reached agreement on the issues toward which, it seems to me, we had found ways of approaching, is sad. It is disappointing.

But I would say that I would not call this meeting unsuccessful. On the contrary it was still a step in the complex and difficult dialogue and in the quest for solutions. To be sure, in general, the solutions that we are seeking are not easy ones. They are the solutions to difficult matters and so let us not sow panic around the world. But at the same time it must be said that the world must know everything that happens so that it does not feel that it is a detached observer. The time has now come for action by all forces.

[ABC correspondent in English followed by Russian translation] ABC correspondent in Moscow, (Rogers). Mr General Secretary, I do not understand why, when you and President Reagan had the opportunity to reach an agreement on reducing nuclear weapons, the Soviet side did not agree to research on SDI and surely you said all the time in Geneva that you are ready to pay a high price for reductions in these weapons. And now when such opportunities were achieved you missed them.

[Gorbachev] Your question contains an element of criticism and so I shall answer it in greater detail. First, the President came empty-handed and with empty pockets. And I would say that the U.S. delegation brought us the trash from the Geneva talks. And it is only thanks to the far-reaching proposals of the Soviet side that we were able to reach very major accords -- they have not been officially drawn up, I should stipulate -- on reducing strategic offensive weapons and on medium-range missiles and, naturally, we hoped that in these conditions -- and I think that this is perfectly understandable to a politician, to a military man and simply to an ordinary person -- that if we sign these two accords on major reductions in nuclear weapons then care should be taken that nothing should happen that might wreck this difficult process which we have been following for decades. And then we posed the question of the fact that we are in favor of consolidating the ABM Treaty all the time. It has already placed SALT II in doubt and now in Reykjavik would like to see the ABM Treaty dead and buried -- and with the participation of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, furthermore. And that will not happen.

The whole world would not understand us. And I am convinced of this, convinced, and everyone who is seated here, everyone is convinced of this, that if we should go on to start attacking the ABM treaty, the last mechanism that has done so much, after all, to restrain the process of the arms race, then we are not worth anything as politicians. But it is not enough to preserve this. In conditions when deep reductions in nuclear weapons are beginning, we think that this treaty should be strengthened. And we proposed a mechanism for consolidating it, by refraining -- for 10 years, over which we would reduce totally these nuclear, rather eliminate the nuclear potential of our countries -- by refraining from exercising the right to abandon the ABM Treaty. But during that time, too, no one should be tempted, neither the Soviet Union, to overtake America in space research, and, so to speak, break out, gain military superiority, nor should America do likewise with regard to the Soviet Union. We said we favor laboratory research and testing, but oppose taking these researches and testing of ABM system parts -- space ABM systems -- into space. This is our demand. And so our demand in this case was also constructive, mindful of the position of America.

It would receive, so to speak, if it agreed, the possibility, as part of continuing laboratory research, of addressing its questions concerning the implementation of the SDI program; but without going outside that framework and without any attempt to create a space ABM defense. I think that the logic here, as children say, is iron. Sometimes it is necessary to learn from children, too. Let's go over to the women.

[Unidentified journalist in English with simultaneous Russian translation] In light of what has happened here in the field of human rights, do you intend to share your thoughts at this conference, and maybe tell us some of your thoughts in this field?

[Gorbachev] I think that this humanitarian problem [interrupted by indistinct voice] -- what?

[Unidentified speaker] What initiatives will there be as far as Western Europe is concerned?

[Gorbachev] I didn't understand the translation then. No. Just a minute. What?

[Unidentified correspondent] With regard to Western Europe, does the Soviet Union plan any initiatives, after what has happened in Reykjavik?

[Gorbachev] In the first place, I think that Western Europe hears what I am saying. And if it would think, carefully study what proposals we have submitted, then it would see that these are all the same proposals that are in the interests of Western Europe. We understand that we could take an indifferent attitude to the interests of Western Europe, in which the shoots of a new way of thinking are putting down roots and in which responsibility is growing for the preservation of our European home, for the consolidation of our European home. Now you, please, no, let's hand over to the women again. How difficult it is to get through to a woman!

[NEWSWEEK Moscow correspondent speaking in English, fading into Russian translation] NEWSWEEK Moscow correspondent. I would like to know of the intentions of and possibilities for your coming to Washington. You spoke about the necessity of reaching a number of agreements, especially on issues relating to medium-range missiles. I would like to know whether reaching such an agreement is possible before you visit Washington?

[Gorbachev] I think that in spite of all of today's dramatic tension we have not moved further away from Washington, but rather closer. If the President and the U.S. Administration follow up my invitation to continue studying everything discussed here in Reykjavik, and if the administration consults those circles it considers necessary to consult in America, then I think that all is not yet lost. Building on what we had here in Reykjavik, possibilities exist for reaching agreements that would make a meeting in Washington realistic and necessary and possible, and it could be a successful one. We have no (?doubts) on that score.

[CNN correspondent speaking in English with superimposed Russian translation] Peter Ryan, Cable News Network. Mr Gorbachev, you said in your speech that President Reagan should think about the situation and consult with Congress and the American people. Do you think that American public opinion will back up the Soviet approach in this regard?

[Gorbachev] Let's wait and see.

[RUDE PRAVO correspondent] [Words indistinct]

[Gorbachev] Welcome to you! We recently had a good meeting.

[RUDE PRAVO] [words indistinct] I have a question for you as a politician and lawyer. What, in your opinion, are the priorities in human rights issues in the nuclear age; and what role can the human factor play in resolving issues of war and peace?

[Gorbachev] You know, you're a real philosopher! [laughter] I can only say that I once studied philosophy, too, and have started to study a bit again now. I think, when we talk about human rights, what we discussed today, first and foremost, was the question of preserving peace and deflecting the nuclear threat from man; that is the supreme priority. There will be peace, there will be life -- we will work it out somehow, because we are sitting here, from all over the world, discussing the most urgent issues. We are people after all. There are more and more educated people in our world, educated peoples. And that is why I think that the peoples will work it all out.

And this is why I say that -- if I understood you correctly -- when we speak of human rights, I should put the individual's right to life first. That is the first thing, and the second -- you mentioned some reverse connection. Can someone remind me? [muttering] Ah -- the human factor, what about it? I think that in a nuclear age -- and it is precisely here that I see a manifestation of the new thinking -- wars, nuclear war and the threat of nuclear war pose the question of the role of the human factor in a new manner in the struggle for peace and preventing war, for today this war will affect everyone, irrespective of where it starts. For this reason it seems to me justified and natural.

Only ill-wishers consider that all antiwar movements, everyone who comes out in defense of peace, are the product of Moscow's intrigues, hirelings or people suborned by socialism and so forth -- this is not serious, and the people are now working things out. If women, children, and men of all ages are rising today and joining hands and demanding an end to this dangerous tendency, when the world is moving toward the threat of nuclear war, I think that movement will grow, and that the role of the human factor is increasing considerably, is growing.

[IZVESTIYA correspondent] IZVESTIYA, Moscow. There has been much and frequent talk in the White House that the main danger for the United States is the Soviet intercontinental missiles. We proposed in Reykjavik to eliminate this main danger to the United States within 10 years. What is your impression? Why was the other side not ready to remove this main threat from its country?

[Gorbachev] You have very rightly asked this question. It has been used for many years by the U.S. side to show that the Soviet Union is not in a mood to work seriously for disarmament, for the halting of the arms race, that it does not take into account America's concerns, and so on. As you see, we have come down to the matter, and indeed we put the question very sharply. There exists the triad, already recognized, generally recognized by us and by the Americans -- so the whole triad of strategic armed forces should be reduced by 50 percent in the first 5 years. This is a large step. But we at the same time showed and told the Americans that we, too, have our concerns, and particularly on the following score: The fact is that 70 -- or maybe? -- Is that right?

[Unidentified voice] Yes, yes.

[Gorbachev] Tell me, Akhromeyev, 70 percent of strategic forces are stationed on submarines in America, 850 multiple warheads or more?

[Unidentified voice] Six hundred fifty-six.

[Gorbachev] Six hundred fifty-six multiple independently targeted warheads. And after all, submarines sail around the Soviet Union, in all seas and oceans. So from where will it strike? This is even worse than a land-based heavy missile. So, you see, in general this is all talk. When they do not want to resolve questions, they look for problems, obstacles. But these obstacles have been removed, and this is the important thing. And indeed an interesting question is the fact that we have embarked on such a large step, having in addition removed all the problems concerning medium-range missiles which have strategic significance for the United States -- the present Pershings and forward-based weapons. We have taken these out of the equation, so to speak, when it came to resolving the question of strategic missiles. This indicates our good will. But the Americans nevertheless failed to match us. I think -- I'm coming back to this yet again -- that the Americans think they will break out into space and achieve military superiority and will implement the idea of one president who said that he who rules space would rule the earth. We continue to be dealing with imperial ambitions. But the world is not like that. The world does not want to be a fiefdom of the United States. It will not be a fiefdom of the Soviet Union. Each country has the right to make its own choice, for its ideology, for its values. If we do not recognize this then there are no international relations, then there is chaos and law by the fist, you understand. We will never agree to this.

America is probably very nostalgic about the old days when it was mighty while we all emerged from the war weakened. It had both economic and military superiority. There is evidently some nostalgia, but nevertheless, we wish our American partners would accept the realities. This is what they should do, otherwise we will make no progress in the search for correct solutions, if the Americans do not start thinking in today's terms and proceed from present-day realities. [turns to another correspondent]

[Bulgarian television correspondent] Bulgarian television, Comrade Gorbachev. [5-second break in transmission] ... understood you, these talks are not being stopped, and I also understand that the instructions of the Soviet leadership, of the Soviet delegation, will be to find resolutions for the issues that have not yet been resolved.

[Gorbachev] You are right.

[Correspondent] Do you think that the U.S. delegation will be given the same kind of instruction by the U.S. leadership after Reykjavik?

[Gorbachev] I hope so. I hope that this will be so.

[Unidentified correspondent] One would like to draw attention to the European Continent. In what way, in your opinion, will the outcome of the meeting in Reykjavik affect the pan-European process? What will be its fate now?

[Gorbachev] I believe that both politicians and the people of Europe at this very crucial time will be up to the mark. The time calls for action, and not just magniloquent statements not followed by anything concrete. The world is sick and tired of idle talk. The world needs a real process of disarmament, of elimination of nuclear weapons. I think that this tendency will be growing. I am especially hoping for wisdom and a sense of responsibility on the part of politicians and peoples of Europe. [turns to next correspondent] Go ahead please -- I mean you over there!

[NBC correspondent speaking in English fading into Russian translation] [Name indistinct] NBC news. Am I correct in understanding that you are directly appealing to other members of the international community to act as a lobby in order to force the United States to change its opinion?

[Gorbachev] You know, lobbying is well-developed in your country. We know the way the U.S. political process works. Perhaps that is why the President found it hard to make a decision at this meeting. But when it is a question of strengthening peace, and not simply strengthening it, but of doing something, taking real steps to strengthen it -- when joint efforts are required -- and this concerns everybody, not only the United States and the Soviet Union, I do not think of the lobby system; I think of the sense of responsibility and common sense of the peoples, of an understanding of the asset which is today's peace, and of the need to preserve that peace.

For this reason, when in this case we start calling peoples, movements, or politicians who call for peace -- and this coincides with what we proclaim -- when we start calling them lobbyists for the Soviet Union, I think that is insulting. People will implement their political and civic position and I think that will be a correct assessment.

[Unidentified correspondent speaking in English with superimposed Russian translation] I work in Iceland as a newspaper publisher. Did you have any difficulties in coming to the decision to come to Reykjavik? This is a NATO country, and as you know, the government is in favor of having a nuclear-free zone proclaimed in the north of the country. I would like to know your attitude to these facts. Thank you.

[Gorbachev] I wanted to end this, but will avail myself of the fact that a representative of the Icelandic press is posing the question. I would like to say in reply to your question that we were the ones who proposed Iceland, and therefore we had no difficulty. I also want to thank the government and the people of Iceland for applying all their human, organizational, and material potential to doing their utmost to resolve the questions that needed to be resolved to hold this major meeting. We are grateful. We have felt comfortable here. We have had broad contacts. I have learned a particularly great deal of interesting information from Raisa Maksimovna, who had many interesting meetings in Iceland. The atmosphere was very friendly. There is very great interest in our country. We are very grateful to Iceland and the Icelandic Government for all they have done. We wish Iceland prosperity.

As for the latter part of your question, concerning the fact that the government of your country wishes to declare to be a nuclear-free zone, we welcome this. We welcome this, and regard this as a contribution.

Dear friends, thank you for your attention. I think we have spent the time usefully. I wish you all the best. Thank you. Goodbye. [applause]

None of you asked: General secretary, what is the role of the press at this important historic moment? Think about that! I'm asking you the question. [laughter] Goodbye.

PRAVDA Version

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[Text] Reykjavik, October 13 TASS — Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, gave a press conference in Reykjavik on October 12 for the journalists who covered the Soviet-American meeting.

Addressing the media, Mikhail Gorbachev said:

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, comrades,

I welcome you all.

Our meeting with the U.S. President, Mr. Reagan, ended about an hour ago. It had lasted a little longer than we had planned. It was made necessary by business at hand. So I want to make my excuses to you for having failed to come for the press conference at the appointed time.

You already know that the meeting took place on the initiative of the Soviet leadership. But, naturally, there would have been no meeting if Mr. Reagan had not agreed to it. That is why, I would say, it was our joint decision to have that meeting.

Now it is over. It is sometimes said that face to face, you don't see the other's face. I've just emerged from the meeting which, especially in the closing stage, passed in pointed debates. I am still under the impression of those debates. Nevertheless, I will try now not only to share my impressions but also to sort out what took place. Yet it will be the first impressions, the early evaluations, the first analysis. The meeting as a whole is yet to be evaluated more substantially.

It was a major meeting and you yourselves will realize this when I recount its contents, the problems which were the subject of a very broad, very intensive and very interested discussion at it.

The atmosphere at the meeting was friendly. We had an opportunity to present our views freely and without restrictions. This enabled us to further our understanding on major problems of world politics, bilateral relations, primarily on those questions which are in the focus of world public attention, on problems of war and peace and ending the nuclear arms race, in short, on the entire complex of questions coming under that subject.

Before going over directly to the characterization of the meeting itself, the contents of the discussions, the proposals of the sides and its results, I want to explain to you why we came up with the initiative to hold the Reykjavik meeting. I am a regular reader of the world press and I saw in those days what a broad response the news of the meeting provoked.

A good deal was said in this context both about the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President. The question was asked if they had not made haste, if there was any need for such a meeting, who made concessions to whom, who outplayed whom, and so on, and so forth. But you know, the cause that was the starting point for our proposal to the U.S. President to have a meeting without delay and his decision positively to respond to our invitation were very important.

I would now like to recall Geneva, when we met for the first time. It was a major dialogue and now, after quite some time, we have not revised our evaluation of the Geneva meeting. At that time, if you remember, we noted the special responsibility of the USSR and the United States of America for safeguarding peace and said jointly that nuclear war should never be fought and that there could be no winners in it. That was a statement of immense importance. We also said that neither side would seek military superiority.

It also was a very important statement.

Almost a year has passed since Geneva. The Soviet leadership remained loyal to the commitments it assumed there. Having returned from Geneva, we extended our moratorium: We had had it in effect till January 1 this year. Our test sites have been quiet for 14 months now -- is this not evidence of our commitment to the Geneva accords and our responsibility for the destinies of peace? Those were not easy decisions since tests in Nevada continued at that time and are going on now. On January 15 we made a major statement, in which a program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century was formulated.

Last June the Warsaw Treaty countries put forward a major comprehensive program for large-scale reductions in the conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. It also was a major step in view of the concerns aired by the West Europeans and the United States.

Drawing the lesson of the Chernobyl tragedy, we put forward the initiative on an emergency IAEA session in Vienna. It did take place and you know about its results -- they are very promising. Now we have an international mechanism making it possible to resolve many important questions of the safety of nuclear power engineering.

In other words, in the period under review -- and I do not think I am exaggerating by thus evaluating our policy because what I talk about is facts, not merely intentions -- we have been doing everything possible to contribute to the emergence of a new thinking in the nuclear age. It gives us pleasure to note that the shoots of this new thinking are sprouting, on the European field too. One piece of evidence was the success of the Stockholm meeting.

At this point, I'll probably conclude the list of the concrete actions that we have undertaken, guided by the letter and spirit of the Geneva agreements with President Reagan. The facts themselves, I think, allow you to assess the seriousness of our attitude to the Geneva agreements.

Still, why the need for the Reykjavik meeting, what were the motives for our initiative?

As a matter of fact, the hopes for major changes in the world situation, which we all entertained, started to evaporate shortly after the Geneva meeting, and, in my opinion, not without grounds.

Much was said, perhaps, too much, during the Soviet-American talks, between 50 and 100 variants of proposals were put forward, as I told the president yesterday. This fact alone raises doubts as to the fruitfulness of the discussions under way there.

If there were one or two, even three variants, which would make it possible to narrow somehow the scope of discussions and concentrate the search on some major directions, it would be possible to expect that the search would bring about concrete agreements and proposals to the government...

But nothing of this kind is taking place in Geneva, although the discussion there is concerned with key issues of world politics. The negotiations have recently been running idle, so to say, and are practically at a standstill. The arms race has not been stopped, and it is becoming increasingly clear that developments are approaching a point at which a new spiral of the arms race becomes inevitable with unpredictable military and political consequences.

Our major initiatives, which I have already mentioned, have evoked a broad response from the world public, but they have not found due understanding on the part of the American Administration.

The situation has been worsening, anxiety around the world has started to grow again. I think it is no exaggeration -- you yourselves are witnesses to that -- that the world is in turmoil.

The world is in turmoil, and it demands that the leaders of all countries, above all major powers, primarily the Soviet Union and the United States, display political will and determination capable of stopping the dangerous trends.

Thus, something has to be done to overcome such a course of developments. We reached the conclusion that a new impetus was necessary, a powerful impetus to turn the processes in the required direction.

Such impetuses could be made only by the leaders of the USSR and the U.S. That is why, in replying to President Reagan's July 25 letter, I decided to invite him to an immediate meeting. I wrote: the situation is such that we ought to put aside all affairs for a couple of days and hold the meeting without delay.

The letter was handed over to the President by Eduard Shevardnadze.

Now, this extremely important session has been completed. We believed that much would depend on its outcome. And, naturally, we came to the meeting not empty handed.

What have we brought to Reykjavik? We have brought a whole package of major proposals which, once accepted, could really bring about within a brief period a breakthrough, I would say, in all directions of the struggle for limiting nuclear weapons and really avert the threat of nuclear war, making it possible to start moving towards a nuclear-free world.

I suggested that the President and I give right here in Reykjavik binding instructions to our foreign ministers and other corresponding departments to draft three agreements that we could sign with the President later during my visit to the United States.

The first -- on strategic arms -- stipulated a fifty per cent reduction, and no less, with an eye to fully eliminating these deadliest of weapons already by the turn of the century.

We proceeded from the premise that the world is waiting for really major steps, deep reductions rather than some cosmetic steps -- merely to calm down public opinion for a certain period. Really bold, responsible actions are now required in the interests of the entire world, including the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Naturally, both the Soviet and the American delegations, which would have been instructed to draft the agreement on strategic arms, should have balanced the reduction of their historical structure in a positive and honest way.

The point at issue is the very triad that was recognized way back when drafting SALT II. But when we started discussing this issue with the President, there reemerged in response everything that figures at the Geneva talks -- all levels and sublevels, in brief, much arithmetic, and everything intended to confuse the essence of the matter.

When we put forward the following specification: to reduce by half each component of the strategic offensive armaments: land-based strategic missiles, submarine-launched strategic missiles and strategic bombers.

The American delegation agreed to that. Thus, we reached agreement on a very big issue.

I also draw your attention to the fact that we made serious concessions here.

You must remember, to, that when we made our proposal on 50 percent cuts in Geneva, we counted medium-range missiles as strategic weapons because our territory is within their reach. Now we have dropped that demand, along with the question of forward-based systems.

Agreement was thus reached in Reykjavik on cuts in strategic weapons thanks to these major concessions.

Our next proposal concerned medium-range missiles. We proposed that instructions be given to draw up an accord on weapons of that type too, with a view to giving up all the options which had been discussed up to that time, temporary or interim, and going back to the earlier American proposal on the total elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Moreover, unlike our Geneva proposals, we now left absolutely aside the nuclear potentials of France and Britain. Although, you understand, it was a very large concession on our part. Indeed, those two countries are allies of the USA, and they have large nuclear potentials, which continue to be built up and upgraded. And all their military activities are closely coordinated within NATO. We know this for certain. We nevertheless removed that obstacle to agreement.

There also was concern about Asia. We offered a compromise there as well: Let us sit down to negotiations immediately, clarify complaints and find a solution. We understood that the question of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km was bound to arise. So we made a proposal on that question: a freeze on those missiles and talks on what to do with them.

These are the major measures we want to be taken. I think that the Americans had not expected this from us but they entered discussion and stated frankly that they were not happy about removing their missiles from Europe. They began anew to invite us to their intermediate option. We, however, insisted on the total riddance of Europe of both Soviet and American medium-range missiles.

In the course of the discussion on that question, we drew the U.S. President's attention to the fact that he was to all appearances renouncing his brainchild, the "zero option," which he was insistently offering some time ago. We now took it up.

The discussion, and very pointed discussion, continued into today. And we decided to take another step to meet the other side: We stated that if the American and Soviet missiles in Europe are eliminated, we agree to have 100 warheads left on our medium-range missiles and the Americans as many on theirs in U.S. territory.

Eventaully we agreed to have an accord on that question too, although again, as a matter of fact, it was thanks to a major concession on our part.

But then advance has to be started in some way. I have pointed this out on more than one occasion. There is a need for bold, innovative solutions! If we always turn to the past for advice and use what belongs to very different times, without regard for where we are today and where we will be tomorrow, and that there may be no tomorrow at all if we act in this way, there will be no dialogue. There must be some way of making a start. So we made this compromise although, I repeat, it was not easy for us. In short, we also agreed at the meeting with the U.S. President on the abolition and reduction of medium-range missiles.

In view of our readiness to make deep cuts in nuclear weapons, we formulated a question as follows: As soon as we are entering the concrete phase of the elimination of nuclear weapons, there must be absolute clarity about verification. Verification must now become tougher. The Soviet Union stands for triple verification, which should guarantee absolute confidence for each side that it would not be led into a trap. We reaffirmed our readiness for any form of verification. That question was removed, too, because of this stand of ours.

One more problem in view of our setting about the practical abolition of nuclear weapons is such: Each side should have a guarantee that during that time the other side will not be seeking military superiority. I think that it is a perfectly fair and legitimate requirement both politically and militarily.

Politically, if we begin reductions, we should take care that all existing brakes on the development of new types of weapons be not only preserved, but also strengthened.

Militarily: Indeed, care should be taken to preclude the following situation: Both sides have reduced the nuclear potentials and while the reduction process is underway, one of the sides secretly contemplates and captures the initiative and attains military superiority.

This is inadmissible. I apply this to the Soviet Union. We have all rights to lay similar demands on the American side.

In this connection, we raised the question in the following way: When we embark on the stage of a real, deep reduction and, after ten years, of the elimination of the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union and the United States, it is necessary that this period should not see the shaking of the mechanisms restraining the arms race, above all such as the ABM treaty. These mechanisms should be consolidated.

Our proposal was reduced to the following: The sides consolidate the ABM treaty of unlimited duration by assuming equal pledges that they shall not use the right to break out of the treaty within the next ten years.

Is this proposition correct and logical? It is logical.

Is it serious? It is serious.

Does it meet the interests of both sides? It does meet the interests of both sides.

Simultaneously, we suggested that all ABM requirements be strictly observed within these ten years, that the development and testing of space weapons be banned and only research and testing in laboratories be allowed.

What did we mean by this?

We are aware of the commitment of the American Administration and the President to SDI. Apparently, our consent to its continuation and to laboratory tests offers the President an opportunity to go through with research and eventually to get clear what SDI is, and what it is about, although it is already clear to many people, ourselves included.

It was at that point that a true battle of two approaches to world politics, including such questions as the termination of the arms race and a ban on nuclear weapons, began.

The American Administration and the President insisted to the end that America should have the right to test and study everything involved in SDI not only in laboratories but elsewhere, including the outer space.

But who will agree to this? A madman? But madmen, as a rule, are kept where they should be, where they are given medical care. Anyway, I do not see any in posts of leadership, especially at the helm of states.

We were on the brink of taking major, historic decisions, because up to then the point had always been merely arms reductions. We took decisions on ABM, SALT-I, SALT-II, etc.

Since the U.S. Administration, as we understand now, is confident of U.S. technological superiority and is hoping to achieve through SDI military superiority, it has gone even so far as burying the accords already achieved. We suggested that instructions were given for drawing up treaties with a view to their practical fulfillment. They could be signed during a meeting in Washington. But the American side torpedoed all this.

I told the President that we were missing an historic chance. Our positions had never been so close.

Bidding me goodbye, the President said that he was disappointed and that I had from the outset come unwilling to look for agreements and accords. Why do you display such firmness on SDI and the problem of testing, all that range of problems, because of one word? But I think that the matter is not words but substance. Herein lies the key to the understanding of what the U.S. Administration has on its mind. I think that it has on its mind what, as I now see, is on the mind of the American military-industrial complex. The administration is captive to the complex and the President is not free to take such a decision. We made breaks and held debates and I see that the President was not given support. That was why our meeting failed when we already were close to producing historic results.

That was the sort of dramatic situation that arose at that meeting, when, in spite of very substantial concessions on our part, we failed to reach accord.

...Although our dialogue with the USA was difficult, it continued after Geneva and I put to the President my view of what our meeting during my visit to the United States should be like. It is known to you.

It is not a condition. I think, it is understanding of our responsibility, both my own and the President's. It prompts precisely this approach to a future meeting in Washington. We need a productive meeting. It should really lead to tangible results, cardinal changes and steps, especially in such urgent questions as nuclear arms control, prevention of the arms race and elimination of nuclear weapons.

I told him so in my letters and repeated it in person during our meeting: You, Mr President, and I must not permit our meeting in Washington to fail. That is why I called upon you to have a meeting without delay. We have constructive contributions to make so as to reach agreement and come to a Washington meeting with serious proposals and serious decisions.

I cannot presume even for one moment that we have a meeting in Washington and that that meeting fails. What then, generally speaking, should people think in the Soviet Union, in the USA and all over the world? What sort of politicians are at the helm of those enormous states? They meet each other, exchange letters, already had their third meeting but they cannot agree on anything. This, I think, would be a downright scandalous outcome with unpredictable consequences. We just cannot permit this to happen. This would cause disappointment all over the world, not only in our countries.

This is in fact an outline of a Washington meeting as regards the way we should hold it and the results we should achieve.

That was what prompted us to propose a working meeting here, in Reykjavik, so as to sort out everything in a businesslike manner, to listen to each other attentively and to try to find points of contact and common approaches that would meet the interests of our two countries, the interests of our allies and those of the peoples of all countries.

Regrettably, the Americans came to this meeting empty-handed, with a set of mothballed proposals which are already choking the Geneva talks. We, as you see, submitted our proposals to overturn this situation to clear the way, to go over to a new stage and actually resolve the outstanding questions.

Now I have told you what happened.

What is to be done?

The United States remains as a reality, and the Soviet Union remains as a reality. A character in a novel of one of our Russian writers was going to close America -- but could not do so. We do not have such a syndrome. America is a reality, quite a reality. The Soviet Union, I think, also is a substantial reality. But the world, too, is a reality, and today one cannot gain any authority or, what is more important, resolve outstanding problems if one does not reckon with the realities of today's world.

At this meeting, we felt there was a shortage of new thinking. And there reemerged the ghost of pursuit for military superiority.

This summer I had a meeting with Mr Nixon, and he said to me: I have grounds to say, based on my vast political and life experience, that the search for that ghost of superiority has taken us too far. Now we do not know how to break out of the pileups formed by the mounds of nuclear weapons. All this is complicating, deteriorating the situation of the world.

I think, nevertheless, that agreements have become apparaent here. They have not only been endorsed. We put forward our proposals in a package. I think you understand why this was done. Nevertheless, the very path that we have covered with these agreements on major cuts in nuclear weapons gives us substantial experience and considerable gain.

I think that the U.S. President and we should reflect on the entire situation that has ultimately evolved here at the meeting, and make another try and step over the things that divide us.

We have agreed on many things already, traversed a long path. The President, probably, needs to consult Congress, political circles and the American public. Let America ponder on all that. We will be waiting, without withdrawing our proposals that we have made public. In fact, we have come to agreement on them. That was the first point.

Secondly, I think, that all realistically-minded forces in the world should act now. We all, living in the socialist world, in the capitalist world and in the developing world, now have a unique chance: to really start, at last, work on ending the arms race, banning nuclear weapons, destroying them and diverting the nuclear threat from mankind.

In this connection, we submitted the following proposal to the U.S. President: Let us agree to start talks on banning nuclear explosions immediately after the conclusion of our meeting in Reykjavik.

At that, we proposed that this be a process in the course of which we could examine at some stage, perhaps, even on a top-priority basis, also the question of thresholds, and the nuclear blast yield, and the number of nuclear explosions per year, and the fate of the 1974 and 1976 treaties, and would move further towards the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear explosions.

I'll tell you that we were close to finding a formula on this question as well. We told the American side: We do not demand that you introduce a moratorium. It is up to you. You report to your Congress, to the people on how you will continue nuclear explosions or whether you will join our moratorium during the talks that we will start. But let us sit down for full-scale talks to work out an agreement on the total and final prohibition of nuclear explosions.

In passing, we will also consider the questions that you mention: verification, thresholds, number of nuclear explosions, and the 1974-1976 treaties, all this can be examined.

The positions were drawing closer. But when there occurred a rupture on the question of ABM, when all the discussion was broken off and the search was suspended, we stopped our meeting.

I think that we and the Americans should reflect on all this, and world public opinion should reflect on the situation that has evolved in the world in respect to the principal issue of concern to peoples of all countries -- issues of war and peace, issues of the nuclear threat.

I think, and this is no exaggeration, that everything that we submitted to the President meets the interests of the American people and the peoples of all countries. If this does not seem to be true to someone, we are all eligible to say today: Listen to the demands of American people, Soviet people, the people of all countries.

I came here for the meeting and said that it was time for action. This is truly so.

Indeed, the time to act has come, and we should not waste it. We shall act. We shall not give up our course towards peace, towards the struggle against the arms race, for banning nuclear weapons, for eliminating nuclear weapons and for diverting the threat from all of our planet. I think that we shall not be alone in this struggle.

This is what I wanted to tell you now, right after the conclusion of the meeting. Perhaps, I could say more should I have more time to ponder everything that has happened. It seems to me, however, that I expressed myself clearly and definitely on all questions.

I do not mention now that we dwelt on many other issues. We discussed humanitarian issues and dealt with concrete problems in that sphere. Two groups of experts were at work. You probably already know about that. One of them was headed from our side by Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev, and from the American side by Paul Nitze. They worked practically through the night.

The group on humanitarian issues was headed from our side by Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, and from the American side by Assistant Secretary of State Ridgway.

There was an interesting exchange of opinions there, too, and some understandings reached there could have been a component part of the final document. But since the main thing collapsed, the entire process ground to a standstill.

As you see, this was an interesting, important and promising meeting on the whole. But it has ended this way for the time being.

But let us not give way to despair. I think that this meeting has brought us to a very important stage of understanding where we are. It has shown that accords are possible. I am sure of this.

Thank you.

Do you still have questions even after such a detailed speech delivered by me? Well, come up with them. Let us sit until the early hours.

Question (Czechoslovak television): Mikhail Sergeyevich, you said that a historic change has been lost here, in Reykjavik. When, do you think, a new change will emerge?

Reply: You know I should like to give an optimistic answer to this. Because much was done on the eve of the meeting and at the meeting. If we again think over everything and display realism and responsibility both in the United States, in the White House and in our Soviet leadership, then the chance will not be lost to resolve these questions.

Question (Japanese NHK TV company): Does it mean that the dialogue with the USA, with the Reagan administration is still going on? Or you think that possibilities are very small for a productive dialogue with Reagan?

Reply: I think that at present the need for the dialogue has become even greater, no matter how difficult it would be.

Question (newspaper PRAVDA): Mikhail Sergeyevich, what do you think, why did the U.S. Administration decide to wreck the negotiations, taking such an irresponsible decision and ignoring world public opinion?

Reply: I think that America has yet to make up its mind. I think it has not done this yet. This, as we felt, affected the President's stand.

Question (Australian Radio Broadcasting Corporation): You said that President Reagan is a captive of the military industrial complex. Does it mean that the next 2 years will be sterile? Are you hopeful that the next U.S. president will not be a captive of this complex?

Reply: Irrespective of what the military-industrial complex is at present and irrespective of what place it holds in present-day America, let us not overestimate its possibilities. The final say is with the people of any country, including the American people.

Question (Icelandic radio and television): After the negative result of the summit, will the Soviet Union counter the American SDI program with something else and will it not launch its space arms programme full blast?

Reply: I think that you have understood the essence of the Soviet position. If now we have approached a stage at which we start a drastic cut in nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range missiles (we have already approached understanding with the Americans to do this in the next decade), we have the right to demand that we should be guaranteed in this period that nothing surprising and unforeseen will take place. This also includes such a sphere as space and deployment of a space-based ABM system.

I told the President (maybe I will slightly open the curtain over our exchange of opinions) that the SDI does not bother us militarily. In my opinion, nobody in America believes that such a system can be created. Moreover, if America eventually decides to do this, our reply will not be symmetrical. True, I told him: Mr. President, you know that I have already been turned into your ally in the SDI issue. He was surprised by this. It turns out, I tell him, that since I so sharply criticize the SDI, this offers you a convincing argument that the SDI is needed. You just say: If Gorbachev is against it, this means that it is a good thing. You win applause and financing. True, cynics and sceptics have appeared who say: What if this is Gorbachev's crafty design -- to stay out of the SDI and to ruin America. So you figure this out yourself. But we are not scared by the SDI in any case.

I say this with confidence, since it is irresponsible to bluff in such matters. There will be reply to the SDI. An asymmetrical one, but it will be. We shall not sacrifice much at that.

But what is its danger? For one thing, a political danger. A situation is created right away, which brings uncertainty and fans up mistrust for each other and suspicion. Then the reduction of nuclear weapons will be put aside. In short, quite another situation is needed for us to take up thoroughly the question of reducing nuclear weapons. Second, there is a military aspect after all. The SDI can lead to new types of weapons. We also can say this with competence. It can lead to an entirely new stage of the arms race which is unpredictable for its serious consequences.

It turns out that, on the one hand, we agree to start reduction of nuclear weapons -- at present the most dangerous and dreadful, and, on the other -- we should bless research, and even conduct it in space, on location, so as to create the latest weapons. This does not agree with normal logic.

Question (THE WASHINGTON POST): You have just held another meeting with President Reagan after 2 days of sessions. What is your impression of the President as a political figure? Do you believe that he shares your sense of responsibility for the destinies of the world?

Answer: My impression is that Mr Reagan and I can continue the dialogue and engage in the quest for ways to resolve major pressing problems, including those I spoke about.

Question (Danish television): Do the unsatisfactory results of the meeting mean that no progress will be achieved on the banning of nuclear tests and other problems which were discussed yesterday and today? Is this problem -- the banning of nuclear tests -- linked with other problems discussed at the sessions?

Answer: I have answered this question already. We believe that our contacts with Americans and with the President, much less international relations, have not been broken off as a result of the latest developments. The quest is going on, and it will be further continued. In my opinion, there is even more reason for the developments that took place here, in Iceland, to become a powerful impetus that would make us all realize that we should join the common struggle for the normalization of the international situation, for the quest for ways out of impasse situations, including those which were discussed here, in Reykjavik. In fact, another impasse situation emerged here as well. However, I am an optimist.

Question (GDR television): You said that the meeting had brought no results. Does it mean that it was useless? What do you think: Has peace become more reliable after the Reykjavik meetings?

Answer: I think, you have considered your question thoroughly. What I like about our German friends is the accuracy of expressions, including the expression of thoughts. In my opinion, despite the fact that we concluded our meeting without reaching agreement on the problems to which we seemed to have found approaches, what happened in Reykjavik is sad [pechalnyy] and disappointing. However, the meeting can hardly be described as fruitless.

On the contrary, it is a new stage in a complicated and difficult dialogue in search of solutions. After all we are searching for far from easy solutions to difficult issues. This is why we do not spread panic throughout the world. But at the same time, we should state that the world should know all that is going on and should not feel like an onlooker. The time has come for vigorous actions by all forces.

Question (American TV company ABC): Mr. General Secretary, I don't understand why, when you had an opportunity to achieve with President Reagan agreement on cuts in nuclear weapons, the Soviet side did not agree to SDI research. You yourself said in Geneva that you were ready to pay a high price for nuclear arms cuts. Now, when you had such an opportunity, you missed it.

Answer: Your question contains an element of criticism, so I will answer it in some detail.

First, the U.S. President came to Reykjavik with empty hands and empty pockets. The American delegation, I would say brought us trash from the Geneva talks. It was only thanks to the far-reaching proposals of the Soviet side that we were about to reach most major agreements (they were not formalized, mind you) on cuts in strategic offensive weapons and on medium-range missiles.

Naturally, we hoped in that situation -- and I think it is perfectly clear to a politician, a military man and any normal person in general -- that if we are to sign such agreements on major cuts in nuclear weapons, we should take care to ensure that nothing could thwart that difficult process, towards which we had been moving for decades. Then we raised the question that we stood for strengthening the ABM treaty. The American side is constantly burrowing under the ABM treaty.

It has already called in question SALT II and would now like to stage a funeral of the ABM treaty in Reykjavik, moreover, with the participation of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. That will not do. The world as a whole would not understand us, it is my conviction.

All of you who are sitting here, all of you are convinced that if we begin to attack the ABM treaty in addition to everything else, the last mechanism which has contributed so much to constraining, in spite of everything, the process of the arms race, we are worthless politicians. But it is not enough to preserve its terms at a time when deep cuts in nuclear weapons are initiated. We think that the treaty must be strengthened. We proposed a mechanism of strengthening it -- not to use the right to pull out of the ABM treaty during the ten years in which we will totally reduce and destroy the nuclear potentials in our countries.

At the same time, to ensure that neither the Soviet Union seeks to overtake America in space research and achieve military superiority nor America seeks to overtake the Soviet Union, we said that we agreed to laboratory research and testing but opposed to the emergence with that research and testing of components of space-based ABM defenses into outer space. This is our demand. Our demand in that case also was constructive and reckoning with America's stand. If she agreed, she would get an opportunity to resolve her problems within the framework of continued laboratory research but without attempts to develop space ABM defenses. I think there is iron logic here, as the children say, and sometimes we should learn even from children.

Now let ladies have a chance.

Question (THE GUARDIAN): Is the Soviet Union planning any new initiatives for Western Europe after what came to pass in Reykjavik?

Answer: I think Western Europe is hearing what I am saying and if she thinks over and closely studies our proposals, she will find them meeting her interests. We understand that we cannot be indifferent to the interests of Western Europe, in which the shoots of new thinking are taking root and in which responsibility is growing for the preservation and strengthening of our European home.

Question (NEWSWEEK magazine): What are your plans for a visit to Washington? You said that an agreement or two should be achieved before such a visit. Can such agreements be achieved before you come on a visit to Washington?

Answer: I think that in spite of the dramatic events of today, we are not farther from Washington but closer to it, if the President and the U.S. Administration listen to my proposal to continue studying everything we discussed here in Reykjavik and keep counsel with those circles they think necessary to consult. I do not think everything is lost. There are opportunities to rely on what we had here in Reykjavik to reach agreements which will make a meeting in Washington real and possible and it could produce results.

Question (American TV Company CNN): Mr. Gorbachev, you said in your speech that President Reagan should think over the situation and keep counsel with Congress and the American people. Do you think that American public opinion will back the Soviet approach?

Answer: We will wait and see.

Question (RUDE PRAVO): I have a question for you as a politician and a lawyer. What do you think of human rights priorities in the nuclear-missile age and what role the human factor can play in deciding questions of war and peace?

Answer: You are a philosopher. I myself once studied philosophy and have now again turned to it. I think that when we discuss human rights, we should remember that the question of safeguarding peace and averting the nuclear threat from man today is the main priority. If there is peace, there will be life -- and we will sort out problems in one way or another. There are more and more educated people in the world. I think the people will sort out everything. That is why when we discuss human rights, I will attach priority to man's right to live. This is the first point.

The second is the human factor. I believe that in the nuclear age (and I consider it a manifestation of new thinking) the threat of nuclear war gives a new dimension to the

role of the human factor in the struggle for peace, for the prevention of war. Because today a war will affect everyone regardless of where it breaks out. It is only ill-wishers who see the hand of Moscow behind all the anti-war movements, all those who work for peace. Women, children, and men of all ages are coming to the fore today, linking hands and demanding a stop to the dangerous tendency under which the world is advancing towards the threat of nuclear war. I think that the role of the human factor is growing immensely in this situation.

Question (IZVESTIYA): The White House has talked a good deal and often that the main danger to America is posed by the Soviet ICBM's. But we proposed in Reykjavik that this main danger to America be eliminated over 10 years. What do you think of the reasons why the other side proved not ready to strike down this main danger and avert it from its country?

Answer: You are quite right to pose this question. It was used by the American side over the years to claim that the Soviet Union was not serious about disarmament and ending the arms race, that is disregarded America's concern, etc.

As you see, we proposed radical reductions, and put the question very pointedly, moreover. There is the trial of strategic weapons recognized both by us and by the Americans. We suggested that all that triad of the strategic armed forces be cut by 50 percent over the first five years. It was a major step.

At the same time we told the Americans that we were concerned, too. The United States has 70 percent of its strategic forces deployed on submarines. It is 656 independently targetable multiple warheads. The submarines are known to be circling the Soviet Union in the seas and oceans around it. Whence will they strike? It is worse than heavy ground-launched missiles.

In short, when they do not want to come to grips with questions, they look for problems and raise artificial obstacles. But in our case those obstacles were removed. This is the important thing. We indeed took a very important step by dropping reservations on medium-range missiles, which have strategic importance to America. We also excluded from the count forward-based systems in our approach to strategic missiles. All this shows our goodwill. Yet the Americans did not meet us halfway.

The Americans think that they will achieve military superiority over us through outer space and realize the idea of one of their presidents, who said: He who will dominate outer space will dominate earth. This shows that what we have to deal with is imperial ambitions.

But the world today is not what it once was. It does not want to and will not be the happy hunting grounds of either the United States of America or the Soviet Union. Every country has the right to a choice, to its own ideology, to its own values. If we do not recognize this, there are no international relations. What there is is chaos and the law of the fist. We will never agree to it.

America must be very nostalgic about olden times, when she was strong and militarily superior to us, as we all had emerged from the war economically weakened.

There must be nostalgia in America. Yet we should wish our American partners to come to grips with today's realities. They ought to do so too. Otherwise, if the Americans do not start thinking in today's terms and proceeding from today's realities, we will not make progress in our search for correct solutions.

Question (Bulgarian television): I take it that the Geneva talks will not be stopped, and the Soviet leadership is going to give instructions to the Soviet delegation to quest for ways to resolve the problems which have not been resolved so far.

Answer: You are right.

Question: Do you think that after the Reykjavik meeting similar instructions will be given to the American delegation?

Answer: I hope it will be so.

Question (CTK news agency): In what way, do you think, will the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting influence the all-European process?

Answer: In my opinion both the politicians and people of Europe will measure up to the situation as well in this very important moment. Time requires actions, not just eloquent statements which are not followed by anything concrete. The world is tired, it is fed up with empty talk, it needs real progress in the sphere of disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. I believe that this trend will be getting more prominent. I am pinning special hope on the wisdom and sense of responsibility of the politicians and people of Europe.

Question (American NBC television company): As I understand, you are directly calling on other members of the world community to act as a kind of a lobby in order to influence the United States and make it change its mind?

Answer: We know how developed lobbyism is in your country, how the political process goes in America. Perhaps, that is why it was difficult for the President to make a decision at this meeting.

But when the matter at hand is related to consolidating peace and undertaking real steps to this end, when concerted efforts are needed -- this concerns all, not only the United States and the Soviet Union -- then, I think, one should speak not about lobbyism, but about the sense of responsibility, the common sense of people, about the appreciation of today's peace and the need to protect it.

It is, therefore, insulting to accuse people of movements campaigning for peace of being lobbyists for the Soviet Union. The point at issue is that people uphold their political and civic stance.

Question (Icelandic newspaper MORGUNBLADID): I publish a newspaper in Iceland. Was it hard for you to decide on coming to Reykjavik? For Iceland is a NATO member. At the same time, as is known, our government proposed proclaiming the north a nuclear-free zone, and I would like to know your attitude to this.

Answer: I would like to end the press conference with this subject and will use with pleasure the question put by a representative of the Icelandic press. I want to recall that it was the USSR which suggested Iceland as a possible venue for the meeting. That is why we had no difficulties whatsoever on this account.

I want to thank the Government of Iceland, the people of Iceland for using all their potential -- human, organizational and material -- for resolving all questions of arranging the meeting.

We are grateful for that, and we felt at ease here. I received much interesting information from Raisa Maximovna who had had many meetings in Iceland. They were all very interesting. We are pleased with the friendly atmosphere and the great interest in our country. We thank Iceland, the Icelandic Government for what they have done. We wish prosperity to your people.

As to the latter part of your question concerning the intention of your country's government to proclaim the north a nuclear-free zone -- we welcome this.

Dear friends, thank you for your attention. I think that we have spent the time usefully. I wish you all the best. Good-bye.

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CSO: 5200/1027

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV 14 OCTOBER TELEVISION ADDRESS ON SUMMIT

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[Address by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on "Vremya" program, live or recorded]

[Text] Dear comrades, you know that the day before yesterday, on Sunday, my meeting in Iceland with Ronald Reagan, the President of the United States of America, ended. A press conference took place on television on the results of the meeting. The text of the speech and my replies to journalists have been published. Having returned to the homeland, I consider it my duty to tell how things went and how we evaluate what has taken place in Reykjavik.

The results of the meeting in the capital of Iceland have just been discussed at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Tomorrow a report will be published on what kind of judgement has been pronounced by the leadership of our party about this major political event -- an event, whose consequences, we are convinced, will for a long time have an effect on international relations. Before Reykjavik, much was said and written about the forthcoming meeting. As usually happens in such cases, there was a multitude of suppositions and opinions. This is natural. The event did not pass without speculation, either. Now that the meeting has ended, its results are at the center of attention of the world public. Everybody is interested in what took place, what it produced and what kind of world there will be after it.

We strove at the meeting in Reykjavik to put the main issues in world politics, the halting of the arms race and nuclear disarmament, at the top of the agenda. That, in fact, is what happened. What are the reasons for our urgency in this matter? One frequently hears from abroad that the reason for this is our internal problems. In the calculations of the West, the thesis exists that the Soviet Union's economy will not, in the final analysis, bear up under the arms race; it will break and go cap in hand to the West; one has only to pressure it some more and to build up the position of strength. Incidentally, this could also be heard in the speech made, after our meeting by the U.S. President.

More than once I have had occasion to say that such plans are not only built on sand, but are dangerous, since they can lead to fatal political decisions. We know our problems better than other people do; we do have some, we discuss them openly, we tackle them, we have our plans, our approaches in this respect, and we have the common will of the party and of the people. In general, I have to say that the Soviet Union is strong today in its cohesion, in the political energy of the people, in its dynamism; and I think that these tendencies, and thus the strength of our society, will

grow. We will always be able to stand up for ourselves. The Soviet Union has the means to answer any challenge, if this should be necessary. This is known by Soviet people, and ought to be known throughout the world.

But we do not want to play at power games. This is an extremely dangerous occupation in the nuclear-missile age. We are firmly convinced that the protracted, feverish state of international relations harbors the threat of a sudden and disastrous crisis. Practical steps are needed away from the nuclear abyss. Joint Soviet-American efforts -- the efforts of the whole world community -- are needed in order radically to improve international relations. In the name of these goals, on the eve of the meeting, before we received President Reagan's consent to a meeting, we in the Soviet leadership had done a lot of preparatory work.

In addition to the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, other departments, scientific representatives, military experts and specialists from various branches of industry took part in this work. The positions we worked out for the meeting in Reykjavik were the result of broad and continual discussion with our friends, with the leadership of the countries of the socialist community.

We sought to fill the meeting with matters of principle and far-reaching proposals.

Now about the meeting itself. How did events develop there? It is necessary to talk about this not just in order to establish the truth, which our partners in negotiations in Reykjavik are already distorting; but chiefly in order to share with you what we intend to do next.

The first meeting with President Ronald Reagan began on Saturday at 1030. After the greetings, indispensable on such occasions, and after a short meeting with reporters, we were left alone with one another, with just our interpreters. We exchanged opinions on the general situation, on how the dialogue between our countries is shaping up, and designated the issues we were to discuss.

Then I asked the President to listen to my specific proposals on the main issues which were the reasons we had come to this meeting. I have already spoken about these in some detail at the press conference. But nevertheless, I shall remind you of them briefly.

A whole package of major measure was put on the table which, if adopted, would initiate a new epoch in the life of mankind -- a nuclear-free epoch. Herein is the essence of a fundamental turning point in the world situation, the possibility of which was evident and real. What was involved was not limitation of nuclear weapons, as was the case in the SALT I and SALT II treaties and other treaties, but the elimination of nuclear arms in a relatively short period.

The proposal dealt with strategic offensive weapons. I stated our readiness to cut these by 50 percent during the first 5 years. This involved halving strategic arms on land, at sea, and in the air. To make an agreement easier, we made a great concession: We removed our former demands to the Americans to include American medium-range missiles able to reach our territory, and the American forward-based arms, in the strategic equation.

We were also ready to take into account the concern of the United States about our heavy missiles. We viewed the proposal about strategic weapons in the context of their complete elimination as proposed by us on 15 January this year.

Our second proposal dealt with medium-range missiles. I suggested to the President the complete elimination of Soviet and American missiles of this class in Europe. And here, too, we made a great concession: We stated that, in contrast to our former position, the nuclear missiles weapons of Great Britain and France need not be counted in.

We took as our starting point the need to clear the way to detente in Europe, to free the European peoples from the fear of a nuclear disaster, and then to progress to the elimination of all nuclear arms. You will agree that this is also a bold step on our part.

Knowing in advance the objections there might be, we stated that we were willing to freeze nuclear weapons with a range of less than 1,000 km, and to start immediately on talks about their further fate. As for medium-range missiles in the Asian part of our country, a question which has always been present in the global option of President Reagan, we proposed starting talks on that question immediately.

As you can see, here, too, our proposals were of a major and serious nature, providing the opportunity for fundamentally resolving this problem, too.

The third issue, which I put before the President in the very first conversation, and which was an integral part of our package of proposals -- that is the existing treaty on antimissile defense and its ban on nuclear testing. Our approach is this: Once we enter a completely new situation, when a considerable reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination over a visibly short period are starting, it is necessary to safeguard oneself against all surprises. We are talking about weapons that up to now constitute the core of the defense of our country; therefore, everything that could undermine equality in the course of disarmament has to be excluded; any possibility of developing [sozdat] weapons of a new type securing military superiority must be excluded.

We believe this position to be perfectly natural and logical, and so we firmly stated the need for strict adherence to the ABM Treaty of 1972 that has no fixed period, and, moreover, in order to strengthen the conditions of that treaty, we proposed to the President that reciprocal obligations be undertaken on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union not to exercise the right of withdrawal from the treaty, at least for 10 years, and over that period to put an end to strategic weapons. Taking into account the particular difficulty which the administration has created for itself on this issue, when the President has personally linked himself with space weapons, with the so-called SDI, we did not request the cessation of work in this sphere, but the understanding that all the provisions of the ABM Treaty would be fully observed -- that is, that research and testing in this field would not go outside the confines of the laboratory. This is an identical limitation, both for the United States and for the Soviet Union.

As he listened to us, the President made remarks, and asked for some things to be explained in more detail; in the course of the conversation, we raised the question of monitoring [kontrol] in resolute and definite terms. Having tied it in with the pre [corrects himself], the post-nuclear situation. And this situation requires particular responsibility. I told the President that if both countries embark on the path of nuclear disarmament, then the Soviet Union will tighten up its position on monitoring. It must be real, all-encompassing, convincing, it must inspire total confidence in the reliability of the observance of the agreement, and contain the right to inspect on-site.

I must tell you, comrades, that the first reaction from the President was not entirely negative. He even said: What you have set forth just now reassures us. However, the fact did not escape us that our interlocutors -- both Comrade Shevardnadze and Mr Shultz had by now joined in the conversation on these issues -- that our interlocutors were in some confusion. At the same time, in their uncoordinated remarks there immediately appeared doubts and objections. The President and the secretary of state, began impromptu, as they say, to talk about divergences and disagreements. In these words of theirs, we clearly caught familiar old sounds which we have been hearing for many months at the Geneva talks.

We were reminded about all kinds of sublevels in strategic nuclear weapons, about an interim option for missiles in Europe, that we should join in the SDI -- we, the Soviet Union -- and replace the existing ABM Treaty with some new treaty. And we heard much more in this spirit from their side. I expressed surprise: How can it be? We are proposing to accept the American zero in Europe and sit down at a negotiating table over the medium-range missiles in Asia, while you, Mr President, are retreating from your previous position. I don't understand it. Regarding the ABM, we are proposing to preserve and consolidate that fundamental, important agreement, while you want to give it up and are even proposing to replace it with some new treaty, and thereby, after breaking with SALT II, also wrecking this mechanism which preserves strategic stability. I cannot understand that either.

We have also figured out the SDI plans, I said. If the United States creates a three-layer ABM system in space, we shall respond to that. But we are concerned by something else: SDI would mean weapon transfer to a new environment which would destabilize the strategic situation and make it even worse than today. If such is the U.S. objective, then that is what you should say. But if you truly want to have sound security for your own people and for the whole world, then the American position is absolutely groundless.

I told the President straight: We have advanced new major proposals while from you we are now hearing what everyone has truly had enough of, and what cannot lead anywhere. I ask you, Mr President, to examine our proposals once again, carefully, and to answer item by item. And I presented to him, translated into English, prepared earlier in Moscow, a draft of possible directives which, should agreement be reached in principle, we could give to our foreign affairs ministers and other departments for the preparation of three draft agreements. Then it would have been possible to sign them during my visit to the United States.

We met again in the afternoon. The President read out the position that had been drawn up during the break. It became clear after the very first sentence that we were again being offered -- as I put it at the press conference -- a load of mothballed junk which is already stifling the Geneva talks. All kinds of interim variants, numbers, levels, sublevels, and so on. Not one new thought. Not one fresh approach, not one idea that might have included even a hint at some kind of solution, at some kind of forward movement.

It became clear, comrades, that the Americans came to Reykjavik completely emptyhanded. The impression was created that they had come there only to gather fruit into their basket with empty hands. The situation was dramatic. The U.S. President was not prepared to decide the questions of principle in a major way, to come part way to meet us, so as to really give an impulse to talks that would produce results and give rise to hope. This is what I called for in my letter to the President in which I put forward the idea of holding the urgent and immediate meeting so as to give a powerful

impulse at the level of the top leaders of the two countries, an impulse to the talks on disarmament, nuclear disarmament.

Convinced that our proposals had been carefully thought out, taking into account the interests of our partner, we decide not to give up on our efforts to achieve a breakthrough at the meeting. After many clarifying questions, a ray of hope appeared on strategic weapons. Latching onto this, we took yet another great step in the search for a compromise.

I said to the President: Both you and we have an acknowledged triad of strategic offensive weapons: these are land-based missiles, strategic submarines, and strategic bombers. So let us reduce each part of this triad by 50 percent. This does away with the need for all sorts of levels, sub-levels and all sorts of calculations. After lengthy debates, we managed to reach mutual understanding on this issue.

Then a discussion developed on the problem of medium-range missiles. The Americans stubbornly defended the so-called interim option, which envisaged retaining a part of their missiles remaining in Europe, including Pershing II missiles, and, of course, retaining our corresponding missiles, the SS-20, likewise. We came out categorically against this. I have already explained why. Europe deserves to be rid of nuclear weapons, to cease being a nuclear hostage. The President, for his part, had difficulty fighting against his own zero option, which he had been pushing for such a long time. Nevertheless, we sensed the Americans' intention to frustrate any agreement, under the guise of special concern for their allies in Asia. A lot was said about that by the American side that was unfounded. There is simply no point in repeating all this today.

And things started going well only when we made yet another step to meet them, on this issue as well. We agreed to the formula: zero missiles in Europe, and 100 warheads each on medium-range missiles in the East of our country, and correspondingly for the Americans on the territory of the United States respectively.

The main thing is that we managed to come to agreement on ridding the European Continent of nuclear missiles. Agreement was thus reached, too, on the issue of medium-range missiles. An important breakthrough was made in this aspect of nuclear disarmament, too.

The American Administration did not succeed in evading our persistent striving to get positive results. But the questions of ABM and a ban on nuclear explosions still remained.

Prior to our meeting the next day, on Sunday, for our third conversation, which according to the schedule should have been the final one, two groups of experts, from our side and the American side, worked through the night. They thoroughly analyzed what had been discussed at our two preceding meetings with the President and accordingly reported the results of their nighttime debates to myself and to the President. The result was as follows: A possibility emerged for getting down to elaborating agreements on strategic offensive weapons and on medium-range missiles.

In that situation, the ABM Treaty acquired a key significance. Its role was becoming even more important. Can we possibly wreck, said I, what until now has been somehow making it possible to restrain the arms race to some degree. And if now we are going to reduce strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, both sides should be confident

that nobody during that time will create new weapons that would undermine the stability and parity. That is why to me it seems completely logical to define a time limit. The Americans were speaking about 7 years; we proposed 10 years. The very same 10 years during which nuclear weapons were to be destroyed. We proposed 10 years during which neither the Soviet nor the American side would make use of the right, and they have such right, to abandon the ABM treaty. And research and experiments would be conducted in the laboratory only. And so I think you understand why 10 years. This is not coincidental, as I said before.

The logic here is simple and pure. In the first 5 years the first 50 percent of strategic weapons are cut, and in the second 5 years, the second half. That makes 10 years.

In this same connection, I proposed entrusting our responsible representatives with beginning full-scale talks on banning nuclear explosions in order, as a result, to work out an agreement on a complete and final ban on them. And during the preparation for such an agreement -- here, too, we showed flexibility and took a constructive position -- it would be possible at the same time to solve individual questions connected with nuclear explosions.

In response, we again heard an argument from the President which is very familiar from Geneva and from his public speeches, about how the SDI is a defense system, and, if we eliminate nuclear arms, how will we be able to defend ourselves from any madman who might get nuclear weapons into his hands, about how he is ready to share the results of the work on SDI with us.

To this latter remark, I told the President: Mr President, I am unable to take this idea of yours seriously, the idea that you will share with us the results of your work on SDI. At present, you do not even want to share oil industry equipment or dairy equipment with us. So do you expect us to believe a promise to share SDI developments with us? This would amount to a second American Revolution, and revolutions don't actually happen that often. I said to President Reagan: Let us be realists and pragmatists. That is a more reliable way. What we are discussing is too serious.

Incidentally, yesterday, when he was trying to justify his position on the SDI, the President said that he needed the program for America and its allies to remain invulnerable to a Soviet missile strike.

As you can see, the mention of the madmen is already missing. The Soviet threat has been dragged out into the open again. But that is absolute trickery. We have, after all, proposed to eliminate not only strategic, but all nuclear weapons at the disposal of the United States and the USSR. Under strict monitoring, incidentally. Why is the question of safeguarding the freedom of America and her friends from the Soviet nuclear missiles raised, then? If there would be no such missiles? If there are no nuclear weapons, who needs a defense against them? It follows that this whole venture with Star Wars is of an exclusively militarist nature, and it is aimed at gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union. Let us go back to the talks, however. Although the accord on strategic weapons and medium-range missiles had been reached, it was premature to think that all this had been finally decided in the course of the first two conversations alone.

Another whole day lay ahead. Almost 8 hours of tense and uninterrupted discussions, during which we had to return again and again to those questions, which, one might have thought, had already been agreed upon.

In these discussions, the President attempted to venture into ideological problems, demonstrating total ignorance, to put it mildly, and lack of understanding of what the socialist world is and what goes on in it. I rejected attempts to link ideological differences with questions of ending the arms race. I persistently brought the President and the secretary of state back to the matter on which we were meeting in Reykjavik.

I had to remind my collocutors time and again of item 3 of our package of proposals, without which agreement on the whole was impossible. I mean the need for strict adherence to the ABM Treaty, to consolidate the regime of that crucial treaty, and to ban nuclear tests.

Again and again we had to draw attention to what, one would have thought, were quite clear things. Given that we have agreed to get down to deep reductions in nuclear arms, we must create the sort of situation in which, not just in action, but even in thought, there should be no attempts to rock the strategic stability, or to get around the accords. We must -- there can only be one answer, which is that one. Therefore, we must have the certainty of the retention of the open-ended ABM Treaty.

You, Mr President, I said, must agree with the fact that, given that we have gone for nuclear arms reduction, there must be total certainty in the fact that the United States will not do anything behind the USSR's back, while the USSR is similarly not doing anything behind the United States' back which might put your security under threat, which would depreciate the agreement and create difficulties. And from this we have the key task of strengthening the ABM conditions: not to go out into space with the developments [razrabotki] of this program and remain within the framework of the laboratory. The 10 years of not exercising the right to abandon the ABM Treaty are essential to create confidence in the fact that, in resolving the problem of arms reduction, we are guaranteeing the security of each side, and I would even say security throughout the world as well.

But the Americans were clearly inclined toward something else. We saw that the United States in fact wants to weaken the ABM Treaty, to revise it in order to develop [razrabotat] a large-scale space ABM system, in their own egoistic interests. To agree to this would have simply been irresponsible on my part.

Regarding nuclear tests -- here, too it was clearer than daylight why the American side does not want to conduct talks in earnest on this subject. It would prefer to make them endless, to defer a solution of the problem of banning nuclear tests for decades. For the umpteenth time we had to reject attempts to use talks as a screen for freedom of action in the sphere of nuclear tests. At the meeting I said bluntly: I have doubts about the honesty of the U.S. position. Is there indeed nothing in this position which can be detrimental to the Soviet Union? How can one agree to scrapping nuclear armaments if the United States continues to improve them? We were still left with the impression that the chief obstacle was SDI. If it could be removed, it would be possible to agree on banning nuclear tests, nuclear blasts, as well.

At a certain stage when it became quite clear that continuing the discussions was a waste of time, I reminded them: We have proposed a definite package of measures and I request that you regard it as such. If you and I have worked out common positions on the possibility of major reductions of nuclear weapons and have not reached agreement on the ABM issue and the issue of nuclear tests, then everything we have tried to create here collapses.

The President and the secretary of state reacted to this firmness of ours painfully. But I could not pose the question any differently. It was a matter of the security of the country, of the security of the whole world, of all people and continents.

An impasse had arisen. We proposed major, really large-scale things that were clearly compromises. We made concessions. However, I did not see even the slightest desire on the American side to reply to us in the same way or to make any movement to meet us. We began to think of how to end this meeting, these discussions.

Nevertheless, we continued our endeavors to get our partners to follow a constructive path.

The conversation planned as the final one had exceeded the permitted time period. In this situation, instead of going away, we to Moscow and they to Washington, we agreed once again to have a break, let the sides think everything over, and to meet again after dinner. Returning to the town mayor's house after the break, we made another attempt to end the meeting with success. We presented the following text as a basis for reaching a positive result. Here is that text. I quote:

The USSR and the United States would pledge, for a period of 10 years, to refrain from using their given right to abandon the indefinite ABM Treaty, and for the duration of this period strictly adhere to all of its provisions. The testing of all space elements of an antimissile defense in space is forbidden, except research and testing carried out in laboratories. During the first 5 years of this 10-year period, up to 1991 inclusive, the strategic offensive weapons of the sides will be reduced by 50 percent. During the following 5 years of this period the remaining 50 percent of the strategic offensive weapons of the sides will be reduced. Thus, by the end of 1996 the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and of the United States will be totally eliminated.

Commenting on this text, I made an important addition, referring to a document handed to the President at the close of our first conversation. Its essence lay in saying that at the end of 10 years, when there would be no nuclear weapons, we propose the elaboration at special talks of a mutually acceptable decision on how to proceed further. However, this time, too, our attempts to reach agreement did not yield results. For 4 hours we again tried to persuade our interlocutors of the well-founded nature of our approach, in which nothing threatened them, which did not harm the interests of the United States' real security. But the longer this went on, the clearer it became that the Americans were not going to agree to limiting research [issledovaniye], development [razrabotka] and testing in the SDI program to the laboratory. They are dying to have weapons in space.

I stated firmly that we will never agree to helping with our own hands to wreck the ABM Treaty. For us this is a matter of principle, of our national security. And so, finding ourselves literally one, or two, or three steps from making decisions that could be historic for the whole nuclear space age, we could not take this step, or these steps. There was no turning point in world history, although -- and once again I say this with conviction -- it was possible.

But our conscience is clear. There is nothing to reproach us with. We did everything we could. Our partners did not have sufficient breadth of approach, understanding of the unique nature of the moment, and in the final analysis courage, responsibility and political determination, which are so necessary in solving such most important, urgent

world problems. They remained in their old positions, which time has already undermined and which do not correspond to contemporary reality.

Foreigners in Iceland asked me, and comrades here ask me, what I see as the reasons for this conduct by the American delegation at the Reykjavik meeting.

There are many reasons, both subjective and objective ones, but the main one is that the leadership of that great country is too dependent on the military-industrial complex, on monopolist groups who have turned the race in nuclear and other weapons into a business, means of making profits, the aim of their existence and the point of their activities.

It seems to me that in their appraisal of the situation the Americans are making two serious errors. One is tactical -- they think that the Soviet Union, sooner or later, will reconcile itself to the attempts to revive American strategic dictate, will go in for a limitation of only Soviet, for a reduction of only Soviet weapons, and will do this because, they say, it has a greater interest than the United States in an accord on the problem of disarmament. But that is a profound delusion, and the quicker the Americans rid themselves of it -- that is, the American Administration, and I am saying this for perhaps the hundredth time -- the better it will be, both for them and for our relations and for the whole world situation.

The other error is a strategic one. The United States wants to exhaust the Soviet Union economically through a race in the most up-to-date and expensive space weapons. It wants to create various kinds of difficulties for the Soviet leadership, to wreck its plans, including in the social sphere, in the sphere of improving the standard of living of our people, thus arousing dissatisfaction among the people with their leadership, the leadership of the country, and by the same means to limit the opportunities of the Soviet Union in its economic ties with the developing countries. And they, in such a situation, will all be forced to go cap in hand to the United States of America. Far-reaching schemes, but both the strategy and the strategic line of the present administration are also being built on delusions.

It would appeal that in Washington they neither want to burden themselves with an attentive analysis of changes which are taking place in our country, nor do they want to draw the corresponding practical conclusions for themselves and for their course. They are trying to indulge in wishful thinking, and on the basis of this delusion are building a policy of relations with the USSR. Of course, all the long-term consequences of such a policy are not difficult to foresee. But one thing is already clear to us now: It will not bring anyone -- it cannot bring anyone anything positive, including the United States itself.

Before speaking before you today, I read the statement by the U.S. President about Reykjavik. What stands out is the fact that the President ascribes all of the proposals which were discussed to himself. Well, obviously, these proposals are so attractive for the American people and the peoples of the whole world that one can resort to such cunning! We are not gnawed by vanity. But all the same it's important that people should obtain a true picture of the course of affairs in Reykjavik. What else?

I have already said at the press conference that work done both before the meeting, and there, in Reykjavik, will not go to waste. We ourselves thought over many things, in connection with this meeting, and reviewed many things.

We have now cleared the way to better carry out a further struggle for peace and disarmament. We have gotten rid of the obstructions that had built up, of details and trivialities, of stereotypes that were holding up new approaches in this most important area of policy.

We know where we are. We see our capabilities more clearly. The preparations for Reykjavik helped us to formulate a platform, a new, bold platform which enlarges the chances for fiscal success. It is in accordance with the interests of our people and society at the new stage of its socialist development. At the same time this platform is in accordance with the interests of all other countries and peoples, and therefore deserves trust. We are convinced that it will be met with understanding in many countries of the world, and in the most varied political and public circles.

I think that a great many people throughout the world, including persons vested with power, will be able and bound to draw serious conclusions from Reykjavik. Everyone will have to think again and again: What is it all about? Why do such obstinate efforts to create a breakthrough, and move forward to a nuclear-free world, to general security, not yet yield the necessary results? I would hope that the President, too, has a more accurate and more complete idea today of the course of our analysis, the intentions of the Soviet Union, the possibilities for, and limits to movement in the Soviet position -- more accurate and complete in particular because Mr Reagan got them at first hand; I mean the clarifications about our constructive steps for the sake of stabilizing and improving the international situation.

It is obvious that the American leadership needs a certain amount of time. We are realists, and recognize clearly that issues which over many years, decades even, have not found solutions can hardly be resolved in a single sitting. We have quite a bit of experience in conducting affairs with the United States of America. We know how changeable the internal political weather can be, how strong and influential the enemies of peace are on the other side of the Atlantic. None of this is new to us, or unexpected. And if we do not give up, do not slam the door, do not give vent to our annoyance -- although there are more than enough grounds for doing all this -- it is just because we are sincerely convinced of the need for new efforts for the construction of normal interstate relations in the nuclear age. There is simply no other way.

And one more thing: After Reykjavik the notorious SDI has stepped even further into everyone's view as a symbol of obstruction to the cause of reluctance to remove the nuclear threat looming over humanity. It is impossible to interpret it in any other way. This is one of the most important lessons of the Reykjavik meeting.

Briefly summing up these highly concentrated days, I would summarize them as follows: The recent meeting was a major event. A reappraisal took place. A qualitatively new situation has come about. Nobody can now act in the same way as he acted before. The new meeting was a useful one. It prepared a possible step forward, toward a real shift to the better, if the United States will finally adopt realistic positions and renounce illusions in its appraisals. The meeting persuades us of the correctness of the course we have chosen, of the need for and the constructive nature of the new political thinking in the nuclear age.

We are full of energy and resolve. Having made a start in restructuring, the country has already proceeded some distance. We have only just begun, but there has been an advance.

Growth in industrial output over 9 months came to 5.2 percent. Labor productivity rose by 4.8 percent. The national income has increased 4.3 percent compared with last year.

All these indexes are above the planned levels for this year. And this is the most powerful support on the part of our people, for these are all the fruits of our people's labor; the most powerful support for our party's policy is support in getting things done. This indicates that the labor of the people in the new conditions permits the economic potential of the country to grow more rapidly, and thereby strengthens its defensive potentialities.

The Soviet people and the Soviet leadership are united that the policy of socialism can and must be only a policy of peace and disarmament. We will not diverge from the course of the 27th CPSU Congress.

Thank you for your attention.

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CSO: 5200/1027

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA: POLITBURO HEARS, APPROVES GORBACHEV SUMMIT REPORT

PM151331 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Oct 86 p 1

["At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo"]

[Text] At the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. On 14 October a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo was held, at which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, gave a report on the results of his meeting with the U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik. The Politburo noted that the Soviet-American summit meeting was an important event in international life, in the struggle against the arms race and for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, and for removing the military threat from the whole of the earth.

The position of the Soviet side at this meeting was honest and open. It was based on the principles of equality and equal security; it took account of the interests of both countries, of their allies, and of the peoples of all states; it was a concrete expression of a new approach, a new way of thinking, the need for which is dictated by the realities of the nuclear missile age. Manifesting a sincere aspiration to reach an accord, the Soviet side submitted new compromise proposals, which took full account of the concern of the U.S. side, and made possible an agreement on such very important issues as the reduction, and the future, total elimination, of strategic offensive weapons and the destruction of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The implementation of these proposals would open up the possibility of a drastic turning point in the development of international relations, the removal of the nuclear threat, and the development of peaceful cooperation among all members of the world community.

Unfortunately, it did not prove possible to embody the de facto agreement on the issues indicated in accords binding the sides. The sole cause of this in the final analysis was the stubborn reluctance of the U.S. Administration to create conditions for the implementation of these accords by strengthening the ABM regime and accepting the corresponding obligations, equal for both sides. Such behavior forces one to doubt even more the statements of Washington that, as they say, the SDI program is of an exclusively "peaceful" nature. Simple logic prompts the thought that if there is no sword, then no shield is needed. But by all accounts, another purpose is being earmarked for this program.

Having approved the activities of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the meeting with President Ronald Reagan, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo notes that a qualitatively new situation has come about. The struggle for nuclear disarmament has reached a higher level, from which it is now necessary further to step up efforts with the aim of radical reductions and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In this respect it was stressed that contacts and negotiations must continue, including those in Geneva, on the whole range of issues connected with nuclear and space weapons on the basis of the platform put forward by the Soviet side in Reykjavik. It would be a fatal step to pass by the historic chance for a cardinal solution to the problems of war and peace. Everything must be done to make use of this chance. This meets the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the United States, the interests of the whole of mankind.

At the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo concrete foreign policy measures, directed at conducting this principled line in connection with the results of the meeting in Reykjavik, were examined and approved.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: RESPONSE TO U.S. FIRST STRIKE THREAT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 86 (Signed to press 19 May 86) pp 23-29

[Article by Col G. Lukava, professor and doctor of philosophical sciences:
"The Surprise Factor in Imperialism's Aggressive Policy"]

[Text] Mankind is now going through perhaps one of the most difficult stages in its development. The cause of this is the aggressive, militaristic course of the most reactionary forces of imperialism led by the right-wing U.S. monopoly bourgeoisie. "By virtue of its social nature," the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th Party Congress points out, "imperialism constantly generates an aggressive, adventuristic policy."

The imperialist military relies on surprise in its aggressive plans. Strictly speaking, the desire to achieve a military strategic superiority in an of itself confirms this. The reactionary circles of the West, above all the Pentagon's strategists, do not wish to give up on the obviously unrealizable idea of the possibility of a delivering with impunity a surprise nuclear strike on the USSR and achieving victory in a nuclear war. Therefore, the question of surprise, which the aggressor is counting on, and its military and political aspects cannot help but attract attention today. It requires a comprehensive analysis and comprehension in order to present clearly the essence of specific countermeasures to be taken to foil the adventuristic plans and insidious schemes of imperialist reaction.

In its essence, military surprise represents actions unexpected for a state or group of states, as well as means and methods of armed conflict making it possible with the least expenditure of manpower and resources, efforts, and time to strike the enemy when he is least prepared to repel a strike. Such a beginning of aggression, imperialist believe, will enable the attacking forces to eliminate or weaken organized resistance by the armed forces of the opposing side and ensure achievement of military, material, and spiritual superiority over the enemy.

In a situation where capitalism has grown into the monopoly stage of its development, reliance on surprise has essentially become the rule in the aggressor's actions. This has been confirmed by the history of two world wars and dozens of local wars unleashed because of imperialist states. During the

dismal years of the "cold war," the U.S. military and political leadership adopted the idea of the fascist blitzkrieg--a perfidious, surprise attack on the USSR and a "lightning-fast" first strike with all forces and resources in order to achieve decisive strategic results already at the very start of the war.

Between 1946 and 1958, this problem was solved quite simply in the Pentagon--they planned to deliver a surprise massive nuclear strike against major Soviet industrial and administrative centers. On the banks of the Potomac they believed that this was precisely the way to achieve a quick victory. Advancing the strategic concept of "massive retaliation," the White House and the American generals proceeded from the fact that although the USSR had eliminated the United States' monopoly on nuclear weapons, at that time it did not have the capability to carry out similar retaliatory actions against objectives located on U.S. territory. After all, at that time aircraft were the nuclear-weapon carriers, and Soviet military airfield were located considerably farther from U.S. territory than American air bases were from the USSR.

In 1959 a new branch of the armed forces was created in the USSR--the Strategic Rocket Forces. This was a forced, but extremely necessary step in response to the growing aggressiveness on the part of imperialism. Through the heroic labor of Soviet scientists, engineers and workers, missiles of various types and purpose capable of reaching U.S. territory were developed and widely introduced into the troops. The Soviet Union created its own nuclear submarine fleet, increasing the vulnerability of a probable aggressor. That is when the "simple and long ago solved" problem concerning the forms and methods of waging a nuclear war unexpectedly became extremely complicated for the U.S. strategists. With deepest disappointment, the Pentagon admitted that in the changed conditions a surprise attack on the USSR would not prevent a powerful retaliatory nuclear missile strike.

Without abandoning their aggressive anti-Soviet plans, American ruling circles began feverishly looking for new forms of armed conflict against real socialism and relying on various war scenarios both with and without the use of nuclear weapons. These intrigues were reflected in the notorious "flexible response" and "realistic deterrence" doctrines, which called for a more cautious approach in planning war against the Soviet Union. But, as before, they were based on a reliance on surprise.

Ignoring historical experience and the realities of our times, in the early 1980's American imperialism decided to make a global technological leap in the military field and break the military strategic parity established between the United States and the USSR. Having initiated an unprecedented arms race, Washington in essence returned to the adventuristic anti-Soviet concepts of the 1940's and 1950's. The United States is developing and widely publicizing military strategic concepts "justifying" reliance on the surprise factor and the offensive nature of using all the armed services equipped with the most destructive types of nuclear and conventional weapons. This is also evidenced by the new military doctrine of the United States, the aggressive essence of which was openly expressed by U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, calling it a strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the USSR

on a global and regional scale. The essence of the doctrine is the unrestricted use of U.S. strategic offensive forces in a surprise first strike against the Soviet Union.

The policy of "direct confrontation" actually further develops the same offensive nuclear strategy which was advanced by the previous occupants of the White House and the Pentagon. But now it is even more open and aggressive in nature. In accordance with this policy, the Pentagon's generals are preparing for lightning-fast, limited, and lengthy wars, planning in any case to use weapons of mass destruction first and nurturing an obviously illusory hope for victory.

High-ranking individuals in the U.S. defense department today talk much about a limited nuclear war, trying to convince the world public that supposedly such a war would not affect the peaceful population of the warring states, much less of other countries. But the idea of a limited nuclear war is a keen variant of the same "first strike" concept. The American medium-range nuclear missiles stationed on the territory of a number of Western European NATO countries are intended precisely for ensuring military strategic surprise when delivering such a strike.

Seeing that the balance existing within the framework of agreements reached earlier cannot be broken by a quantitative buildup of modern arms and that the Soviet Union responds immediately with adequate measures to U.S. attempts to gain a unilateral military advantage, Washington set as its goal to put an end to equal security by a different way--rendering the other side's retaliatory weapons "harmless" by using space-based strike weapons. The directive signed by President Reagan in July 1982 on the national space policy for the next decade places special emphasis on exploring space for military purposes. Expanding this directive, on 23 March 1983 the chief of the White House announced the extremely dangerous for all of humanity "Star Wars" program, called the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) for purposes of misinforming the public. Violating the permanent ABM Treaty concluded earlier between the United States and the USSR, the American side has decided to turn space into a strategic staging base of aggression. Presently the United States is speeding up the creation [sozdaniye] of a second-generation antisatellite system (ASAT). Several tests have been conducted, including the destruction of a real target in space. A special command has been set up in the U.S. armed forces and given the name Space Command.

As the American press points out, \$3 trillion are needed to implement the SDI program. Needless to say, this requires the appropriate international and internal "public" support, extensive publicity, and direct approval by NATO allies. Being aware of this, the Washington administration is putting all mass information and propaganda media and diplomatic channels into action in order to make the "Star Wars" program appear "attractive" and at all costs hide its true purpose from mankind.

Striving to distract people's attention from the widescale military preparations of the United States and NATO, Western propaganda has sharply stepped up the fuss about the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and making great efforts to spread false claims about the West "lagging behind" in the

military sphere, about the appearance of new "windows of vulnerability" in the U.S. war machine, and so forth. All sorts of pseudoscientific "theoretical research" by NATO specialists, experts, and political figures are used to support these false claims.

The aspiration of the White House and Pentagon to deploy space-based strike weapons as quickly as possible is intended to increase sharply the first-strike capability against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. After all, it is no secret that, simultaneously with the decision to begin development of the SDI system, U.S. ruling circles are speeding up development of the armed forces over the entire spectrum of the so-called nuclear triad. According to American press reports, in the past 3 years B-52 strategic bombers have been armed with 1,080 cruise missiles. The U.S. Air Force is receiving the new B-1B strategic bomber, and next the "Stealth." Modernization of the Navy's missiles and arms is being sped up.

As THE NEW YORK TIMES recently wrote, the U.S. Armed Forces will receive the MX ICBM's earlier than planned. Development of another missile--the Midgetman--is nearing completion. The stationing of American medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe continues. At the same time, the process of modernizing and creating [sozdaniye] new types of conventional weapons is continuing to expand in the United States and other NATO countries.

The Soviet Union is countering the rush by overseas and NATO militarists to build nuclear weapons with a clear, precise peaceloving policy corresponding to the expectations of all peoples, a policy of reason and good will. In 1982 the USSR unilaterally pledged not to use nuclear weapons first and called upon the United States to do the same. Since 1983 our country has had a unilateral moratorium in effect on being the first to put antisatellite weapons in space. Back before the summit meeting at Geneva, the Soviet Union suspended further deployment of its medium-range missiles and implementation of other retaliatory measures in Europe and appealed to the United States to respond in kind. From 6 August until the end of 1985 the USSR unilaterally ceased all nuclear detonations. A proposal was made to the United States and other nuclear powers to do the same. The results of the Geneva meeting prompted the Soviet leadership to take another important step--to extend the moratorium on nuclear detonations until 31 March 1986. Finally, in a statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January of this year, a comprehensive program for ridding the earth of weapons of mass destruction over the next 15 years was proposed. Weighing all the circumstances related to the security of its own people and all of mankind as well, in May the Soviet government decided to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to August of this year.

Naturally, such unilateral steps in the military sphere cannot be taken as permanent if the other side declines to implement the proposals made by us and continues the arms race. Contrary to common sense, the White House today is taking precisely such a stand. On the eve of the end of the moratorium announced by the Soviet Union, the United States carried out another nuclear detonation and announced its plans to detonate a number of nuclear devices in the near future. The U.S. ruling circles continue to lay emphasis on pursuing a militaristic policy and rely on strength in order to dictate its will on

other countries and peoples. Furthermore, they make statements publicly that this is precisely the method they will use to influence the Soviet Union's policy as well.

But, as the Soviet leadership has repeatedly emphasized, these attempts are worthless. Force has never worked for anyone against our state before, and now it is simply ridiculous.

The Soviet Union has been forced to maintain the strategic balance by improving and developing its own armed forces and also by taking other necessary defensive steps. And imperialism will not succeed by any tricks in changing the correlation of military forces in its favor. Material and intellectual potential ensures the Soviet Union the ability to create any weapon if we are forced to do so. But we understand the full extent of the responsibility facing today's and future generations. "We are deeply convinced," stated comrade M.S. Gorbachev, "that it is not the 'Star Wars' program with which we must enter the third millennium, but widescale projects for peaceful exploration of space by forces of all mankind."

The reliance by militant circles of U.S. and NATO imperialism on the surprise factor and on the possibility of a "disarming" first nuclear strike against the USSR and its allies requires a constant set of countermeasures on our part which would reliably ensure the failure of a perfidious attack by any aggressor and its decisive defeat. This set of countermeasures is supported by the countless advantages of the socialist system, our economic and defensive might, and the unity, cohesion, and close cooperation of the countries of the socialist community.

First of all, preserving the established military strategic parity, i.e., the approximate equality of combat capabilities of the two opposing military organizations--the USSR and Warsaw Pact armed forces and the U.S. and NATO armed forces--is of great importance in frustrating sudden aggression by imperialism. "The Soviet state and its allies," the new wording of the CPSU Program points out, "do not seek to achieve military superiority, but also will not permit the military strategic balance established in the world arena to be broken."

At the same time, the socialist states are pressing to lower steadily the level of this balance and reduce the number of arms on both sides so as to ensure the security of all peoples.

The highest vigilance of the working people of socialist states and armed defenders of socialism occupies a special place in the set of measures to prevent surprise aggression on the part of imperialism. Revolutionary vigilance for us is quite a broad concept, many-sided, and at the same time sufficiently concrete. It is a specific social and class orientation and direction of consciousness and practical action corresponding to communist ideals and interests of defending the socialist homeland and its security and ensuring a high degree of activeness of public institutions and USSR citizens and their real contribution to exposing and intersecting the hostile actions of forces of reaction and aggression.

In a political sense, vigilance is expressed in the ability of Soviet people in a timely manner to uncover the aggressive plans of imperialists and recognize and render harmless their subversive activities in economic, social, defensive, and ideological spheres. Vigilance is impossible without a thorough understanding of the political situation, meaning that it is closely linked with the class assessment of phenomena of internal and international affairs, a clear awareness of the threat originating from the class enemy, and an irreconcilable attitude toward it. Vigilance in a socialist society is based on people's communist conviction, which is demonstrated in selfless devotion to the motherland and hatred of its enemies and in a firm, acute sense of responsibility for the fate of their country. Vigilance assumes not only a person's constant desire to labor selflessly and even to do heroic deeds in the name of the motherland, but also a daily demonstration of efficiency, smartness, restraint, discipline, decisive refutation of slanderous fabrications and provocative rumors, and strict keeping of state and military secrets. Vigilance is one of the most important moral fighting qualities of the armed defenders of socialism.

Political vigilance in the USSR has taken on nationwide importance and has become a vivid demonstration of life-giving Soviet patriotism and proletarian socialist internationalism, and an inalienable quality of every member of our society. In the practical activities of the CPSU and the Soviet government it is expressed primarily in recognizing in advance attempts of imperialist infringement on the achievements of socialism, posing a danger for the vital interests of our people, the peoples of the entire socialist community, and the defensive capability of the countries of socialism. It is also reflected in all the necessary steps taken for timely frustration of hostile actions of the imperialist warmongers.

The 27th CPSU Congress very definitely pointed out that as long as there is a danger of imperialism unleashing aggression, military conflicts, and various provocations, it is necessary to devote unremitting attention to increasing the defensive might of the USSR and strengthening its security. The Soviet Armed Forces and state security agencies must always be ready to intersect imperialism's intrigues against the USSR and its allies and to defeat any aggressor.

Combat readiness virtually represents that state of the Army and Navy which ensures in any situation their immediate transition to active and decisive actions in order to defeat an enemy. It is characterized by firmness, the ability of troops to carry out successfully pre-planned tasks, mobility, and readiness for combat operations under the most unforeseen conditions and with an abrupt change in the situation.

Of exceptionally great importance in maintaining the USSR Armed Forces in a state of constant combat readiness are the activities of military cadres in forming in personnel of units and subunits the correct scientific idea of the role of surprise in the military strategic plans of imperialism, particularly American imperialism, and real measures to counter these plans. Such a task is being carried out through purposeful and many-sided organizational and ideological activities of military councils, political bodies, and party organizations, especially in the combat and political training process.

Predicting the nature and peculiarities of the war which imperialists are planning against us and the forms it will take, personnel's knowledge of the probable enemy and his capabilities, and a thorough study of the military preparations of the United States and its Atlantic allies occupy an important place. It appears necessary to have a comprehensive analysis of the maneuvers and exercises which are continually conducted by NATO armed forces in direct proximity to the borders of socialist countries. Analyzing these exercises makes it possible to conclude that the armies of the member states of this imperialist bloc are preparing to unleash widescale aggression against the socialist community without a pause in operations.

In a contemporary war, should the imperialist risk unleashing it, the initial period will be of particular importance, when combat operations unfold in a short period of time on an unprecedented scale and encompass land, water, and air space, and we know that the overseas war machine is openly preparing to make active use of space for aggression as well. In such conditions, the difference between the front and rear will virtually disappear.

Exemplary, vigilant alert duty by personnel--maintaining specially assigned forces and resources at a high degree of combat readiness for carrying out suddenly arising tasks or conducting combat operations--is taking on ever-increasing importance in terms of foiling a surprise attack by imperialist aggressors. Increasing the quality and effectiveness of combat training in every possible way and making it as close as possible to the actual conditions of a contemporary war play an enormous role.

During classes and training sessions, tactical exercises, sea and ocean cruises, and when standing alert duty, it is important to explain to the soldiers that the USSR Armed Forces possess the most modern types of weapons and combat equipment which embody the latest achievements of domestic science. In their tactical and technical characteristics they are not inferior to corresponding armaments of the armies of the probable enemy.

At the same time, being concerned about further strengthening the country's defenses, our party is orienting the scientific cadres towards developing fundamental research and solving military-technical problems related to finding new, promising means of conducting armed conflict, which the aggressor counts on using in a war.

One of the main directions of increasing combat readiness of the Army and Navy is moral and psychological training of personnel for actions in conditions where the enemy uses weapons of mass destruction and fundamentally new types of weapons of various classes and purposes. This training is intended to reduce the psychological effect from the enemy's surprise use of the latest means of armed conflict and to increase the overall combat aggressiveness of personnel, and hence thwart the aggressor's plans and ensure inflicting a crushing retaliatory strike on him.

Reliably ensuring the security of the motherland and the achievements of socialism, increasing the vigilance of the Soviet people, strengthening the country's defenses, and maintaining a high combat readiness of the Army and

Navy are constantly at the center of attention of the CPSU and the Soviet government. The guiding role of Lenin's party was, is, and will be that constant factor which guarantees the strength and solidity of our defenses and the might and constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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CSO: 1801/244

3 November 1986

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: GENEVA NUCLEAR SPACE WEAPONS TALKS CONTINUE

Medium-Range Arms Group 25 Sep

LD251406 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 25 Sep 86

[Text] Geneva September 25 TASS--The group on medium-range nuclear weapons had a meeting here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

Space Armaments Group 30 Sep

LD301241 Moscow TASS in English 1232 GMT 30 Sep 86

[Text] Geneva September 30 TASS--The group on space armaments held a session here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments.

Space Weapons Session 7 Oct

LD071231 Moscow TASS in English 1222 GMT 7 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva October 7 TASS--A meeting of the working group for space weapons has been held here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

Strategic Arms Session 8 Oct

LD081300 Moscow TASS in English 1228 GMT 8 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva October 8 TASS--A sitting of the group for strategic armaments was held here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

Strategic Weapons Session 1 Oct

LD011411 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1349 GMT 1 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva, 1 Oct (TASS)--A session of the group for strategic weapons was held here today in the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons.

Medium-Range Arms Session 2 Oct

LD021251 Moscow TASS in English 1233 GMT 2 Oct 86

[Text] Geneva, October 2 TASS--The group on medium-range nuclear armaments met in session here today within the framework of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1014

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADA: VISITING SHEVARDNADZE HOLDS TALKS ON ARMS

Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in English 2 Oct 86 p A5

[Text]

The decision by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to meet face to face in Reykjavik, Iceland, this month has cast a more positive light on prospects at nuclear arms talks, External Affairs Department officials said yesterday.

After the first direct meeting between External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on Wednesday, the officials said that there was an encouraging tone to the talks, which were dominated by arms control.

The atmosphere was relaxed and amicable during the three-hour meeting. Doctrinaire speechmaking that characterized some earlier meetings was absent, they said.

The Soviet minister also gave Mr. Clark some details on the agenda for the Reykjavik meeting and the goals Mr. Gorbachev hopes to achieve with Mr. Reagan. The officials said the Clark-Shevardnadze meetings yesterday concentrated almost entirely on international affairs.

Bilateral issues such as grain sales, Canada-Soviet family reunification cases, trade and other economic issues were reserved for today.

The meetings also provided the Canadian side with an inside view of

the Soviet stance at the Geneva negotiating table. Canada has no status at the Geneva talks and usually has to rely solely on information from the United States.

But the officials, while trying to be as vague as possible on the major points of discussion, did say Mr. Shevardnadze refrained from trying to persuade Mr. Clark that Canada should press the Americans to join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

The United States detonated another nuclear device on Tuesday, but the Soviets have been keeping to a self-imposed moratorium since August, 1985.

A key part of the agenda for Mr. Clark at the meetings with Mr. Shevardnadze is human rights. The officials said the subject was discussed in the context of international agreements stemming from the Helsinki human rights accord, but specific cases involving Canada and the Soviet Union were left to today's agenda.

Although no details were provided, the officials said the two foreign ministers were to discuss during a working lunch regional issues in the context of East-West relations, terrorism, the United Nations and the international economy.

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CSO: 5220/1

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADIAN EDITORIALS ON ABM TREATY PROPOSALS

Narrowing of Gap

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 29 Sep 86 p A8

[Editorial by Keith Spicer]

[Text]

At last we see the makings of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on a guaranteed period of time for continuing to adhere to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. If the two superpowers can agree soon on a lengthy such period, this could signal a breakthrough of major importance in arms control.

The original treaty stipulates that it shall be "of unlimited duration." But each party has the right to withdraw "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter... have jeopardized its supreme interests."

In that event the party concerned must give notice to the other six months prior to actual withdrawal.

Half a year is not long when a country is basing its security policy on the belief that the other side will stick to a treaty. Lead-times in new weapons production are at least several years, including the normal period required to research, develop and test a new concept.

Any move to give more stability to the international strategic security system must be welcomed. Thus President Reagan's offer last week not to deploy strategic defensive weapons for at least seven and a half years (if the Soviets also agree) represents a new departure of great potential significance.

The Reagan proposal would restrict the U.S. and the Soviet Union to research, development and testing of a defence system

through 1991 to determine if advanced strategic defence systems were feasible. After 1991 either side would be obliged to offer the other a plan for sharing the benefits of the new system if it decided it was feasible to deploy the system and wanted to do so.

This second stage provides for a compulsory two-year negotiation period. If this is unsuccessful, the party taking the initiative could deploy after a further six-months' notice of intent to do so.

At about the same time as Reagan announced his plan to the United Nations, the Soviet leader was writing to the president signalling a shift in his position. He proposed that adherence to the ABM Treaty be continued by both sides for "up to" 15 more years. There have even been hints that the Soviets would accept 10 years in the end.

As the gap narrows, negotiation will intensify. The question is fundamental because Moscow will not agree to any reduction of strategic offensive weapons until this issue is settled. The relationship between the two types of weapons is a vital security concern giving rise to fears of "first strike" capability if it gets out of balance.

Since it is in no one's interest to maintain or create an unstable East-West nuclear equation, the sooner Gorbachev and Reagan reach agreement on strategic defences, the better for all of us. Fortunately both leaders now seem to realize this.

Approach in Stages

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 30 Sep 86 p A8

[Editorial by Keith Spicer]

[Text] As we welcome Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Canada today, a few facts might help him make the most of his time.

Despite some differences with our American superpower, Canada is not a soft sister in NATO. Our commitment to Western collective defence is unshakeable. Though we are ourselves a non-nuclear power, we support fully the West's nuclear deterrent and will do nothing to weaken it.

Though Canada wants all nuclear weapons eliminated, we realize there are no solutions in the absence of reasonable trust between East and West. We do, however, share the view that neither superpower should have nuclear superiority — that would only lead to instability and insecurity for us all.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban may seem like a panacea to some and a superpower moratorium a meaningful step towards that end. But unless the leaders of both superpowers feel equally confident that they no longer need to test new weapons, to press for such a step now only creates uncertainty and tension. Instead, we should approach the desired end in stages.

Canada's stand on strategic defence research must not be misunderstood. We hold that it is prudent for the West, for the U.S., to determine the feasibility of developing defences against intercontinental ballistic missiles. Shevardnadze cannot deny that his own

country has been doing the same for a long while.

The crying need is for the two alliance leaders to engage in a fruitful dialogue on the fundamental relationship between strategic defence and strategic offence. Canadians do not understand Moscow's continued refusal to do so.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty requires improvement. The six-month withdrawal clause gives very little sense of security to either side. Canada urges the Soviet Union to negotiate with the U.S. an accord to provide a period of several years of non-deployment. During this time all of us can work for full-scale nuclear reductions and a sharing of technological advances.

Canada has been particularly active in Geneva in promoting the abolition of chemical weapons. If that is the Soviet aim as well, the minister has an ally here — but one that will insist on adequate verification measures.

Above all, Canadians want another superpower summit this year. As agreed last year, it should be held without preconditions.

More generally, our distinguished guest will have had a productive stay here if he departs with the knowledge that Canadians are not security mediators or experimenters. We are solid allies of the Americans — who also want better East-West relations and an end to confrontation.

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CSO: 5220/1

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADIAN EDITORIAL CALLS REYKJAVIK MEETING 'RISKY PREMISE'

Ottawa THE CITIZEN in English 1 Oct 86 p A8

[Text] The suddenly-called "pre-summit summit" in Iceland will give President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev a chance to assess many things. One issue — 'now secondary yet significant — is the precedent set by the Nicholas Daniloff deal. What happens the next time the Americans catch a Soviet spy?

The pressure on President Reagan to secure the U.S. journalist's freedom was impelling. But might it not have been wiser for him not to have made any concessions from the outset even if this meant a delay in achieving the desired result? We think so.

Could it be that the Jimmy Carter-Iran hostage affair warped the president's judgment so much that he placed the individual ahead of the security interests of his country, weakening in the process U.S. negotiating leverage? So it seems.

Even the summit could have been jeopardized if Mikhail Gorbachev had not decided to stop playing games that pleased the KGB and, instead, started thinking of the broader interests of the Soviet Union.

This was not Reagan's finest hour or that of his chief advisers. They sent the wrong signals to the Soviets, and these could well influence Gorbachev's attitude at the summit and in conducting his future policy towards the U.S. That could hurt us all if it means a tougher, less flexible Soviet arms control line, for example. Or a more rigid policy on family reunification and human rights.

The consequences of this week's deal could be grave. Either Soviet espionage activities in the U.S. will now go unchecked or, every time a Russian agent is arrested, an innocent American in Russia will likewise lose his liberty. Then another bargain will be struck and the gruesome business of body-trading will be enacted once more.

As we worry about the future, we can take some comfort in knowing that at least Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov will obtain his freedom as a result of the trade-off. But that might have happened anyway in talks over the 25 alleged spies in the Soviet UN mission.

After the big swap — some details of which were divulged Tuesday — we can at least hope that the Iceland superpower summit and the one to follow in the U.S. will produce some meaningful results in the arms reduction field and, above all, that of human rights.

Yet until Soviet spying in the West is contained and the superpowers conduct their relations in a steadier, more reasoned and less heated manner, our hope for the future is at best guarded and, at worst, fearful.

The hastily agreed-to meeting in Reykjavik may suggest that small crises can help foster big compromises. That may be partly true now because of the timing of the Daniloff affair. But as a substitute for statecraft, it is a risky premise. To prevent further nasty surprises, we still need new ground rules for spy-catching and spy-swapping.

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CSO: 5220/2

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

CANADA: REAGAN ANTICOMMUNISM STANCE IMPEDES ARMS DEALS

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 13 Oct 86 pp A1, A4

[Article by Richard Gwyn]

[Text]

REYKJAVIK — Like a clammy hand from the past, the anti-communism of Ronald Reagan's long-ago Hollywood years reared up here and stopped him from signing the most dramatic and sweeping of all East-West arms deals.

By a combination of his own determination to negotiate from strength and of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's eagerness to spend less on arms so he can spend more on his economy, Reagan had fashioned for himself the chance to become either an architect of international peace on a scale unmatched since World War II, or, at least as he sees it, the architect of permanent U.S. military invulnerability.

Just how close the choice was, we'll never know for sure. Gorbachev, at his news conference, at one point blamed the U.S. "military-industrial complex," and at another commented scath-

ingly that Reagan "did not receive sufficient support" from his own delegation.

Undoubtedly, the hawks around Reagan influenced the president. So, at a distance, did all the scientists and corporations whose livelihoods, and profits, depend upon Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative anti-missile program.

But, almost certainly, Reagan's choice was most influenced by the old Reagan who in the 1950s relentlessly chased out closet

Communists from among the actors and screen-writers in Hollywood.

The intervening years, and above all his six years in power, have matured Reagan enough for Gorbachev to be able to say, "I can do business with him." But, in the end, the old Reagan convinced the Reagan of today that it's better to be invulnerable to Communists than to be at peace with them.

Reagan's offer to Gorbachev amounted to an offer he had to refuse. Indeed, in Gorbachev's vivid phrase, "only a madman" would have accepted it.

Over two days of almost round-the-clock talks, the two sides agreed to arms cuts unprecedented in breadth and depth — a 50-per-cent reduction in strategic missiles, followed by their com-

plete elimination over 10 years; virtual elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe; a phased reduction of nuclear tests.

These accords would not only have abruptly ended the arms race but, by ending the principal source of fear between the two superpowers — that one or the other might launch a first strike — could have transformed U.S.-Soviet relations into the kind of near-normal relations that now exist between those former Cold War opponents, the United States and China.

But mutual cuts on such a scale can happen only if the two sides trust each other. Perversely, as each side does away with the weapons that have for so long protected it, so would it become proportionately more concerned that the other side was similarly acting in good faith.

In place of trust, Reagan insisted upon what Secretary of State George Shultz described as "an insurance policy." He insisted, that is, on the unimpeded right to develop his Strategic Defence Initiative anti-missile program. The threat to actually deploy SDI, explained Shultz, would "ensure compliance" by the Soviets.

Reagan's insurance policy, though, would in effect bankrupt the Soviet Union militarily. At the same time as the Soviet Union was dismantling its missiles — in lock-step with U.S. reductions — the United States would be developing a system that could, with ever-greater ease, render "impotent and obsolete" the Soviet Union's dwindling armory. In theory, the United States would become invulnerable and the Soviet Union be left unable to respond to a U.S. attack.

Only a Soviet "madman" would ever sign so one-sided a deal.

A strong case can be made that Gorbachev, by demanding the SDI research be conducted only in laboratories, was similarly insisting upon more insurance than he really needed. In an astonishing admission, he declared he was "not militarily concerned about SDI," because it would not work anyway.

Both sides seemed to be trapped, from opposite ends, in a chain of illogicality. Reagan was insisting on the insurance of SDI even after negotiating an agreement that would have done away with all of the strategic missiles the system is supposed to be able to knock down.

Gorbachev was insisting that Reagan effectively abandon a defence program that he believes is technologically unfeasible.

Gorbachev broke the chain of mutual illogicality when he declared that the real problem with SDI was "political." It showed "a lack of trust, a suspicion." Amid suspicion and mistrust, he said, "there can be no reductions in armaments."

There, surely, is the heart of the matter. The missiles exist because the two superpowers mistrust each other. So long as the mistrust remains, so will the missiles.

Yet what will remain also after Reykjavik is the memory of how close the two sides came to trusting each other. Against everyone's expectations, Reagan and Gorbachev almost rewrote post-war history.

The agreements that were negotiated, although not signed, represent new high-water marks in East-West diplomacy. Their sheer scope (extending beyond arms control to, for instance, a "reference," according to Shultz, to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union) shows that the two superpowers can — almost — do business.

Maybe, before his two remaining years as president are done, Reagan will exorcise the old Hollywood, anti-Communist ghost from himself. More probably, some new president, untrammled by the past, will take over where Reagan left off.

If that happens, then the sharpest memory of Reykjavik will be not that Reagan and Gorbachev failed, nor even of how close they came to success, but rather of how silly was the reason that stopped Reagan from writing himself into history as a statesman of peace rather than as a warrior of strength.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA: U.S. TO RESUME CRUISE MISSILE TESTS IN CANADA

PM061051 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 5 Oct 86 p 4

[TASS report: "More Tests"]

[Text] Ottawa, 4 Oct--U.S. cruise missile tests will resume in Canada, the National Defense Ministry announced on Friday. They were halted after two flights by these nuclear-capable missiles ended unsuccessfully in January and February this year. Under the military agreement concluded between Canada and the United States in 1983, the Pentagon is empowered to hold six tests of these nuclear missiles a year. The Canadian Foreign Ministry has let it be known that the first of the new series of tests will be held in the fall.

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CSO: 5200/1020

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TURKISH OPPOSITION TO MISSILE DEPLOYMENT--Ankara October 9 TASS--The deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads on Turkish territory is out of the question, according to an official spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Sami Onaran made the statement in connection with remarks in Istanbul by Lieutenant-General T.F. Healy, head of staff of the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Southern Europe, to the effect that Turkey should accept cruise and Pershing missiles on its territory. The Turkish spokesman said that the deployment of any weapons on Turkish territory was a national question and needed governmental approval. Turkey's stand on this issue did not change. Onaran said that Turkey had always opposed the deployment of nuclear-tipped missiles on its territory. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2057 GMT 9 Oct 86 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/1031

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MOSCOW RADIO: U.S. 'PUSHING' BACTERIOLOGICAL WAR PREPARATIONS

LD041220 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English 1400 GMT 22 Sep 86

[Text] The United States is pushing through its work on the creation of bacteriological arms. According to the American newspaper WALL STREET JOURNAL, the Pentagon has placed orders for the production of the most dangerous Rift Valley fever virus in laboratories of four big American corporations and 24 universities. Altogether the U.S. Defense Department has allocated, in violation of international conventions, a sum of \$42 million for work on 57 projects for creating bacteriological means of mass affliction.

Washington tries to cover up its criminal activities by declaring that there is a theoretical basis for that. Bacteriological arms made with the use of the latest technology and without going into heavy expenses may assume an especially important military significance. They are capable of becoming truly great, said the U.S. assistant defense secretary, Douglas Feith, in an interview given to THE WASHINGTON POST. And other Pentagon officials, contrary to logic, declare that bacteriological arms are allegedly elements of America's defense arsenal.

The danger of the experiments conducted by the American military and the fact that they are most certainly not doing this for defense purposes but are seeking ways to speedily and cheaply annihilate whole nations may be judged from many facts. For instance, it is well known that the U.S. Defense Department has been trying hard to use the inhabitants of a number of developing countries as the object of their experiments. Artificially creating hotbeds of infection, the Pentagon bacteriologists are provoking epidemics, haemorrhagic fever in Korea, dengue in Cuba, viral encephalitis in Nicaragua and conjunctivitis in El Salvador. Lately information has been received to the effect that the AIDS virus, which is a syndrome of a deficit of immunity, is also the work of the very same American specialists.

French scientists Jacob and Levi Segal have established that the AIDS virus is an artificial product obtained as a result of manipulations with human genes. In a report distributed in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, scientists noted that back in 1977 a center was created at the Fort Detrick base in Maryland state where research was conducted on human beings, prisoners who had received long prison terms. The human guinea pigs were promised to be released if they remained alive. There is evidence, the authors of the document point out, that some of those former prisoners who had survived and were eventually released had become the spreaders of this new disease. Soon the employees of the bacteriological center became convinced that the time required for spreading this virus was insufficiently speedy for military purposes. However, they were already powerless to halt the spreading of the epidemic that had been started.

The version spread by the USA to the effect that the AIDS virus started spreading from Africa, stress Jacob and Levi Segal, is part of a large-scale and racist operation launched for the purpose of hiding the preparations that are going on in the USA for a bacteriological war. There are all indications that the United States Administration, having sanctioned the development of the banned arms, cannot rest in peace over the fact that the Japanese militarists obtained certain successes in this line. For, at the time World War II was ending, a special unit of the Japanese Imperial Army, the notorious Unit Number 731, whose crimes have now been publicized, already possessed stocks of death-dealing bacteria and had sufficient quantities to destroy all of mankind. But the past must not be repeated, and the world must not permit madmen nurturing thoughts of global dominance to once again threaten the world with this horrible weapon whose effects are quite unpredictable.

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CSO: 5200/1015

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

IZVESTIYA: 'AGENT ORANGE' AFTERMATH, U.S. CBW BOOST

PM081019 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 7 Oct 86 p 4

[A. Blinov dispatch: "The Poisoned and the Poisoners"]

[Text] Washington -- For 15 years the toxic substance dioxin has remained firmly in the organisms of the Americans who sprayed so-called "Agent Orange" in South Vietnam during the Vietnam war.

This is evidenced by the recently published results of research into the blood and fatty tissue of former American military servicemen that was conducted over the course of 3 years by a group of American and Swedish doctors.

A total of 48 million liters of "Agent Orange" was sprayed by the American Air Force over the territory of South Vietnam. It not only destroyed vegetation over large areas but also basically poisoned all life forms. Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese suffered as a result.

"Agent Orange" ricocheted against those who loaded it into aircraft canisters and were part of the units which invaded the affected zones. [paragraph continues]

Many of them suffer from various illnesses. Due to genetic damage some of them have produced invalid children. Two years ago seven chemical companies agreed to pay out of court limited compensation to a group of Americans suffering from the effects of "Agent Orange".

However, the main guilty party, the U.S. Government, has no intention of admitting its guilt for waging a chemical war prohibited by international conventions. What is more, the Pentagon is building up its chemical weapons. Its latest "invention" is binary munitions. Without waiting for final consent from Congress, the Pentagon has spent many millions of dollars on developing binary weapons. In all it is planned to spend an astronomical sum, \$10 billion, on the creation [sozdaniye] of a full-scale chemical arsenal in the coming year.

The United States is also working on other barbaric weapons -- biological weapons. According to members of the Foundation on Economic Trends organization, large stocks of lethally dangerous microorganisms have been accumulated at the biological warfare center at Fort Detrick (Maryland). The lawsuit brought to the court by members of the foundation points out that in 1981 the laboratory noticed that the contents of an almost 1-liter vessel was missing. It contained the virus of a disease widespread in Asian and African countries that produces the symptoms of severe influenza. According to (N. Levitta), the former head of this laboratory, there was no inquiry into the incident. As stated in the lawsuit, Fort Detrick employees could remove lethal viral strains from the laboratory even in their briefcases.

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CSO: 5200/1015

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR'S ISRAELYAN: BW BAN TALKS RESULTS 'POSITIVE'

LD281107 Moscow TASS in English 0957 GMT 28 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 28 TASS -- "The vast majority of the delegations have demonstrated their interest in strengthening the convention," Viktor Israelyan, leader of the Soviet delegation to the second review conference on the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction, said in an interview with the Geneva correspondent of the newspaper IZVESTIYA.

"The Soviet delegation," he said in the interview which was published today, "has done everything in its power towards achieving the prime goal of the conference, which we have seen as enhancing the germ warfare ban convention in every way."

"We have suggested drafting and adopting an extra protocol to the convention to provide for stronger verification measures," he added. "With that aim it has also been proposed holding, after appropriate preparations, a special conference of the states that are parties to the convention and readiness has been expressed to do this without delay, for instance next year," Israelyan said.

"In our conviction," he said, "broad state-to-state cooperation in the peaceful development of biological science and uses of its achievements in the interests of social, economic, scientific and technological progress is among the effective ways of strengthening the convention's regime."

"Many proposals have been made at the conference on this score. We are convinced that this approach will provide an added fillip to the further expansion of international cooperation in the interests of advancing biological science and for the benefit of peace and progress," Israelyan added. "We consider the results of the conference to be positive also because the convention is part of the existing machinery for limiting the arms race and promoting disarmament. The Soviet Union is prepared for constructive cooperation with all countries which are interested in it in fact rather than in words."

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CSO: 5200/1015

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: AFGHAN REBEL CHEMICAL USE LINKED TO BINARY ARMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by A. Goltz: "They Have 'Silent Death' in their Arsenals"]

? [Text] The Bakhtar Agency has issued a statement reporting that the Armed Forces of Afghanistan seized an enormous lot of chemical ammunition during military operations against the Dushman. According to testimony from former counterrevolutionaries who had come over to the national authorities, Dushman bands have been given instructions to begin using chemical weapons not only against the armed forces, but also against the peaceful DRA population.

Judging from everything available, the American special operations which directly control the Dushman have conceived new, large-scale provocation with chemical weapons. And it is aimed at a long-range goal. The American Congress will again soon vote on allocating assets for the production of binary chemical weapons. Judging from the materials in the American press and statements by U.S. political figures, many legislators have planned to come out decisively against the production of a new variety of "silent death."

The Administration and the Pentagon are feverishly looking for arguments with which to force Congress to approve "chemical rearmament." For example, the NEW YORK TIMES ran an article by Director Adelman of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in which he attempted to prove that the production of binary ammunition would facilitate progress in the negotiations on totally banning chemical weapons.

But just as before, Washington's main bet is on provocation. It is, in general, not very complicated. Chemical weapons were transferred to Dushman bands. At the right time they would use these weapons against the peaceful inhabitants. And the mass media agencies that are obedient to the administration would again raise the evil howl about how mythical "Soviet manufactured chemical weapons" are being used in Afghanistan. And as a result Congress would allocate assets for binary weapons.

But Afghan Army operations disrupted the provocateurs' schemes and they were caught red-handed. The weapons that were seized in Afghanistan are just one piece of evidence that convicts the criminals who are planning to conduct chemical warfare against the population.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET MAJOR CLAIMS DUSHMANI USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

PMO21327 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Second Edition) in Russian 30 Sep 86 p 3

[Report by correspondent Major A. Oliynik: "The Dushmans are Using Chemical Weapons. Press Conference in Kabul"]

[Text] Kabul, 29 Sep -- A press conference here for local and foreign journalists presented convincing new evidence of the involvement of the United States and its satellites in the undeclared war against the DRA. It concerned the Afghan counterrevolutionaries' use of barbaric chemical weapons, manufactured in the United States, the FRG, and other capitalist countries, as well as conventional weapons.

DRA Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel (Ghulyam Dzhilani) gave conference participants details of the wide variety of types of chemical weapons recently captured by the Afghan Army when routing dushman gangs in Kabul, Lowgar, and Vardak provinces. They include 82mm and 60mm mortar bombs filled with toxic agents, CS gas hand grenades, and a powerful toxic agent for poisoning water. There were examples of photographs of poisoned civilians and manuals compiled by Western special services for the dushmans: "How To Use Chemical Weapons," "Chemical Materials And Their Practical Use."

A BAKHTAR spokesman addressed the conference, stressing that while one of the most pressing issues of modern times -- banning and destroying chemical weapons -- is being discussed at the United Nations and other international forums, U.S. special services, with the assistance of the dushman rabble, use Afghan soil as a site to test and use chemical weapons.

It was stressed at the conference that according to statements by former counterrevolutionaries who have gone over to the DRA's side and the testimony of dushman prisoners, the bandits are being trained to use chemical weapons in Afghanistan by U.S. instructors based in Peshawar (Pakistan) and masquerading as various specialists, including doctors. According to their statements, the chemical weapons must be used primarily against civilians. The foreign advisers are demanding they be used in such a way as to be able to blame the Afghan Army and units of the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan for the killings. As "material evidence" the bandits were ordered to send to Peshawar photographs of the people, animals, and plants they had poisoned and samples of water and soil from contaminated areas.

A certain (Sakhi Mukhammed), former gang member from the "Islamic society of Afghanistan," taken prisoner recently by the DRA state security organs, said his group of 20 had trained at a center near Peshawar. Two Pakistani advisers and one American conducted training in the use of chemical weapons on Afghan territory. They had

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vigorously recommended the use of chemical weapons in densely populated places to kill as many civilians as possible, and by night, to create panic. To undermine the historic gains of the April Revolution and halt and reverse socioeconomic development of democratic Afghanistan, a BAKHTAR statement says, reactionary forces, headed by the United States, are prepared to use the dirtiest methods in the bloody war by the dushmans against their own people, including barbaric chemical weapons. The Afghan people angrily condemn the criminal plans of U.S. imperialism and its accomplices and will do all they can to wreck the intrigues of counterrevolution.

/12858

CSO: 5200/1015

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS MILITARY COMMENTATOR ON NEED TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

LD032358 Moscow International Service in Polish 1500 GMT 3 Oct 86

[Commentary by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS commentator on military affairs]

[Excerpts] The problem of the ban on chemical weapons manifested itself to humanity over 70 years ago, when these weapons were actively used during World War I. [passage omitted]

Stemming from a general concept of preparing for a war a considerable distance from American territory, the U.S. ruling circles assume that in the age of nuclear missiles, they will be able to adopt chemical weapons in a war without exposing themselves to the risk of a chemical strike in retaliation on their own territory. Installing chemical weapons in Western Europe and completing its arsenals with new binary ammunition, the Pentagon continues to count upon gaining a one-sided advantage in a chemical war. American strategists assume the side which first employs poisonous substances will be able to achieve victory, if only on a limited scale. It is not insignificant as regards the U.S. stance, which does not want to go for a full ban on chemical weapons, that the U.S. Army, as a result of the Vietnam War, acquired great experience in conducting chemical warfare. The United States has at its disposal the largest supplies of chemical weapons in the world, including an arsenal of poisonous agents which paralyze the nervous system and which are particularly dangerous for humanity. The Pentagon is going ahead with mass production of a fundamentally new form of chemical weapons: binary ammunition.

During the multilateral negotiations conducted for many years in Geneva concerning a total ban on chemical weapons, the American side unceasingly took up an obstructionist stance. For example, for a while, the head of the U.S. delegation to these negotiations stated that control over adherence to the agreement is absolutely imperative but impossible.

In this way, the possibility of the United States' joining any agreement whatsoever concerning chemical weapons was made impossible in practice. A similar stance by Washington collides directly with agreements noted in the Soviet-American declaration after last year's summit meeting in Geneva. At the time, both sides acknowledged as irrevocable the mobilization of efforts for the conclusion of an effective international convention for a total and universal ban on chemical weapons, enabling appropriate control and the destruction of supplies of these weapons already in existence. The wide-ranging program for the banning and liquidation of existing supplies of chemical weapons, put forward recently by the Soviet Union, creates new prospects for achieving an agreement which is mutually acceptable. The Soviet program

forsees not only the liquidation of all chemical weapons supplies but also the destruction of the industrial base for its production. All these steps, as proposed by the Soviet union, would take place in conditions of strict control, which would include an international territorial inspection.

To achieve a final solution to the problem of chemical weapons in the interests of all of humanity, all that is necessary is Washington's goodwill and its turning away from a 19th century mentality.

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CSO: 5200/1015

3 November 1986

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

MOSCOW: U.S. 'MISINFORMATION' ON AFGHAN CW--The editor of the newspaper WASHINGTON POST, Leonard Downie, says the actions of the United States Government fully undermined all trust in it and in the American press as well. An analysis from our commentator, Aleksandr Pogodin, who writes: In the same way claims are made now that the Afghan Army uses toxic chemicals against civilians. But it's common knowledge that the bands dispatched to Afghanistan from outside widely use chemical weapons made in the United States. These facts were reported by foreign journalists staying in Afghanistan. [Excerpts] [Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 7 Oct 86 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1015

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

FRG PAPER SEES CDE CONCLUSION AS DYNAMIC BREAKTHROUGH

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 26 Sep 86 p 7

[Article by Gerhard von Glinski: "One Step Beyond Defense"]

[Text] One is not taking away anything from the agreement reached in Stockholm, if one lays the emphasis on the instrumental nature of this conference. The conference came to a successful conclusion because the two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, wanted it this way at this juncture and not because this conference on confidence building and disarmament in Europe had worked out the agreement all by itself as part of a continuous process. Quite a few of the 35 delegations will therefore be left with some bitter feelings because this service aspect does not really correspond to the rules of the entire CSCE process to which we have grown accustomed.

At the same time, it would be unrealistic to express regrets about missed opportunities. To be sure, the natural weight of the military blocs was clearly in evidence--particularly during the closing stage when the NATO and Warsaw Pact commissions entered into direct negotiations. Once these talks had started, the neutrals and the non-aligned, who had so often helped the CSCE process overcome an impasse, were left out in the cold. But then they, too, will profit from the conference outcome.

This outcome is not so much reflected in the details of the painstakingly developed text language but rather in the spirit behind it. To put it simply, the outcome of the Stockholm conference means that the situation in Europe will henceforth be marked by dynamics rather than stasis.

This is the new aspect as compared to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which also contained some dynamic aspects--but in truth only in the eyes of the West. The West meant to take advantage of that Final Act in order to inject more freedom and self-determination into East Europe by way of compliance with its human rights provisions. This met with only limited success; in the Soviet Union, for instance, the Helsinki watch groups have since been quashed.

The East has always seen the Helsinki Final Act as placing the final seal of approval on the European frontiers and the new political order which had emerged following World War II. It was a document which legitimized its usurpation, i.e. the entire cordon of socialist states in Eastern

Europe erected by the Soviet Union after 1945. The subsequent European security conferences held in Belgrade and Madrid could do no more than retouch this image slightly.

In Stockholm, things were different. Albeit with a great many provisos and limitations, the dynamic principle was acknowledged by both sides. Both sides are banking on the future and entering into a dialogue. For the United States, this is not so much of a new departure; it has dealt with all disarmament accords since the late sixties in this way; but for the Soviet Union, the Stockholm agreement represents a step out of the defensive. The new leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev has recognized that the old stonewalling tactics are no longer of any avail.

This logic is reflected in the roughly 30 pages of the final conference document and its binding provisions which include the prior announcement of military activities. Whenever at least 13,000 men or 300 tanks are involved in military maneuvers, such maneuvers must be announced at least 42 days before they are scheduled to start.

The two sides have met halfway as regards their original position with the East gaining something of an advantage in the process. Since its divisions are normally smaller than 13,000 men, their activities do not require prior announcement.

It is extremely uncertain whether this particular provision would make a new Czechoslovak-style invasion impossible and whether it would lead to the abandonment of threatening gestures such as those by the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Poland in the "Solidarnosc" era. In this regard, the Stockholm agreement will fare no differently than other agreements: as long as it has the support of the participants it will work in practice.

The experiences of the past several years are reflected in the new provisions regarding the observation of military activities. The value of Western observers at Eastern maneuvers has been very limited. The present agreement states that the observers will be given an opportunity to observe larger-size combat units at the division (or other equal) level; to visit them whenever possible and to speak with the commanding officers. This is an indication of the fact that none of this was possible heretofore. It remains to be seen whether the more precise language will do the trick.

From the Western point of view, the most interesting provisions are doubtless those dealing with compliance and verification of the agreement. Robert Barry, the head of the U.S. delegation in Stockholm, called this particular passage "historic." That is no exaggeration. This segment of the agreement could really mark a fundamental change in East-West relations.

One need only recall the fifties when Nikita Khrushchev rejected President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal. The Soviets, he said, would never allow anyone to peek into their bedroom. At that time, the Kremlin leader let a summit conference in Paris collapse over the downing of an American reconnaissance plane--that was the famous U-2 affair. Still taking this same line, Andrei Gromyko rejected the suggestion of on-site inspection in the Soviet Union at the opening of the CDE conference 32 months ago.

By contrast, the Americans had become so obsessed with the idea of verification that they measured each and every East-West accord against it. Verification became an *idée fixe* with them.

Against this background, the relevant passage still looks somewhat meager in view of its many petty provisos--but it is there nonetheless. Any participating nation has the right to request inspection on the territory of any other nation, if it harbors any doubt about compliance with the agreement. This right to inspection must be honored no more than three times a year. It will not be conducted in an aircraft of the inspecting country but in one provided by the host nation. But the request must be honored. That is the point.

Clearly, this document could serve as a model for other East-West disarmament agreements dealing with nuclear or chemical weapons. Mikhail Gorbachev has jumped over the shadow of the past on this issue. For the first time, he has honored his verbal commitments.

In awareness of previous disappointments, the West is hesitant about viewing the Stockholm accord as more than a ray of hope. To be sure, Stockholm is not Geneva where the negotiations on nuclear weapons are going on. But the fact that this agreement was reached 10 months after the Geneva summit where the two superpowers set the course has restored at least some confidence in the world.

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CSO: 5200/2415

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

PRC JOURNAL ON PROGRESS AT CDE IN STOCKHOLM

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 29, No 41, 13 Oct 86 pp 11-12

[Article by Zheng Dexin: "East and West Move a Step Closer"]

[Text] **T**he agreement on confidence and security building measures reached in late September by the 35 countries participating in the European Disarmament Conference in Stockholm contributes to the easing of tension in Europe and the improvement of East-West relations.

The final document adopted at the Stockholm conference reiterates that participants will not resort to armed force, and disputes must be solved by peaceful means. It also specifies regulations for the advanced notification of military exercises and on-site inspection.

This agreement among the members of the European Disarmament Conference was acclaimed by the Western world as the first East-West security accord since the beginning of the 1980s, and the first major agreement since 1979, when the second strategic nuclear arms conference was held.

Attended by 33 European nations (except Albania) and by the United States and Canada, the meeting aimed at building confidence between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact by reducing the risk of accidental military clashes.

When the conference began in January 1984, the United States

and the Soviet Union had suspended disarmament talks and were embroiled in serious disputes over medium-range missiles. For a long time the meeting made no progress because of disagreements over procedural matters. Only after the US-Soviet summit last November did it begin substantive discussions and documents were drawn up on the basis of a compromise proposal put forward by neutral states.

Significant progress was made over the last two months as concessions were made both by the United States and the Soviet Union. The latter agreed to the notification, observation and on-the-spot inspection of its military activities. Moscow also conceded to limit notification of military activities to operations on the ground, postponing discussion of exercises in space until later. Washington responded with several concessions. It agreed to inform the Warsaw Pact of all troop movements from America to Europe; to give notification of exercises involving more than 13,000 soldiers instead of a smaller figure, and to reduce inspections to three a year, pledging not to abuse the right of inspection.

The world has reacted positively to the results of the conference. West German Chancellor Helmut

Kohl said the Stockholm accord showed that with patience and persistence mutually acceptable agreements can be arrived at despite the difficulties in East-West relations and arms control.

Compared with the final document adopted at the European Security Conference held in Helsinki in 1975, the current accord has moved one step forward. First, the 1975 document required only the voluntary notification of military activities while the 1986 one has binding force on all signatory nations. Secondly, the Helsinki agreement limited inspection to an area 150 miles within the Soviet Union's

western border. The new Stockholm agreement, however, makes the whole territory of Europe— from the Atlantic to the Urals, a distance of more than 1,000 miles— subject to inspection. Thirdly, Moscow has given up its former stand regarding supervision and examination. These are viewed as the most important achievements of the conference and its contribution to the International Peace Year.

However, the concessions made by the Soviet Union and the United States are very limited ones and differences between them still exist on the actual implementation of the document. Worldwide, agreement on disarmament is still a long way off. ■

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CSO: 5200/4008

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER HITS U.S. ARGUMENTS ON MORATORIUM

PM131145 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (First Edition) in Russian 9 Oct 86 p 3

[A. Lyutyy "Pertinent Notes": "Back-to-Front Arguments"]

[Text] Robert Gale, the U.S. medic who became world famous thanks to his noble assistance to the victims of the Chernobyl AES accident, said at a recent Las Vegas press conference: "The radiation resulting from the Chernobyl accident was just one-tenth of the radiation which arises after the detonation of the smallest nuclear device. Bear in mind that we were operating in optimum conditions. There were more than enough doctors and the hospitals were unharmed. But what would happen during a nuclear war? Chernobyl has yet again refuted those who hope to survive a nuclear war." Moving to the topic of nuclear test, Gale bitterly felt that such tests are "contra-indicated by people's health."

U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger did not attend the press conference. And not only because he is probably no admirer of Gale's talents. Weinberger does not believe that nuclear tests in the United States are harmful for his health. Moreover, the secretary is profoundly convinced that not only the physical but political and moral health of the entire country would be considerably strengthened if the United States continued to explode ever larger charges at the underground test site in Nevada. The Pentagon boss preaches a clear creed with regard to military-political strategy: "More, more, and still more." More billions for the arms race, more of the latest first-strike systems. And, finally, more nuclear tests.

The longer the Soviet Union observes its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, the more powerful will be the wave of public feelings in the United States favoring the moratorium and the more uncomfortable Weinberger will feel. He has repeatedly vented his emotions on this score, and with increasing frequency recently. Weinberger is now aiming his ire mainly at Congress, which -- oh, how sinful! -- has dared to oppose the administration's stand on the nuclear test issue. As is well known, the Senate voted for the United States to conclude a nuclear test ban agreement and the House of Representatives advocated banning nuclear tests yielding more than 1 kiloton as of 1 January 1987. For Weinberger this is tantamount to a betrayal of national interests. In a letter sent to Congress the other day the Pentagon leader stated that such bans "undermine the reliability of our deterrence forces and postpone, possibly for an unlimited period, our persistent efforts" in the direction of arms limitation and reduction.

The U.S. defense secretary's message is more than dubious, to put it mildly. For it is far simpler to strive for nuclear arms limitation and reduction by merely ending tests

and thereby removing the possibility of improving these weapons. However, it is this that the Pentagon opposes. "Nuclear weapons tests," Weinberger wrote bluntly to Congress, "are of decisive importance for ensuring the security and safekeeping of our warheads and weapons systems." In other words, Weinberger and his soul mates are planning not to eliminate but to retain and augment nuclear arsenals. At any rate, the talk about willingness to curb the arms race is not backed up by real action.

It is already obvious that there is no real foundation to a number of arguments which have already been put forward by Washington for several months now to justify its reluctance to join in the Soviet moratorium. Let us return, for instance, to Weinberger's statement about the need to maintain the reliability and safekeeping of U.S. nuclear warheads.

Including the recent "Labquark" nuclear test, the United States has carried out 21 nuclear explosions in Nevada since the USSR introduced the moratorium on 6 August last year. Have they all really been carried out in order to ensure that U.S. nuclear arsenals are reliable and secure? At this juncture it is apposite to cite the opinion of Tom Wicker, one of the best-known U.S. observers. "When," Wicker points out, "the White House insists that the United States needs to continue testing in order to check the reliability of existing weapons, even those Americans who support the administration must ask why the Soviet Union does not need to carry out tests to check reliability? And why will only a few Americans admit that most scientists -- including Norris Bradbury, former director of the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory -- believe that there is no need to hold tests for checking purposes? For the United States tests new weapons 10-15 times a year on average, while explosions for checking purposes are held less than once a year."

Nor does the argument that the Soviet Union has held more nuclear tests, and the United States consequently has to catch up stand up to examination. A report recently published by the Center for Defense Information organization in Washington points out that as of August 1986 the United States had held 828 nuclear tests and the Soviet Union had held 604.

Another pseudo-argument is the statement that the moratorium on nuclear explosions cannot be effectively verified [kontrolivorat]. President Nixon once said that it was quite possible for a ban to be "adequately verified [proverka]" and since then national verification [kontrol] means have become much more sophisticated and reliable. "Practically all nongovernmental seismographic specialists," THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "believe that verification [proverka] of the observance of the ban can be guaranteed." The joint experiment by Soviet and U.S. seismologists in the Semipalatinsk region is weighty proof of this. The U.S. scientists were able to monitor [kontrolivorat] tremors in direct proximity to the Soviet nuclear test range. It is worth noting that when the U.S. seismologists invited their Soviet colleagues to the region of the Nevada test range to carry out similar measurements, the State Department imposed a number of clearly artificial conditions with the aim of wrecking the trip.

Recently there have been increasingly frequent statements in the United States to the effect that it is necessary initially to reach an agreement on reducing nuclear arms, and only subsequently to ban nuclear explosions. This thesis was debunked in a recent conversation of mine with William Fulbright, one of the best-known U.S. politicians and formerly chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. "That argument is back to front," he said. "What could be more effective than a nuclear test ban which would initially slow and then freeze the process of improving nuclear weapons? What could be better than this prerequisite for subsequent reductions in nuclear arsenals?"

There are other "back-to-front arguments" currently being cited in Washington. They all bear witness not to state wisdom and a willingness to take constructive steps in the direction of ending the arms race but to a desire to expedite nuclear tests. "I oppose a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement, even if it were verifiable [poddavalos proverke]," Assistant Defense Secretary R. Perle once said. Therein lies the essence of the position of many "hawks" in the administration, who regrettably carry great weight in the country's military and foreign policy.

Speaking in Congress the other day, Senator Hatfield, the well-known Republican, stated that people like Perle "do not care what agreement is being talked about since they do not want any agreement at all." Sincerely hoping for success at the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik, the senator said: "We must not allow such figures to reduce Soviet-U.S. cooperation to zero."

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CSO: 5200/1029

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. PLANNING 16 OCT NUCLEAR TEST BLAST

LD150025 Moscow TASS in English 0015 GMT 15 Oct 86

[Text] New York October 14 TASS -- The Reagan administration, in challenging American public opinion and all sober-minded people on earth, intends to detonate another nuclear device shortly. The explosion, code-named Belmont, was slated for Thursday morning, October 16, Ms. Crescent of the Rocky Mountain Peace Center said to TASS correspondent Antoliy Lazarev. It will be conducted in sector 20 at the Nevada test site. She emphasized that six American anti-war campaigners (Amy Milhouser, 24, Beverly Lyne, 35, Steve Smith, 34, John Seward, 26, Mike Geare, 30, and Charlie Hiflenaus, 37) today sneaked inside the test area. According to Crescent, the objective of these courageous people was to try and hinder the testing.

Belmont will become the 22nd nuclear weapon test (counting the explosions that went unannounced by Washington), conducted by the United States since the Soviet Union introduced its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. News analysts do not rule out the possibility that the blast is linked with Ronald Reagan's "star wars" programme. U.S. anti-war activists are planning protest demonstrations near the gate of the nuclear test range to demand that the Reagan administration stop nuclear tests and join the Soviet moratorium.

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CSO: 5200/1029

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW TV: SETTING-UP AT KAZAKH MONITORING STATIONS COMPLETE

LD101848 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 10 Oct 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The setting-up of nuclear test monitoring stations in Kazakhstan has been completed. The establishment of the stations was envisaged by an agreement between U.S. and Soviet scientific organizations within the framework of a joint experiment on monitoring nuclear tests. It was planned to set up a network of seismic stations in direct proximity to Soviet and U.S. nuclear test sites. Now three stations are in operation in Central Kazakhstan. For the time being, there is not a single one in Nevada, although the agreement envisaged the arrival of a group of Soviet scientists in the United States as far back as September. But, because of the unacceptable conditions being put forward by the U.S. authorities, the arrival of the Soviet seismologists in Nevada is impossible for the time being. In the meantime, there is already a third group of U.S. scientists working in Kazakhstan. We filmed this report of the base station in Karkaralinsk on the night when another nuclear blast -- already the 21st since the Soviet moratorium has been in effect -- was being prepared in Nevada. The echo reached the instruments at the monitoring station in Kazakhstan 13 minutes after the blast in Nevada.

[Video shows scientist talking to camera, identified by caption as V.G. Martynov, staff member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Earth Physics Institute]

[Martynov] What is the significance of this work? We seismologists are trying to help society and people to make the world secure. The significance is not in obtaining new scientific data, although they will come, of course. The significance lies in convincing the world, with this cooperation and this joint work, of the possibility of registering any test, of the possibility of monitoring the silence of nuclear test sites.

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CSO: 5200/1029

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET MEDIA ASSESS PHILIPPINE POSITION ON NT, SE ASIA NFZ, BASES

Public Sentiment

AU050500 Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 9, Sep 86 (signed to press 20 Aug 86) pp 70-77

[Article by Yu. Andreyev: "The Philippines in the International Arena"]

[Excerpts] In recent months reports on the situation in the Philippines have appeared very often on the pages of the world press. The interest in this country is no accident if one considers that it is experiencing perhaps one of the most complicated periods of its development.

Among the broad strata of the Philippines public an understanding is developing of the threat to the very existence of mankind that a nuclear missile war -- were it unleashed -- would bring. The militaristic psychosis generated by American imperialism and its gamble on resolving complicated international issues "from a position of strength" give rise to a fear in the Philippines of being involved in the aggressive military acts of the White House.

There are quite a few reasons for these fears, if one considers that the two largest American military bases in Southeast Asia are located in the archipelago, the period of the agreement on which elapses in 1991. In this regard President C. Aquino has stated that the issue of the future fate of the American military facilities will be submitted to a nationwide referendum.

The possibility of the deployment of nuclear weapons at these bases also produces serious concern among Filipinos. This issue was the subject of discussion at the International Conference for Peace and Security in East Asia and the Pacific Region held in December 1984 in Manila, which was convened on the initiative of the Council of Peace and Solidarity of the Philippines. Speaking at this conference, the Philippine representative noted the country's adherence to the principles of peace and a "vital interest in strengthening it."

As Antonio Paris [name as published], national secretary of the Philippine Council of Peace and Solidarity, stated, the movement is against the "senseless plans of militarists to acquire broad scope in the country." The movement of peace supporters in the archipelago now unites public organizations with various political slants, whose membership includes trade union figures and representatives of young people, the Catholic church, and women's and other organizations. The Philippine peace fighters demand the curbing of the arms race, the immediate end to nuclear weapons tests in

Micronesia, and the elimination of American military bases in the archipelago. The increased strength and influence of the movement is also indicated by the fact that influential Philippine state figures are advocating the nonadmission of nuclear weapons into the country's territory.

The Philippine public was gratified by the USSR's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, assessing it as a very important step in facilitating a decrease in the danger of a nuclear conflict beginning, and welcomed our country's decision on a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Filipinos also expressed approval for the new constructive Soviet disarmament proposals that were set forth in the 15 January 1986 statement and confirmed in the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress.

The recent address by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok produced enormous interest throughout the world. In particular, it pointed out that our country, in accordance with the principled line of the 27th CPSU Congress, will strive to impart dynamism to its bilateral relations with all countries, without exception, located in the Asia-Pacific region. The position of the Soviet Union and its new proposals, which were set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's speech and which are aimed at strengthening peace and security and developing multilateral cooperation in this vast region of the world, are also of great importance to ASEAN member-countries, including the Philippines. The Soviet peace initiatives have certain things in common with positive proposals coming from ASEAN leaders, such as, for instance, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. Also very attractive to Asian and Pacific states is the idea of holding a Pacific conference, where they could discuss the pressing regional and international problems worrying the peoples of this region.

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U.S. Pressure on Manila

OW111311 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1115 GMT 8 Oct 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] The Philippines also play an important role in U.S. imperialist plans in the Asia-Pacific region. There, the largest U.S. Air Force and navy bases are located. Recently, however, the future of these bases seems under a cloud. It is not only because as all the surveys show, an overwhelming majority of the Filipinos are in favor of the bases' liquidation. Now, it could be said, the question has acquired a constitutional aspect. The country's draft Constitution, which has been worked out by a special Constitution Commission, prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Philippines. But everyone knows that nuclear weapons are carried on board U.S. Navy ships and on U.S. planes stationed at U.S. military bases. And so now the question is becoming particularly acute.

It was announced today that on 11 and 12 May of next year, parliamentary and local elections will be held in the Philippines preceded by a general plebiscite on the draft Constitution. Thus, the question of nuclear weapons on the American military bases becomes urgent, and this worries Washington a great deal. In any case, the first warning salvos have already been fired from there on Manila. Comrades, you no doubt remember the Philippine President Corazon Aquino, recently completed a trip to the American capital. She was received there with pomp and generously complemented, and was even promised aid to the tune of \$200 million. However, as soon as the Constitutional Commission proposed legislative measures to turn the Philippines into a nuclear-free zone, Washington began broaching the possibility of certain sanctions against Manila. For example, Dole, the Senate Majority leader, stated that Congress

may not approve aid to the Philippines. The American press considered this statement pressure applied on the Aquino government. The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reasons that for the destabilization of this government there is no need for a government coup; U.S. refusal to give the necessary support will be sufficient.

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CSO: 5200/1029

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

FRG PAPER SAYS U.S. NEEDS TO CONTINUE NUCLEAR TESTING

Bonn DIE WELT in German 29 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Fritz Wirth: "We Know Enough About Secret Preparations"]

[Text] In these drowsy and vacation-weary summer days in Washington one hears, more often than usual, respectful adjectives used to describe Gorbachev: clever, slick, wily and nimble, for example. This appraisal differs considerably from the impression which the American summit negotiators brought back last year from Geneva where the Soviet general secretary clearly showed that he was not yet firmly in control of his office or of the subject matter of that summit meeting.

The change in assessment has something to do with the manner in which Gorbachev has seized the initiative and has more and more often forced the Reagan administration onto the defensive. Soviet diplomacy has lost something of its stiff directness. It has become more flexible, has developed a sense for the weaknesses of the other side and coldbloodedly exploits them. The hand of America expert and former ambassador in Washington Dobrynin, who indeed knows how to go about it, is becoming ever more evident in this.

One of the most effective themes in this is the subject of banning nuclear tests. The Soviets know very well that the United States can only say "no" to their proposed test moratorium at the present time. In the present antinuclear climate this "no" is sweet music to Moscow's propaganda apparatus and therefore the Soviets do not miss an opportunity to provoke this "no" as loudly and as often as possible.

The beautiful thing about this moratorium: They have a clear lead in nuclear testing over the United States and can afford a pause, the ending of which they can always blame on the supposedly uncooperative and nuclear-obsessed Americans. A game of permanent tag.

Atomic tests are an evil, but they exist in a world whose security depends upon the reliability of nuclear deterrence--a necessary evil. And while the Soviet propaganda apparatus is currently attempting to create the impression that the nuclear "peaceniks" are on its side, it is a fairy tale. The Soviet system does not run risks. That was true under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and no one in the Kremlin is about to permit anything to change under Gorbachev. They would not agree to a test moratorium if a disadvantage for them were involved.

The reality of the present so-called nuclear balance of terror is that the Soviets, thanks to their enormous nuclear arms buildup of the past 15 years, have at their disposal enough accurately aimed nuclear warheads to eliminate, in a first strike, similar American nuclear warheads available for a retaliatory strike. This imbalance is one of the reasons for present American test activities. They serve to test the reliability of older nuclear weapons systems and to test newer systems. In a word: They serve security.

That is the overriding motive for the American "no" to Soviet moratorium proposals. The question of verifiability of such a moratorium, on the other hand, has receded farther and farther into the background. The United States meanwhile, has a seismograph which last summer in Norway precisely recorded a Soviet mini-explosion with a fraction of a kiloton force at a distance of over 2800 kilometers.

In brief: The USA needs the tests to close a missile gap and to overcome a nuclear imbalance. It is only too understandable that Gorbachev is interested in preventing this with a moratorium. Besides, there are even more compelling reasons for him: 25-30 percent of the current underground American nuclear tests are for SDI research. A test moratorium would be a welcome way to stop or delay this program. Portraying the United States as the nuclear troublemaker and saber-rattler is an added bonus for Gorbachev.

It would be criminal negligence to ignore in this moratorium issue the lessons which a moratorium victim once summarized with this sentence: "We know enough about collapsed negotiations, secret preparations and the advantages which accrue from long series of tests not to propose another unsupervised moratorium."

This sentence is not from Ronald Reagan, but from John F. Kennedy, uttered in 1962, one year after the Soviets had violated the last nuclear moratorium.

13238/9869
CSO; 5200/2758

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN NEVADA--Washington October 16 TASS--The United States intends to hold today a test of nuclear weapons codenamed "Belmont". This will be the 18th nuclear test in Nevada, officially announced by the United States this year. The power of the explosion will be up to 150 kilotonnes. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2350 GMT 15 Oct 86 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/1029

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA DISCUSSES NEED FOR MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

PM021315 Moscow PRAVDA (First Edition) in Russian 30 Sep 86 p 4

[N. Kovalskiy article: "Mediterranean Knot"]

[Text] The extension of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions is a most important step on the way to forming a comprehensive international security system. This specific, substantial goodwill gesture by our country opens up broad possibilities for creating an atmosphere of trust and cooperation both on a global scale and at the level of individual regions of the world. These include, in particular, the Mediterranean, which acutely needs a new policy-- a policy of realism, peace, and good-neighborliness.

The Soviet proposal to convene a broad conference on the Mediterranean, along the lines of the CSCE, continues to be discussed abroad. The attempts at first made by the West to hush up this Soviet initiative failed. Now some people are hastening to declare the USSR's proposal "unrealistic" or "necessary only to Moscow." All this is reminiscent of the history behind the convening of the Helsinki conference and the "arguments" advanced against it.

It is a well known fact, however, that the conference in Helsinki took place nevertheless. The Helsinki process, which has endured many tests of strength, still continues. The latest evidence of this is the success of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in Europe.

Returning, however, to the Mediterranean problem, it must be noted that over the years since the Helsinki conference the international significance of this region has increased. The political clout of many Mediterranean countries has grown within the world community. The spirit of nonalignment and an anti-imperialist orientation are becoming increasingly characteristic of a number of the littoral states' foreign policy activity.

Great changes are also evident in the economic sphere. Trade and industry have developed considerably in the region. The increased volume of transport operations in the Mediterranean needs a calm, peaceful atmosphere. Commercial and passenger routes from Europe to Africa and back are very busy and traffic through Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the Dardanelles has increased.

In addition to this, however, a very alarming phenomenon has also appeared: an increase in military tension, for which American imperialism is to blame. The waters and coastal territories of a number of countries have become highly saturated with arms, including nuclear arms, and also with military bases. The United States has proclaimed the Mediterranean to be a zone of its interests and has included the entire region in the framework of its neoglobalist strategy.

The damage being done to peace here has been demonstrated by the United States' aggressive course against Libya. The fact that precisely this country has been selected as the target of blackmail to serve as a frightening lesson to all countries that refuse to submit to imperialist diktat is not hard to explain. The United States does not conceal the fact that it is primarily a question of Libya's anti-imperialist stand and its opposition to imperialist policy with regard to the Arab world and to the transformation of the Mediterranean into an arena of confrontation. In short, Libya is an obstacle to implementation of its expansionist plans.

In accordance with the doctrine of "neoglobalism" and reckless belief in the "cult of force," the main pressure is exerted on Libya by military means. Suffice it to say that in the last 5 years the United States has organized military maneuvers off Libyan shores more than 20 times, and 8 times this year alone. This pressure is on the increase. The entire U.S. 6th Fleet has been brought into play--according to the U.S. President, it is the "spear and the shield of American policy." In September a new consignment of F-111 planes was transferred to Britain, from where the U.S. Air Force carried out its April attack on Libya.

At the same time the United States is expanding its network of military bases in the Mediterranean, which are a destabilizing factor in the region and a real source of military danger. According to Western statistics, an impressive strike force is now concentrated at these bases--32,000 American servicemen. As many as 17 bases have nuclear weapons.

The United States is trying to turn its numerous bases and installations into a closed operational system operating autonomously and without controls, counter to the interests of the states on whose territory they are located. Italy, for example, has drawn attention to the fact that the Americans used the NATO base at Sigonella during the memorable incident involving the "Achille Lauro." What is more, as the Italian journal RINASCITA has noted, "The Americans do not even balk at violations of Italy's national sovereignty, which are an integral part of their policy aimed at NATO's military involvement in Mediterranean events, the Near East crisis, and now the Libyan crisis."

Implementing this policy, the United States is trying by every possible means to firmly consolidate its military bases and installations in the Mediterranean countries. Washington does not hide the fact that it has no intention of giving in to the Spanish people's demands that it remove American military bases from the country.

What guides the United States in building up its military presence in the Mediterranean? It is primarily guided by its neoglobalist plans for world supremacy and confrontation with the forces of social progress. In the eyes of the American militarists the Mediterranean is a convenient bridgehead for possible aggression against the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. Cruise missile bases in Sicily, missile-carrying surface ships and submarines, and all other so-called forward-based weapons are intended for carrying out a nuclear missile strike.

The American military presence in the Mediterranean is a means of putting pressure not only on the North African countries but also on national liberation forces throughout the African Continent as a whole. It poses a nuclear missile threat to all the peoples of Africa. The buildup of American military forces in the region also pursues another aim--to resolve the political problems of the Near East exclusively in the interests of American imperialism and its strategic ally, Israel, and to ensure military support for this ally in its aggressive operations against the Arab peoples.

At the same time, the American military presence in the region is an attempt to influence sociopolitical life in the Mediterranean states that are U.S. NATO allies. American leading circles have expressed their displeasure on more than one occasion when left-wing forces have made progress in these countries.

The United States' military presence in the Mediterranean is also a way of implementing its policy aimed at squeezing its West European allies out of the southern part of the region though they have long had not only political, but also economic, trade, and other interests here. It is no secret that in recent decades there has been an increase in the volume of trade agreements between the United States and a number of south Mediterranean states where American capital is waging a concentrated offensive against its competitors from Western Europe.

In this situation peace-loving forces rightly ask: Can something be done to lower the level of military danger in the Mediterranean and to subsequently totally remove this danger? Responsible politicians and statesmen are looking for a constructive answer to this question. It is being discussed in the United Nations. The conference of foreign ministers from Mediterranean nonaligned countries held in September 1984 put forward a series of useful initiatives on the Mediterranean problem. The eighth conference of heads of state and government of countries belonging to the nonaligned movement, held in Harare, spoke out in favor of peace in this region. The peace-loving public formulated a number of important ideas on ways to turn the Mediterranean into a sea of peace in the Delphi declaration adopted at the conference in Athens this February. Corresponding ideas in this direction have been voiced at various levels in a number of Mediterranean countries themselves.

The necessary elements thus already exist for working out a concept acceptable to everyone for turning the Mediterranean into a zone of lasting peace and cooperation. A resolution of this issue would remove the threat of war both in the region itself and stemming from it and would be a step on the way to forming the comprehensive international security system advocated by the 27th CPSU Congress.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly said that it is interested in turning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and cooperation. Guided by the firm principles of its foreign policy, our country is sincerely trying to ensure that hotbeds of tension in the Mediterranean are eliminated by political means. Together with the other Warsaw Pact states, the USSR is in favor of the extension of coordinated confidence-building measures to this region, the rejection of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of Mediterranean non-nuclear countries, and the adopting by nuclear powers of a pledge not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country prohibiting the deployment of such weapons on its own territory. As is well known, the Soviet Union has spoken out resolutely in favor of withdrawing nuclear missile-carrying ships from the Mediterranean.

A solution to these problems would contribute to the struggle to stop the arms race and eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of the century.

In principle, the Soviet Union does not need its naval fleet to be present in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis. If the United States withdrew its own fleet from this region, the Soviet Union would also do this simultaneously, and is ready to immediately begin talks on this issue. At this first stage no restrictions would be introduced on the naval activity and naval arms of Mediterranean littoral states. Further steps, however, to strengthen security in this region could, in the USSR's opinion, be determined in the light of the Soviet proposals contained in the 15 January 1986 statement. A useful role, as has already been said, would also be played by a broad conference on the Mediterranean along the lines of the CSCE. In addition to the Mediterranean states and states bordering this region, the United States and other interested countries could participate in this conference.

Lately there have been increasingly loud proposals voiced in Mediterranean states to examine the problem of the relaxation of tension and reduction of military activity in the region at the forthcoming Vienna meeting of representatives of the states taking part in the CSCE. A whole series of Mediterranean countries are clearly interested in a constructive discussion of this issue at the forum in Vienna.

It is well known that the question of banning chemical weapons has been raised increasingly acutely of late. The idea of creating a chemical weapon-free zone in central Europe is being discussed as a step in this direction. The Soviet Union advocates that this idea also be considered in relation to the Mediterranean region and later the African Continent as a whole.

The USSR has formulated a specific program to eliminate tension in various areas of the Mediterranean. This includes proposals on the principles of a Cyprus settlement and ways to achieve this.

The Mediterranean can and must become a sea of international peace and good-neighborly, mutually advantageous cooperation.

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CSO: 5200/1023

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW: SPD BUNDESTAG DELEGATION ON CDE, CW, SDI

'Frank, Friendly' Gromyko Talks

PM030927 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 3 Oct 86 p 1

[Excerpts] On 1 October Andrey Gromyko, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, received in the Kremlin a delegation of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] led by Volker Hauff, a member of the party board and deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Bundestag faction.

The delegation, which included Bundestag deputies and party economic and ecology experts, arrived on a visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

Andrey Gromyko welcomed the representatives of West Germany's largest party and noted the importance of exchanges of opinion between different social and political forces on a broad range of questions in order to strengthen the foundations of trust and understanding between peoples and states. It is necessary to proceed from the assumption that no global problem today can be resolved by any state singlehanded. This is especially true of the problem of ensuring peace and security.

The results of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which closed in Stockholm, show that only the awareness of all the participating states of their common responsibility can lead to mutually acceptable solutions.

The two sides were unanimous that agreement on an extraordinary meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik constituted an important step which was welcomed by the whole world. The peoples hope this meeting will end with positive results corresponding with the interests of peace.

The delegation members stressed for their part that questions of peace and security were given priority by their party. This was reaffirmed by the Social Democratic Congress in Nuremberg last August.

Both sides noted the closeness of approach between the CPSU and the Social Democratic Party of Germany to many aspects of the problem of averting nuclear war. This is true of the need to end nuclear testing and to avert a nuclear arms race in outer space, a ban on chemical weapons and a number of other questions.

Carrying on intensive exchanges of opinion with the CPSU on questions of disarmament, the Social Democratic delegates stressed the interest of their party in that dialogue being extended to other areas, such as the economy of ecology.

The conversation passed in a frank, friendly atmosphere.

L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union; T.N. Menteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; N.F. Rubtsov, chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretariat; V.G. Vysotin, chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium International Relations Department; and Joerg Kastl, FRG ambassador to the USSR, were present at the conversation.

Voigt on Moratorium, SDI

LD022242 Moscow TASS in English 2219 GMT 2 Oct 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, October 2 TASS--Karsten Voigt, a well-known foreign policy expert and a member of the Federal Board of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, visited our country as a member of the parliamentary group for contacts with the USSR of the West German Bundestag.

"I think that the ending of nuclear tests meets both the interests of socialist countries and the security interests of the West, including West Germany," he said in an interview to the newspaper TRUD.

Touching upon the strategic defence initiative, Voigt stressed that way back in 1979 the Social Democratic Party of Germany had taken the decision condemning the development of laser and other weapons to be stationed in outer space. "Since that time my party's view of this matter has not changed. If the Social Democrats come to power in the elections scheduled for the beginning of next year, the agreement with the USA on the participation of West German companies in work on the SDI programme, signed recently by the current government of the CDU/CSU-Free Democrats, will be cancelled."

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CSO: 5200/1023

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET NEWSPAPER POLL ON PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

PM101201 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (First Edition) in Russian 9 Oct 86 pp 1, 3-4

[Feature by Sergey Bulantsev, Vladislav Ivanov, Aleksandr Mozgovoy, and Valentin Chikin: "Will Mankind Succeed in Preventing Nuclear War? 1,512 Persons Living Along the 30th Meridian Reply to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's Questionnaire" -- capitalized passages within slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpt] In this period of tense world atmosphere, in the last few days of September, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA decided to conduct a mass poll of the population in order to discover ordinary people's attitudes to the solution of the global questions of war and peace. The 30th -- Pulkovo -- meridian was chosen for the purpose of the poll.

Let us have a look, reader, at the map of our country: The 30th meridian, cutting the European Soviet Union from north to south, runs through densely populated regions containing dozens of major cities, settlements, and villages of the RSFSR, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Moldavia. Sociological groups from the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Editorial Office conducted the poll in the cities of Nikel and Kovdor in Murmansk Oblast, in the city of Sortavala and in Vyartsilya Settlement in the Karelian ASSR, in Leningrad, in the cities of Velikiye Luki and Nevel in Pskov Oblast, in the cities of Vitebsk and Zhlobin in the Belorussian SSR, in the cities of Belaya Tserkov, Uman, and Belgorod-dnestrovskiy in the Ukrainian SSR, in the operators' settlement at Chernobyl AES, in the city of Tiraspol in the Moldavian SSR, and on a number of kolkhozes and sovkhoses lying along the 30th meridian.

Life is bubbling today on the land along the 30th meridian, new buildings are rising everywhere, the appearance of towns and the countryside is changing year by year. But these regions also recall other times, when war raged throughout the territory from the Barents to the Black Sea, leaving behind ashes, the smoke of conflagrations, and inconsolable human grief. Obelisks, with long lists of the names of those who gave their lives to defend the motherland's freedom and to whom we owe our peaceful life today, stand in the squares of cities and villages in mournful testimony of those grim years.

Our questionnaire was completed by 1,512 persons.

There was hardly a dozen among those polled who, for one reason or another, were unwilling to complete the questionnaire. Specialists in the study of public opinion know how difficult it is at times to obtain an answer to questions that are asked openly. This time, however, everything was different -- over 90 percent of those polled deemed it necessary to express their opinion in detail, to share their thoughts and deliberations, and to speak frankly of their doubts and alarms. Here is yet another noteworthy fact: The questionnaire gave people an opportunity to remain anonymous, but more than 50 percent of those polled signed the questionnaire and gave their names and addresses, thus emphasizing the desire to state openly and frankly their attitude to the problems of disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war.

And so, 1,512 persons answered the following questionnaire:

1. Will mankind succeed in preventing nuclear war? Yes or No.
2. On what is your belief based?
3. In your view, is nuclear disarmament attainable by the year 2001? Yes or No.
4. Why do you think so?

(Materials from the public opinion poll are published on pages 3 and 4).
[Editorial note: Each of pages 3 and 4 is laid out as follows: Three columns of 3-6 sample answers from 12 cities, including Chernobyl; one 2-inch column being a map of the area along the 30th meridian; and two columns of analysis of the poll's results, which constitute the remainder of this excerpt.]

Statistical Analysis

The public opinion poll covered a total of 49 different establishments: industrial enterprises and production associations, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and forestry units, construction organizations, institutions, schools, technical colleges, VUZ's, and medical institutions. At the same time, people were also polled according to place of residence: In Leningrad, for example, the poll was conducted among residents at No. 1 Serdobolskaya Street, site of V.I. Lenin's last underground apartment before the Great October Socialist Revolution; in Nikel among residents of Gvardeyskiy Prospect and Victory Street; and in Tiraspol among residents of Peace Street. The total number of those polled comprised 1,134 urban residents (75 percent) and 378 rural residents (25 percent). 44.8 percent of those polled were men and 55.2 percent women.

Those who replied to the questions fell within approximately 200 occupations.

Social status (in percentages):

Workers	33.3
Kolkhoz members	5.5
Employees	15.0
Engineers and technicians	19.5
Intelligentsia, not employed	
in production	9.1
Pensioners	10.1
Students	5.5
School pupils and technical	
college students	2.0

Age Groups:

Under 25 years	17.5
26-30 years	14.3
31-40 years	32.0
41-50 years	20.0
51-60 years	11.8
Over 60 years	4.4

A few more figures, making it possible to complete the statistical analysis of the poll. Those polled were 55.5 percent nonparty members, 24.9 percent members and candidate members of the party, and 19.6 percent members of the Komsomol. A typical feature of the statistical analysis: While social status, age group, and even geographical factors seem to influence the nature of some answers by the people polled, party membership has no effect. There is no difference between communists and nonparty members as regards the perception of the problems of war and peace. This is yet more proof of the maturity and awareness of the masses.

A Resolute "Yes!"

/THE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY OF THOSE POLLED -- 93.2 PERCENT -- BELIEVE THAT MANKIND WILL SUCCEED IN PREVENTING WAR/

The language of the laconic affirmative indicates the conviction and persistence of champions of peace, our Soviet optimism, or simply human hope. And yet, one comes across answers like: "I would like to believe 'yes'" (V.I. Udod from Leningrad, 37-year old lathe hand). "People are tired of constant alarm and even of the actual word 'war'" (N.D. Grabelnikov from Tiraspol, 60-year old physician). There are literally only a handful of

of answers like the one left in perplexity by Leningrader Ivanovskiy (48-year old engineer): "I don't know." The social cross-section of the "scale of optimism" appears as follows:

	In percentages	
	YES	NO
Intelligentsia	98.0	2.0
Pensioners	97.4	2.6
Kolkhoz members	94.8	5.2
Workers	94.0	6.0
Employees	93.6	6.4
Students	93.5	6.5
School pupils	93.3	6.7
Housewives	92.5	7.5
Engineers and technicians	85.1	14.9

Positions near the bottom of the scale have been taken by students, who are more often than not exposed to the nihilism of their age; the keepers of hearth and home who are most vulnerable in their hopes; and the keenest adherents of technological omnipotence. On the whole, however, and even in every social stratum, the percentage of optimism is exceptionally high. Not so long ago THE WASHINGTON POST conducted a sociological study jointly with ABC-TV, along similar lines to the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA poll. What was the result? More than one-fourth of the U.S. population -- 26 percent -- believe that a nuclear war will be launched in the next few years. There is a vast gap in the world perception of Soviet people and Americans. This is a direct confirmation of the fact that an atmosphere of fear is being fanned in the United States and that political thinking is being militarized.

What Are the Grounds for Optimism

Replies to the second question contain a multiplicity of hues, and often one and the same person adduces a whole series of arguments. If similar reasons are grouped together, the most frequent one is: /THE PEOPLES IN THE WORLD UNDERSTAND THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS A CATASTROPHE; REASON AND COMMON SENSE MUST TRIUMPH (47 PERCENT)./

This argument shows Soviet people's growing conviction that the truth about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war is penetrating human hearts with increasing persistence, appealing to common sense with increasing passion, and encouraging vigilance and a sense of self-preservation. "People have started facing up to the nuclear danger" -- N.S. Berezhnoy from Chernobyl (31-year old shift leader at the reactor). "A nuclear war cannot be won. This is known to our friends and to our enemies" -- A.N. Breneva from Kovdor (31-year old assembly line operator). Many people, like O.S. Kukhnovets from Vitebsk (30-year old lecturer), emphasize: "The ecological consequences of a nuclear war would be tragic for the entire civilization, for all living things." And the confident keynote: "I believe in the common sense of all mankind"--Skrinskaya from Belaya Tserkov (26-year old physician).

The substantiation of this theme is often conducted in a polemical spirit -- arguing against current opinions which, in actual fact, are also to be found in the same opinion poll. "When cornered, capitalism will choose to commit suicide, thus bringing the whole world to the brink of catastrophe" -- Leningrader Maksimov (47-year old actor). He is seconded by a fellow-Leningrader who wishes to remain anonymous: "If one man was able to burn down the Temple of Artemis, why shouldn't a few people be able to destroy the world?"

No, the 30th meridian insists, "even maniacs must take the opinion of the millions into account" -- G.N. Atamashko from Belaya Tserkov (34-year old teacher). "Even the most inveterate murderer must feel afraid of a tomorrow which could be the last day in the history of civilization" -- I.P. Tretyakova from Sortavala (32-year old traffic control engineer). "I am confident that at the very last moment someone among those manning the consoles will ask himself: 'But why? What happens afterward?' And even if he is the only one, he will still manage to impede the fanatics" -- this from a 20-year old driver from Nikel who did not give his name.

Of course, those polled turned their eyes across the ocean, at the orchestrators of militarist policy, the "star wars" designers, the Pentagon hawks. Having weighed their "for" and "against," they often draw a conclusion similar to that of a 22-year old operator from Leningrad's "Svetlana" Association: "The U.S. Government is not so stupid as to launch a nuclear war. It will gain nothing from it."

The following argument provided another mass reason for an affirmative reply to the first question of the poll: /THE STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT, THE DESIRE OF PEOPLE ON THE PLANET FOR PEACE, THE GROWING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AMONG PEOPLES (45 PERCENT)./

Soviet people know the speed with which the legions of people of goodwill are multiplying, the growing number of new movements and organizations that are appearing, and the strengthening "unity of all people in the world" (15-year old school pupil from Belaya Tserkov). They themselves are frequent participants in supporters' demonstrations and marches, in solidarity meetings and assistance funds. They see the real achievements of the mightiest and most humane movement in our time. "The entire progressive public in the world now voices its protest against the arms race. Even some of the NATO countries disagree with the militarist policy of aggressive circles in America and the White House" -- V.G. Pyamsov from Nikel (25-year old geology technician).

The questionnaires emphasize the direct link between the deepening of the processes of the struggle for peace and the imaginative, all-embracing, and constructive foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. "The active work of the CPSU," P.YE. Veloshenyuk from Uman (38-year old VUZ lecturer) notes, "is accelerating the process of rallying the peace-loving forces on the planet, and they are quickly gathering strength." The consistently implemented political course of the 27th CPSU Congress and the changes in the balance of forces in the world arena create a situation which, in the opinion of N.M. Smaatinskaya (35-year old party official), "forces the U.S. leaders to change their approach to the solution of disarmament questions."

/ONE OUT OF EVERY FIVE PERSONS POLLED (21 PERCENT)/ deemed it necessary to emphasize specifically that his optimistic stance was built /ON THE PEACE-LOVING POLICY IMPLEMENTED BY OUR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT./

"The CPSU and the Soviet Government are doing so much work to reach agreement on the complete termination of nuclear tests and on the liquidation of mass destruction weapons in the future, that, in my view, the result cannot be anything but positive" -- Danilova from Kovdor (43-year old construction engineer). "I have confidence in the CPSU's prestige in the international arena and in the energy of Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee" -- N.A. Gaponenko from Belaya Tserkov (50-year old veterinary physician). "I have confidence in the talent of our politicians" -- A.B. Petrova from Vitebsk (35-year old teacher). Those polled single out the purposefulness, determination, and realism in our leaders' approach to the solution of the urgent problems of war and peace; they bid continuing adherence to Lenin's slogan from 1917: "Vigilance, endurance, energy, and the cause of peace will be victorious!"

Out of the other answers to the second question we must single out references to lessons of history -- /THE LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II AND THE TRAGIC FATE OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI (3 PERCENT),/ and to lessons from the very recent past -- /ACCIDENTS AT NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS (2 PERCENT)./

And Soviet people bid themselves not to forget the lessons of the past. "I do not believe in the likelihood of a nuclear war; people would have to be completely out of their minds to launch it and destroy our planet," veteran M.I. Berezan from Uman (64-year old merchandizing specialist) reflects. "Nevertheless, it is necessary to strengthen the army. A 1941 must not be allowed to recur." He lived through the entire Patriotic War from beginning to end and saw countless victims, but what imperialism is now preparing, M.I. Berezan adds, "is a thousand times more dangerous." We must convincingly demonstrate the will for peace, but the powder must also be kept dry. This warning is intertwined with the thoughts and feelings of young patriots, perfect masters of the modern means of defense. Why is a 30-year old carpenter from Velikiye Luki convinced of the inviolability of our peaceful home? "Because I have served in the army," he replies. And that says it all -- no more and no less.

As you can see, the overwhelming majority of those polled not only believe in a future without wars but have solid arguments to back their opinion.

And what about the minority -- /THE 6.8 PERCENT OF THOSE POLLED WHO THINK THAT THERE WILL BE NO SUCCESS IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR?/ Who are they -- hopeless fatalists or, as people say, "well informed optimists?" What arguments do they use to substantiate their stance?

What Nurtures Doubts?

It should be noted first of all that the "fatalists" include a considerable group of people who found it difficult to substantiate their "No" -- 12.3 percent. Or caused great perplexity with their arguments, which are

difficult to grasp: "Intuition" -- that was the one-word answer by an anonymous from Leningrad (37-year old engineer). Or open admissions: "I have my doubts" -- a foreman from Kovdor (30-year old construction worker).

The number of negative answers to the first question from Karelia and Leningrad was higher than average -- 9.4 percent and 8.2 percent respectively. Is this an accident? It does not seem so. One must not forget the blockade of Leningrad or the long-protracted war in Karelia. It is possible that memories of the turbulent war years played a significant role here. But something else is also interesting: War is considered inevitable more frequently by people under the age of 40, in other words those who know about war from books and movies. For example, 9.85 percent of those polled in the 26-30 age group think that war is inevitable. The older the people polled, the less "pessimistic" they are. This paradox is worthy of consideration by social scientists and sociologists. The following sociological viewpoint is also interesting: 2.3 percent of intelligentsia representatives consider war inevitable, while this indicator stands at 14.9 percent among engineers and technicians. Why? Do people who are more closely involved with modern technology perceive its destructive might more vividly? (Incidentally, 3.3 percent of those polled hold that /WAR IS THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY./) But are engineers not inclined to exaggerate this factor, do they not overlook the fact that people are still at the controls of the most complex equipment?

And so, what arguments of modern life make one out of every fifteen persons polled speak about the inevitability of nuclear war?

The most frequent reference is to /THE VAST STOCKPILES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (16.9 PERCENT)./ "The world is chock-full with nuclear weapons. All it needs is just one accidental spark and the planet will go up like a powder keg." -- Demenko from Leningrad (35-year old repairman lathe hand). "War will start, so to speak, despite our wishes," a 27-year old bookkeeper from Nikel develops the same idea, "through a totally accidental incident." One of her fellow-citizens of Nikel, a 26-year old women laboratory assistant, is more specific regarding this "accidental incident": "Drug addiction flourishes in the Western countries, and there is no guarantee that some drug addict won't push the button...."

The argument about the overbearing force of the super-stockpiles of nuclear weapons is boosted by statements that /THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO BUILD UP ARMAMENTS (11.3 PERCENT),/ and that /SOME CAPITALIST COUNTRIES ARE RESOLUTELY AGAINST DISARMAMENT (13.5 PERCENT)./ There is one more argument to be ranked here: /THERE IS NO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN COUNTRIES, THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS VERY COMPLEX (5.6 PERCENT)./ The opinion held by one Leningrader (38-year old computer center operator): "The whole situation speaks for itself. When one side (the United States) is unwilling to understand the other (the USSR) and wants to occupy a dominant position, war is inevitable." Grafchenko from Nikel (34-year old tool maker) adds: "The Americans respond to our peace statements by pursuing the arms race and testing new mass destruction weapons."

The one who is likely to start a war is directly indicated by many of those who perceive its inevitability. N.P. Yushchenko from Chernobyl (25-year old machine operator inspector): "The problem of preserving peace will exist for as long as capitalism exists on our planet, and all this will end in war." /THERE IS NOTHING MORE POWERFUL THAN THE POWER OF MONEY; THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WILL NEVER AGREE TO THE LOSS OF ITS PROFITS/ -- this is what /10.1 PERCENT/ say. /THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR WHILE THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM EXISTS/ is indicated by /12.4 PERCENT./

But there was /NOT ONE SINGLE/ questionnaire proposing the attainment of future prosperity and the resolution of the historical argument between socialism and capitalism by the force of arms or in the crucible of war. On the contrary, the keynote of all the questionnaires was: We are not raising sons for war, the lush fields are not to be dug up for trenches. One hears most often the voice of selfless advocacy of peace. "Our parents and families experienced the Great Patriotic War. We do not want the deaths of our children and grandchildren. We want to see them joyful and happy. If I were to be asked now to help somehow and make my contribution to the cause of preventing war, I would do everything possible," -- a 45-year old woman from Uman who did not give her name and is a cashier controller.

Disarmament in the Year 2001

/56.4 PERCENT OF PERSONS POLLED ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. 43.6 PERCENT GAVE A NEGATIVE ANSWER./

There is, perhaps, nothing surprising in this. After all, the age in which we are living abounds in events which necessitate a highly exacting approach in evaluating the prospects of disarmament. It is sufficient to refer to the news reports arriving from the United States over the last few days: The United States has carried out the 21st nuclear explosion since the time the unilateral Soviet moratorium was introduced. The Pentagon has carried out the latest antisatellite weapon test, while the first of the 15 series-produced B-1 strategic bombers stationed at Dyess Air Force Base has been brought to a state of combat readiness. Of course, this can hardly be described as good news. It induces the appropriate deliberations. In fact, how does the social "scale of optimism" look here?

	In percentages	
	YES	NO
Pensioners	87.5	12.5
Kolkhoz members	78.0	22.0
Employees	62.6	37.4
Workers	56.2	43.8
Intelligentsia	55.0	45.0
School pupils	50.0	50.0
Engineers and technicians	45.0	55.0
Students	43.0	57.0

In this case, just as in the answer to the first question, the gap between "yes" and "no" is reduced as one includes the voice of young people and of those who represent today's world of technology. It is probably no accident that the golden mean here is represented by the backbone of our society -- the working class.

Let us first analyze the smaller group of questionnaires.

Why Unattainable?

Actually, this question is not quite accurate. Many of the 660 persons who expressed doubts about the likelihood of disarmament still believe that it is attainable. But when?

"Not enough time, too many stockpiled weapons, too much mistrust between countries. This is why, by the year 2001, I would like to see agreement reached even if only on freezing the nuclear arms race" -- N.I. Povolotskaya from Leningrad (38-year old engineer). Some extend the time schedule by decades and even by half a century. Others, expressing doubts about the tight timetable, also voice other fears: "The process cannot be so swift, even though the further improvement of armaments is extremely dangerous" -- N.V. Burov from Leningrad (33-year old artist). /ONE OUT OF EVERY FIVE OR SIX/ made reference to the fact that /THE TIME SET FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DISARMAMENT PROGRAM IS TOO SHORT./

This argument, together with the entire set of reasons pointing out the predatory and perfidious nature of imperialism, the barriers raised between countries which are difficult to overcome, the sharp polarization of social goals and interests, and much else, right up to ideological subversion against our country -- all these are substantive and serious arguments. It is very good that people give them profound thought under ordinary circumstances. It could be, however, that, on the basis of the very same critical realism which imbues this section of public opinion, the "doubters" should consider that the imperialist circles could embark on a sensible way out of the crisis of their policy. After all, this is the aim of our large-scale initiatives and constructive programs.

It seems only yesterday that few people believed in the success of the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe. The obstacles appeared too complex. But in the outcome a document was nevertheless adopted in the Swedish capital -- a document which is a major step toward the easing of tension and improvement of the international political climate, a document so necessary for the solution of the vital problems of our nuclear age. It was only yesterday that the noise raised in the United States around the "Daniloff case" made it appear as if Soviet-U.S. relations had entered a blind alley, and yet today the world is impatiently awaiting M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with R. Reagan in Reykjavik....

It must be admitted that we sociologists and journalists found it particularly interesting to work on a set of questionnaires dominated by a spirit of restraint and responsibility. Here we would probably come across quite a few reflections and a serious desire for transformations [preobrazovatelnyye ustremleniya]. A. A. Babkina from Belgorod-dnestrovskiy (49-year old engineer) answered "no" to the third question: She also feels that the time is too short and the adversaries intractable. "They fan hysteria in order to wear us out. They are very well aware that if we do not spend vast sums on armaments we will very soon overtake the capitalist countries in all directions, and this is what they fear most of all.... The main point for us is to endure economically. We will endure if we do not deviate from today's direction. But how can we ensure that we all march in step?"

Battle for Hearts and Minds

Those polled name /THE CONSISTENT PEACE-LOVING POLICY OF THE CPSU AND THE WHOLE SOVIET PEOPLE/ as the main argument in favor of the attainment of nuclear disarmament by the year 2001. They link the prospects of peace with the strengthening of our economy. And they name as one specific condition the adoption by Western powers of the disarmament program put forth by M.S. Gorbachev last January. This package of arguments is cited by 41 percent of those polled.

"The policy direction followed by the CPSU and the efforts by the parties and governments of the other socialist countries inspire confidence in the attainability of nuclear disarmament" -- L.V. Chistyakova from Leningrad (27-year old technology engineer) stresses.

In parallel with the argument used by this group of questionnaires -- /MANKIND URGENTLY NEEDS PEACE AND IT WILL BE GUIDED BY COMMON SENSE (27 PERCENT)/ -- there is an equally popular reasoning that /THE PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS WILL EMBARK ON THE SOLUTION OF DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS, THAT THE STRONGER THE FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES THE GREATER THE STRIDES TO BE MADE IN THIS DIRECTION (26 PERCENT)./

"Yes," seaman B. Khrebtov (33-year old ship's captain) confirms, "nuclear disarmament by the year 2001 is possible, given goodwill by all countries and peoples. But this requires a struggle by everyone everywhere, a buildup of peaceful pressure on the adversaries of detente."

And what is the machinery of pressure? Proposals. The moratorium example. S.I. Topal from Chernobyl (22-year old operator at the AES chemical shop) is convinced: "Both a bilateral and a multilateral moratorium will be adopted." But Z.S. Bondar from Kovdor (50-year old electrical installation worker) warns: An example is fine, but there must be no unilateral disarmament. "We must be ready to repulse any attack so that no one would dare risk taking a chance. Everyone must disarm together, and all NATO forces must be taken into account."

/ONE OUT OF EVERY EIGHT/ in this group of polled persons is convinced: /UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE PEOPLES THE GOVERNMENTS OF NATO COUNTRIES WILL HAVE TO EMBARK ON DISARMAMENT./ This must be aimed for primarily in the United States. The questionnaires contain quite a few messages to the American people. We will cite just one of them. "I address all Americans;" veteran T.I. Irkina from Sortavala writes, "Read the book 'Top Secret' by your compatriot Ralph Ingersoll. You will then understand everything about World War II; he has written very truthfully about the Russians."

The participants in the poll also bid our own politicians and diplomats: Seek ways of mutual understanding. "It is difficult to reach agreement with the United States. But agreement must be reached." This is the summing up by Zapolyarnaya GES workers Fatkhullina, Firkinina, and Khlebutina who answered the questionnaire jointly.

Let us note in conclusion that the mass poll of the population was conducted by the newspaper with active cooperation from the Public Opinion Study Center at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Sociological Research. Direct assistance in organizing the poll was given by officials from local organs in cities, oblasts, and autonomous and union republics. The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Editorial Office expresses thanks to everyone who took part in conducting this study.

Wherever the poll was held, one sensed people's keen attitude to the newspaper's questionnaire and their desire to take advantage of this opportunity to express their opinion on problems of the prevention of nuclear war and of disarmament. This was also shown by the numerous remarks on questionnaires which frankly expressed opinions regarding the importance of this type of "measurement" of public opinion. Let us cite the words by Nurse Lyubov Ivanovna Skorikova from Tiraspol: "We thank the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Editorial Office for its initiative to learn the opinion of people of good will. Peace really is a universal asset."

Let us say it once more: The mass poll of the population along the 30th -- Pulkovo -- meridian was conducted in the last few days of September, literally 1 day before it became known that agreement had been reached on the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan in Reykjavik. But the actual result of the poll is unambiguous: All Soviet people without exception reject war, they advocate peace and a happy future for mankind.

Only a matter of days and hours remain until the Reykjavik meeting. The peoples expect new positive steps in the solution of the global problems of war and peace.

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
RELATED ISSUES

U.S. PLAN TO BUILD NUCLEAR SILOS IN TURKEY DISCUSSED

Turkish Newspaper Report

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 14 Jul 86 pp 1, 5

[Article by Turan Yavuz: "54 Nuclear Depots"]



Key:

1. U.S. Plan for Turkey
2. Black Sea
3. Aegean Sea
4. Mediterranean Sea
5. Syria
6. Iraq
7. USSR

[Excerpt] Priority to Incirlik. The first of the underground nuclear depots the U.S. Defense Department (the Pentagon) is planning to build is intended to be at the Incirlik Air Base. Later, nuclear storage facilities will be built at the Eskisehir, Erhac, Balikesir, and Murted military bases as well.

[Excerpt] Washington--The subject of nuclear storage facilities, which came to light when the Pentagon introduced information classified "secret" into the record in the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, continues to keep Washington preoccupied.

Officials at the Pentagon continue to refuse to comment on matters concerning U.S. nuclear weapons "as a matter of policy" and are avoiding reference to any details of the information entered in the Appropriations Committee record.

According to reliable sources, the Reagan administration will establish 54 underground nuclear storage facilities at five military air bases in Turkey in the coming years.

While these sources say that the first 30 of these facilities will be built at the Incirlik Air Base, they are not forthcoming about a date. It is understood that 6 storage facilities each will later be built at the Balikesir, Murted, Eskisehir, and Erhac military air bases, in that order.

These sources are silent about the "cost" of a total of 54 storage facilities to be built in Turkey, but it is estimated that it will be around \$11 million.

West Germany heads the list on the Pentagon's nuclear storage facilities construction agenda. The United States is aiming at establishing 58 facilities at the Ramstein Air Base in West Germany and 11 at the Araxos Air Base in Greece, which is second in line.

As is known, the Reagan administration decided to set up nuclear storage facilities at 20 of its bases in eight allied countries. These eight countries are Turkey, West Germany, Britain, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Belgium, and South Korea.

Meanwhile, administration officials in Washington are saying that the storage facilities that are being planned to be built in the NATO countries, excluding South Korea, are "for the time being" not within the framework of a NATO plan, and that NATO "approval" is awaited.

The officials point out that the storage issue is an Air Force project, saying: "The project is not in 'approved' status at present because it does not figure in NATO criteria and standards." However, it is necessary for the U.S. Air Force to apply to NATO authorities and obtain NATO approval for the project. (In this way, the Air Force can recover some of its expenditures on the project.

The officials say that NATO has studied the subject and has agreed to a "modified international competitive contract procedure."

Pentagon officials who briefed Congress on the subject said that funds for the underground nuclear storage facilities, which are designed to extend the existing "quick reaction alert" program, have been allocated in the fiscal 1986 budget which Congress approved and in the 1987 budget it is debating.
Record Revealed

Meanwhile, a large part of the Pentagon testimony was deleted from the record made public by the House Appropriations Committee.

It is observed that the replies to questions asked by members of the Committee in connection with the bases in Greece as well as replies to questions on closing down certain bases in Turkey and Greece in connection with this project and transferring their functions to other places have all been deleted.

Congressional circles say that the deletion of certain portions from the record were made at the Pentagon's request, and that these deleted portions retain their "secret" classification.

Foreign Ministry 'No Comment'

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 14 Jul 86 p 5

[Text] Ankara Bureau--The activities of the U.S. Defense Department regarding construction of underground silos for nuclear weapons in Turkey elicited a "no comment" response from the Foreign Ministry.

A highly placed official of the Foreign Ministry, replying to MILLIYET's questions, said that he could "neither deny nor confirm," and that "what is being done is merely modernization work and nothing else."

Yalim Eralp, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, also said in a statement last week that the activities of the U.S. Defense Department consisted of the modernization of certain bases.

[Boxed portion]

Minutes Subjected To Censorship

It is noteworthy that all of the portions concerning Turkey, in particular, have been made unintelligible by deletions in the minutes of the Pentagon's statements made public by the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. The portions from which deletions were made on the grounds of being "classified" yield merely tiny clues on examination. The most interesting aspect of the minutes lies in the total deletion of the replies given to questions concerning the closure of certain bases in Turkey and the transfer of their functions elsewhere for this project.

The blanks appearing in the minutes are as follows:

Question: What military projects are being contemplated for other ... bases?

Answer:

Question: What kind of expenditure do you expect will be made for the ... bases in Turkey and Greece?

Answer:

Question: What kind of guarantee are you providing that the two projects will be postponed in 1987?

Answer: As I stated earlier, we are not doing the ... of the ... modernizations of the storage and operations. We think that this and the 1986 agreement are in our interests. [end boxed portion]

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- END -